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Abstract 
This dissertation analyzes the rise and fall of Planet Green, Discovery Communications 
Inc.’s short-lived multiplatform, environmentalism-themed media brand. Launched in 
2008, Planet Green billed itself as “the first 24-hour network devoted to the green 
lifestyle.” It promised to “bring green to the mainstream” with a full lineup of 
environmentalist lifestyle and reality television, environmental news and documentaries, 
and two websites with a wide array of eco-games and quizzes, consumer advice, DIY 
projects, an open-ended discussion forum, and short-form videos. But despite a huge and 
successful launch and a significant programming budget, by 2012, Discovery announced 
that Planet Green would be cancelled and replaced with Destination America, a male-
targeted lifestyle network aimed at a “between the coasts crown,” said Discovery 
spokespeople. With shows like BBQ Pitmasters, United States of Food, Fast Food 
Mania, and Epic RV’s, the new channel offered a kind of macho celebration of patriotism 
and consumerist excess that seemed to applaud the very things that Planet Green 
cautioned viewers against. My dissertation argues that Planet Green’s rise and fall must 
be understood at the place where contemporary branding meets neoliberal 
governmentality. It was structured by the simultaneous industrial impulses to “govern 
through television” on the one hand, and to maximize profits in an increasingly 
competitive cable TV market on the other. When it came to branding environmentalism 
in particular, these simultaneous impulses were in deep conflict and generated a great 
deal of anxiety among industry insiders. I show that Planet Green took shape in a manner 
designed to ease these anxieties through branding. In the end, however, even with 
Discovery’s extensive resources and professed commitment to the environment, Planet 
Green was unable to overcome the tensions between profits and planet saving. 
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Introduction: Branding environmentalism for television 
 
Introduction 
The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a proliferation of brands 
that positioned themselves as socially and environmentally responsible. Many companies 
launched “green” lines of products (Clorox’s Green Works, and SCJohnson’s Nature’s 
Source, for example) in addition to their traditional, non-environmentally friendly ones. 
Other companies that trade solely on “green” credentials, such as Seventh Generation and 
Burt’s Bees, became what Advertising Age’s Jack Neff terms “megabrands” (Neff 
2010a). Wal-Mart began publicizing “zero waste” goals and carrying organic foods. And 
magazines like Vanity Fair and Elle published “green” issues. We saw the establishment 
of the Green Effie advertising “effectiveness” awards (Effies Go Green 2007), the “first 
annual” of a number of green marketing conferences (Neorr 2007), and marketers began 
to have designated “green budgets” (Sustainable Life Media Editor 2008). Advertisers 
became interested in consumers in the relatively affluent LOHAS lifestyle cluster 
(“lifestyle of health and sustainability”), willing to pay extra for environmentally friendly 
goods and services. Special consumers dubbed “greenfluencers” became a desirable 
target group, valued for being chatty, networked, and willing to plug green brands and 
products for free in their everyday lives (Zerillo 2008) and green marketing guides waxed 
enthusiastic about the complementarity of environmentalism and good business. 
 Simultaneous with this enthusiasm, however, a struggle raged over the meaning and 
practice of green itself. Consumers and environmentalists raised concerns over corporate 
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greenwashing. Marketers worried that consumers would develop “green fatigue” ” (Neff 
2010b) or that anti-greenwashing activism would cause irreparable damage to their 
brands. Other industry insiders complained that consumers, failing to “live green” 
themselves, were holding corporations to unfair standards, as one AdWeek reporter put it 
“a case of individuals outsourcing environmental responsibility to big business” (Dolliver 
2008). Since Obama entered the White House, the Federal Trade Commission had begun 
taking enforcement action against advertisers who made false or misleading 
environmental claims (Neff 2010c), while industry shot back that voluntary, corporate 
self-regulation was superior to “unfair” government oversight (Peeler 2008). All the 
while, global warming, species extinction, ocean acidification and other forms of 
environmental degradation—and the human activities that produce them—show few 
signs of abating. 
It was in this milieu that Discovery Communications Inc. launched Planet Green, 
its environmentalist US cable network and multiplatform media brand. Announced in 
2007 and going live in 2008, Planet Green debuted with a full lineup of eco-TV shows to 
be aired 24 hours a day 7 days a week on the channel that, until this point, had been 
Discovery Home. (Discovery also launched Planet Green programming blocks in its 
Latin American, China, Asia, and UK markets (Discovery Globe 2008).) Discovery 
commissioned all-original programming for the new channel, which ranged from 
environmental news (Focus Earth 7/12/08-1/3/10) to lifestyle and consumer advice (G 
Word 6/4/08-12/15/08) to celebrity-studded competition reality shows (Battleground 
Earth 8/3/08-10/12/08). A docu-series chronicled the green rebuilding of the tornado-
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devastated Greensburg, Kansas (Greensburg 6/15/08-5/3/10) and comedian Tom Green 
hosted a game show (Go for the Green 11/8/08-2/21/09). There were cooking shows that 
instructed viewers in the preparation of organic and local dishes (Emeril Green 7/14/08-
6/21/10, Supper Club with Tom Bergeron 6/4/08-10/23/08) and home design and 
renovation programs covering topics like energy efficiency, green building products and 
techniques, salvaging materials, and eco-design (Total Wrecklamation 9/30/08-4/21/09, 
Renovation Nation 6/4/08-2/18/10, Greenovate 6/6/08-10/3/08, and World’s Greenest 
Homes 6/6/08-2/20/10). There was a green Hollywood gossip and fashion show 
(Hollywood Green with Maria Menounos 6/4/08-9/25/08) and a “high stakes” drag racing 
program that pitted green vehicles against their eco-unfriendly counterparts (Mean Green 
Machines 6/4/08-7/15/08). 
The Planet Green brand extended beyond the TV network to include partnerships 
with environmental nonprofits, scientific explorations, standards-based K-12 educational 
resources for schools, and two expansive websites, PlanetGreen.com and 
TreeHugger.com. PlanetGreen.com was a brand new site wholly aligned with Planet 
Green’s television component. On it, users could play eco-games, take green quizzes, get 
consumer advice, and find recipes and DIY tips. They could read about Planet Green’s 
shows, learn how to volunteer with Planet Green’s nonprofit partners, read short digests 
of environmental policy, and participate in open-ended discussion forums. 
TreeHugger.com was an existing environmental news, lifestyle, and technology site that 
Discovery had acquired in 2007. Discovery tweaked TreeHugger’s brand image, 
populated it with Planet Green info- and advertainment, and cross-linked the sites 
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extensively to co-brand and position TreeHugger as a “sister site” to Planet Green. Planet 
Green also had iTunes and YouTube channels, branded DVDs (from the shows Alter 
Eco, Greensburg, Emeril Green, Renovation Nation), a Facebook page and a Twitter 
feed. 
But despite a huge launch effort, Discovery’s existing brand recognition, a 
generous programming budget, a few big advertisers, a gaggle of celebrities, and some of 
the industry’s top programmers, Planet Green started flailing not long into its existence. 
Much of the original slate of shows was not renewed. Some shows were renewed for a 
second season but then canceled before their third. New shows were introduced, but they 
became less and less environment-themed as time went on. Eventually Planet Green’s 
lineup came to be dominated by reruns from other Discovery-owned channels—shows 
about aliens, the supernatural, and human sexuality, among other topics. On Memorial 
Day, 2012 Planet Green’s demise became official as it was replaced by Destination 
America, a network “dedicated to the bigness of America in all its forms” (Ito 2012) 
celebrating meat, white masculinity, and capitalist excess (shows included United States 
of Bacon and Epic RVs, for instance). 
 
Project overview 
This dissertation chronicles the rise and fall of Planet Green. It takes the elaborate 
and extensive multiplatform environmental media brand as a case study for 
understanding a particular kind of green branding in contemporary culture. I situate 
Planet Green as an example of what Sarah Banet-Weiser (2012) calls the “branding of 
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politics”—a process by which a social issue, like environmentalism, is transformed into a 
platform for selling products and adding brand value. Branding environmental politics 
was a strategy that Discovery perceived to be commercially useful at a particular moment 
in time. Discovery launched Planet Green at the same time that the company became 
publically traded for the first time in its history. Facing increased pressure to generate 
short-term profits for its shareholders, Planet Green must be understood first and 
foremost as a commercial strategy. Planet Green promised to help Discovery “break 
through the clutter” of proliferating cable channels and online content delivery platforms, 
thanks to the contemporary promises of brands as a means to differentiate a channel and 
draw in a valuable “niche” of viewers by offering them a sense of belonging in a larger 
brand community. With content that fully integrated sponsors’ brands into television 
narratives (for example, when General Motors donates a fleet of hybrid vehicles to help 
Greensburg’s rebuilding effort), Planet Green promised to overcome consumer ad-
skipping technologies, such as DVRs. With its extensive online, video-on-demand, and 
interactive content, Discovery hoped Planet Green would draw young and media savvy 
consumers to sponsors’ brands in an era of consumer “migration” away from the 
television set toward other content delivery platforms. Thanks to its international spin-off 
brands, websites and programming blocks, Planet Green would be part of Discovery’s 
internationalization efforts, as it sought out untapped markets to grow the company 
despite a “saturated” US cable market.  
I also argue, however, that while this explanation is a crucial part of the story, it 
leaves two key issues unexplored. First, it ignores the instability of the Planet Green 
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project: that Planet Green’s success in delivering valuable consumers’ “eyeballs” to 
advertisers in an era of ad-skipping, media “clutter,” viewer “migration,” and US market 
saturation was never guaranteed. Instead, as I will discuss, the branding of 
environmentalism unfolded as a struggle, rather than an easy achievement, that was 
carried out by a range of industrial decision makers attempting to make environmentalism 
“work” for television. This resulted in programming that was often contradictory from an 
environmental standpoint and often “unsuccessful” by normative standards of television 
business (i.e., advertiser dollars, ratings, renewal, etc.). I argue that examining instability 
of the Planet Green brand—its environmental contradictions and its ongoing work to over 
come these contradictions for the ends of brand value—offers unique insight, not only 
into Planet Green’s particular failure, but also into the limitations of branding 
environmentalism in contemporary culture. 
Second, understanding Planet Green’s “strong,” multi-platform niche marketing 
and branded entertainment as simply a product of the “cable crisis” tells us little about the 
implications of green branding in particular. Planet Green must also be situated in the 
context of the deregulation, defunding, and devolution of environmental governance that 
has occurred in the US since the 1970s, along with the concomitant dispersion of such 
governance across the population and the private sector with the rise of “voluntary” 
corporate self-regulation and incentivizing of “green” consumer choices with labeling 
schemes like Energy Star. Planet Green was organized by a governing impulse on the 
part of media decision makers that was intimately related to this broader tendency in 
environmental governance. The promotional discourse surrounding Planet Green avowed 
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a will to “[bring] green to the masses” (Campbell quited in Ahrens 2007a) wherein 
“green” was a form of self-governance involving volunteerism, consumer choice, 
personal responsibility, and enterprising appeals to the private sector to solve a range of 
environmental problems from climate change to ocean acidification to toxic dumping. I 
argue that this governing impulse arises within a particular class formation—one which 
includes the liberal-leaning media professionals and elites who worked on Planet 
Green—and is rooted in a structure of feeling that is evident not only in the discourse 
surrounding Planet Green’s launch, but also, as I will show, in the discourse of Green 
Capitalism more broadly. In the case of Planet Green, this was a governing impulse fully 
entwined with efforts to cultivate consumers who would pay extra for environmentally 
friendly goods and services and self-realize through brands. 
This dissertation argues that Planet Green’s rise, its actualization on television, 
and its eventual fall were all structured by two tendencies. First, they were structured by a 
governing impulse seeking to cultivate green consumer citizens for what I call a “new 
environmentalism” that situated brands as authorities and enabling actors in a privatized 
form of planet saving in a manner that would double as profitable branding in a cluttered 
and competitive media environment. I call this environmentalism “new” to highlight its 
alignment with forms of privatized public service that proliferate in the context of 
neoliberalism. While there is nothing new about the involvement of the private sector, 
including large media firms, in how environmental issues get addressed (Andrews 
1999/2006, Gottlieb 2005, Hoffman 2001), what is new, or, at the very least specific to 
contemporary US neoliberalism, is the degree to which the state’s central purpose is to 
  8 
ensure the “freedom” of the market and, with this, the extent to which government has 
become reliant, not only on a citizenry that is self-governing and a corporate sector that is 
self-regulating, but also on the voluntarism of these same entities to help overcome the 
environmental contradictions of a radically free market. 
Second, Planet Green was structured by profound anxieties about the particular 
potential for consumer unruliness when it came to environmental branding—for example, 
viewers might change the channel, scrutinize sponsors’ industrial practices, dismiss the 
channel as “greenwash” or, conversely, “tree-hugging,” or otherwise refuse to conduct 
themselves in a manner that would generate profits for Planet Green and its sponsors. 
While anxieties about consumer unpredictability perennially haunt television industry, as 
Discovery worked to sell Planet Green viewers to advertisers, it worked to overcome a 
host of anxieties specific to environmentalism. 
I also argue, however, that the discourse surrounding Planet Green was organized 
by a cluster of outsized industrial hopes about what “strong branding” could actually do. 
In Planet Green, “strong branding” promised to achieve the new environmentalism and 
overcome unruly consumers through means that were both, as I elaborate in the next 
paragraphs, governmental and performative. It was governmental in that it was aimed at 
shaping a market and guiding consumer behavior and it was performative in that Planet 
Green’s brand value depended less on what consumers were actually doing than on 
whether performative statements by Planet Green’s spokespeople and its advertising team 
could sell the “fictive entity” (Ang 1991) of Planet Green’s viewership of green 
consumers to advertisers. 
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The discourse surrounding “strong branding” waxes enthusiastic about its unique 
capacity to draw consumers into an intimate relationship with a brand, fold it into their 
everyday lives and enact their, for example, environmentalist commitments with, as 
Adam Arvidsson (2006) writes, “the brand in mind.” But the process of branding is also 
highly anxious and uncertain. Success in branding relies wholly upon something that is 
“external to the brand-owning organization”: what individuals think and do (7). 
Throughout its existence, commercial TV industry has been worried about what 
individuals think and do. Since commercial television depends upon delivering valuable 
“eyeballs” to advertisers, technologies seeking to know about and predict the behavior of 
TV audiences (ratings, lifestyle profiling techniques, demographic and psychographic 
data, and other market research) have enormous appeal. The promise of branding extends 
beyond knowing or predicting audiences and audience behavior. It also works to guide 
and shape the conduct of consumers through strategies that have much in common with 
what Foucauldian scholars call governmentality, a process of “governing at a distance” 
by offering individuals a range of resources and techniques to aid them in governing 
themselves in line with the certain goals. In branding, Liz Moor writes, “various aesthetic 
and cultural themes and signifiers are mobilized to support projects that are essentially 
about governance” (Moor 2007, 11).  
But despite the increasing sophistication of audience research and branding 
strategies, TV’s industrial discourse remains fraught with anxiety about the essential 
impossibility of fully knowing, predicting, or controlling consumers. There is a great deal 
of uncertainty about whether TV brands will “work” in the manner intended. Thus, 
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television spokespeople, brand managers, and advertising teams engage in ongoing 
discursive work to persuade advertisers that their branding strategies will deliver what 
Eileen Meehan (2005) calls “bona fide consumers” to commercials and branded 
entertainment. In other words, the value (or “success”) of a TV brand is realized in a 
continual process that is performative (Lury 2004, Moor 2007). It is performative in the 
sense that statements and media content—about, for example, what a brand will do, what 
kinds of consumers it will attract, what these consumers will in turn do and think with the 
brand, and how commercially successful the brand will be—are performed for 
advertisers, multi-system operators and shareholders. These communicative processes do 
not so much access or reflect a pre-existing “reality,” but rather produce a reality in this 
performative process; the brand’s very realization (the way it accrues or loses value, for 
example) is an outcome of this performativity.  
I understand the Planet Green brand as performative in this sense. The brand was 
realized in an ongoing process that drew upon the strategies of strong branding to assure 
advertisers that, despite the highly risky terrain of environmental marketing, it could 
guide and shape consumers’ activities toward a new environmentalism that would be 
good for brands. Planet Green offered consumers a whole range of resources, tips and 
techniques—instructions for a DIY air conditioner, promotion of a water-saving car wash 
spray and Chevy/GM’s new line of hybrid cars, tips for eco-friendly camping, choosing 
eco-friendly toothpaste, planning a green funeral, doing a green remodel, making 
biodiesel, and making sense of the Climate Bill, for example—to take up in their 
everyday lives in order to craft green selves and lifestyles. It also worked to situate 
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brands as resources and authorities to guide the way this process of self-shaping took 
place (for example, branded experts from Whole Foods offered cooking and shopping 
tips on the cooking show Emeril Green as well as in “expert clips” online). Planet Green 
programming and web content invited individuals into this brand community, and offered 
its media universe as context in which individuals could carry out their all of 
environmentalism—in practices like watching television, going online, donating to 
Greensburg’s rebuilding effort, signing petitions, and participating in a privatized public-
sphere-type user-generated discussion “Forums.” 
 Through these strategies, Planet Green worked to overcome unruly consumers by 
guiding them to enact their environmental commitments, activism, politics, and 
sensibilities within and through the fully branded media universe of Planet Green—and 
do so in ways that would add value to Planet Green and its sponsors’ brands. I also argue, 
however, that Planet Green’s governmental aims were about more than adding brand 
value, for they were concerned with producing and enacting a new environmentalism 
that, through branding, sought to overcome the tensions between profits and planet saving 
in a radically deregulated market.  
In this way, Planet Green must be understood as a component of neoliberal 
environmental governance. In the context of the state’s retreat from environmental 
regulation and the defunding of environmental enforcement agencies, matters of 
governance have been increasingly shifted onto the social. As Liz Moor (2007) argues, 
brands themselves have been “caught up” in debates about what the role of the state 
should be as they insert themselves as “solutions” to various and highly charged new 
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social “problems” that stem from the downsizing of public provisioning. Planet Green 
participated in the dispersion of matters of governance across the population, private 
institutions (including nonprofits), and authoritative discourses that characterizes “green” 
forms of neoliberal governmentality. It worked to enact a fully privatized planet saving 
by enabling volunteerism, personal responsibility, and entrepreneurialism—on the part of 
both corporations and individuals—aimed at managing capitalism’s environmental 
externalities in a pure free market realm.  
But I also argue that green branding ought to be understood a struggle, not an 
achievement. And for Planet Green, easing the tensions between privatization and public 
service, profits and planet saving was far more than even the strongest branding, with 
massive financial resources of Discovery Communications behind it, could achieve. As I 
will demonstrate, Planet Green’s structuring tensions—between profits and planet saving, 
between consumerism and conservation, for example—became increasingly visible in its 
programming and web content over time. This becoming-obvious of Planet Green’s 
tensions was intimately linked to its ongoing efforts to make environmental television 
advertiser friendly and garner sufficient ad dollars to justify Planet Green’s existence as 
part of Discovery’s super-aggressive growth strategy. In the end, Discovery concluded 
that it was not worth running a channel that failed to pull its weight in the context of its 
broader growth ambitions. In this way, Planet Green demonstrates the limitations of 
branded planet saving in neoliberal times. 
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Literature review 
This dissertation draws upon four overlapping literatures: television industry 
studies, work on the particular history of Discovery, critical brand studies, and media 
studies work on neoliberal governmentality. 
 
Television industry and history 
In order to understand Planet Green as a commercial strategy that was managing a 
particular set of industrial conditions, it is crucial to situate it in the longer history of 
cable television. I draw from Sarah Banet-Weiser, Cynthia Chris, and Anthony Freitas’s 
(2007) introduction to their edited collection, Cable Visions: Television Beyond 
Broadcasting, which traces the growth of cable television through the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, with particular attention to the consequences of deregulation in the 
1970s and the consolidation of media ownership and proliferation of cable channels over 
the next three decades. Following Ien Ang’s (1991) Desperately Seeking the Audience, I 
point out that these processes were concurrent with mounting industrial anxiety about 
consumers’ ability to “escape” advertisements, thanks to remote-controlled channel 
switching, pay-per-view content, VCRs and other ad-skipping consumer technologies. 
Ang describes this as an industrial anxiety about consumer “revolt” and a loss of 
audience manageability. She points out that various audience measurement technologies 
and the discourse of ratings ought to be understood as an ongoing effort to “catch”—or 
know and predict—a consumer who is in fact essentially unknowable. This anxiety has 
only increased over time, as Joseph Turow (1997, 2006) explains in Breaking Up 
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America: Advertisers and the New Media World and Niche Envy: Marketing 
Discrimination in the Digital Age. As cable faced heightened competition for viewers and 
ad dollars in the 1990s and 2000s, Turow observes a mounting a sense of “crisis” in 
television industry press, arguing that the rise of “branded media formats” are an effort to 
manage this sense of crisis by divvying up consumers into niches, separating desirable 
consumers from undesirable ones, offering them a sense of belonging in the brand, and 
encouraging sustained engagement through which consumers offer up personal data to be 
used in customized marketing messages. 
 
History of Discovery 
Although Planet Green appears to be a straightforward response to this kind of 
media environment, it is crucial to understand Planet Green as situated response to this 
crisis that emerged from Discovery particular trajectory within this broader history of 
cable and niche marketing. I thus turn to work on Discovery in particular, centrally, 
Cynthia Chris’ (2002) “All Documentary, All the Time?: Discovery Communications 
Inc. and Trends in Cable Television” and Ole J. Mjos’s (2010) detailed book-length 
study, Media Globalization and the Discovery Channel Networks. Discovery had been 
somewhat insulated from the “crisis” in cable until 2007. For one thing, Discovery was a 
privately held company until 2007 and was thus not bound to generate short-term profits 
for shareholders. For another, although poorly performing channels risk being dropped by 
cable carriers, by positioning itself as “educational” and “nature focused” Discovery was 
protected (at least to the extent that it remained useful) from this fate because its public-
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service mantle helped carriers stave off regulatory efforts (Mjos 2010, 21). But in 2007, 
Discovery’s new CEO, David Zaslav, began moves to take the company public, 
completing the process at the same time that Planet Green was launched. Planet Green 
was part of a strategy in which Discovery brought its historical brand strategies of 
educational and nature focused programming to bear on its efforts to manage the crisis in 
cable in its increasingly aggressive pursuit of growth. 
 
Critical brand studies 
I argue throughout this dissertation that Planet Green drew upon strategies of 
contemporary branding, not only to manage this larger industrial context, but also to 
insert itself into contemporary matters of environmental governance. Branding is about 
more than knowing audiences, dividing them into niches, and offering them a sense of 
belonging. It is, as Adam Arvidsson (2006), Celia Lury (2004), Liz Moor (2007) have all 
pointed out, a productive strategy that, as I have already discussed, is both performative 
and governmental. Brands play a significant role in shaping markets, managing economic 
production, and organizing everyday life (Lury 2004, Moor 2007). They work by 
providing an “ambiance” and a range of resources aimed at “empowering” individuals to 
enact the details of their lives in a manner that is productive for brands; branding relies on 
individual’s “spontaneous” use of brands to “co-produce” their value (Arvidsson 2006), 
(Arvidsson 2006). Brand value is produced and confirmed through an ongoing 
performative process (Lury 2004, Moor 2007) and it works to “[transform] and [shift] 
cultural labor into capitalist business practices” and “[transform]… everyday lived 
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culture into brand culture” (Banet-Weiser 2012 following Terranova 2000, 8 and 5). 
Branding is thus not only about maximizing profits—though it is always this as well—
but, by enlisting individuals in market-based forms of empowerment, it is also a form of 
governmentality. 
 
Media Studies and Neoliberal Governmentality 
 I understand Planet Green as a part of the dispersion of governmental functions 
across the population that characterizes neoliberalism. Although Planet Green contained 
(sometimes quite paradoxical) traces of older rationalities of government, such as those 
associated with the liberal-democratic state with its emphasis on education for informed 
rational citizenship and its tools for engaged civil discourse (see McCarthy 2010 and 
Ouellette 2002 for examples of this), as a fully commercial enterprise aimed at upscale 
consumers it is best understood as in line with work on television’s role in neoliberal 
governmentality. Thus I follow Laurie Ouellette and James Hay (2008), who argue that 
reality and lifestyle television must be viewed as a “cultural component” to neoliberal 
governance. Such shows urge individuals to actively participate in their own government 
by taking lifestyle as an object of assessment and intervention, extolling privatization, 
volunteerism, entrepreneurialism, and personal responsibility, and by offering individuals 
a whole range of resources for working on their everyday conduct in line with these 
values. Often, television is positioned as a mode of social service delivery, providing 
tools for needy individuals to take care of themselves so as not to be a burden to the state 
(Ouellette and Hay 2008, Ouellette 2012, Ouellette 2004). But Planet Green was 
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different, for it addressed an audience presumably thriving under contemporary 
conditions. Rather, in what I call “a green governmentality for upscale consumers,” 
Planet Green worked to enlist individuals’ everyday practices and labor in alleviating 
industrial anxieties and resolving the contradictions that emerge in the process of 
reconciling contemporary branding with saving the planet. 
My dissertation brings these literatures together to argue that, in Planet Green, 
strategies to mitigate industrial anxieties and maximize profits were inextricable from 
“green” governing ambitions to shape markets and consumer conduct. Discovery took its 
chances on the kind of “strong branding” that its powerful economic position enabled.1 
Strong branding, in the case of Planet Green, was an ongoing struggle that, while always 
fundamentally commercial, was also always governmental; through technical and 
performative means, it sought to overcome the tensions between profits and planet saving 
fully within the realm of the market. 
 
Primary research 
I began following Planet Green shortly I started a graduate program at the 
University of Minnesota the same year the channel went live. I bought a cable 
subscription and I wrote several term papers on the channel during my graduate 
coursework. For the papers, I had recorded shows onto an ancient VCR, transferring them 
from cassettes to DVDs on university equipment in the basement of the building in which 
my department was housed. Eventually I upgraded to a cable subscription that included a 
                                                
1 Discovery controls enormous sums of money, channels in multiple national broadcast and satellite markets, and a vast proprietary 
archive of high-quality content, further, the Discovery brand could be leveraged as not simply an asset, but also as a mark of 
legitimation 
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DVR, which streamlined the process of archiving the channel’s shows and meant I could 
catalog far more hours of television. 
But as I was gearing up to really dig into the material for my dissertation, Planet 
Green was canceled; it went off the air just months before I took my preliminary exams. 
Thankfully, I had watched—and taken detailed notes on—a great deal of the channel’s 
programming; and I had already archived a small handful of shows and web pages. But 
the Planet Green brand was sprawling. There was still a lot of content that I didn’t have.  
As I searched for recordings of Planet Green shows, I discovered that Discovery 
controls its content unusually tightly—I later learned that this was part of its business 
strategy, to own all of its content so that it can monetize it in multiple ways. Although the 
receptionist at Discovery’s headquarters tried hard to help me access content unavailable 
elsewhere (for example, full episodes of Focus Earth and G Word), she was unable to do 
so. I used the research money my department had granted me for the dissertation to 
purchase as many shows as existed on DVD and on Amazon’s streaming video service—
which was quite a few. Planet Green had YouTube and iTunes channels (which remained 
online as of the time of writing), where I could access short clips from Planet Green’s 
staple shows. Additionally, there was content available posted by independent users on 
YouTube—sometimes even full-length episodes. I watched all of the shows I could get 
hold of, sketching out the broad arc of Planet Green’s brand strategy and its consumer-
citizen pedagogy. 
I also began archiving the Planet Green website, making pdfs of web pages and 
comment threads, taking screen shots of images and interactive content. I took detailed 
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notes on the layout, design and content. I took eco-quizzes and played green online 
games, documenting the process. Although in an online message to Planet Green fans 
Discovery had committed to continuing to support the website after the channel was 
gone, I feared that the content might disappear at any moment. And indeed within the 
year, Discovery had begun to whittle it away. On October 2012, for example, I wrote in 
my notes, “navigating the labyrinth of the website; inevitably get shut down at a ‘page 
not found’; for example, slide show of the futuristic ‘green cars’ advertised on the home 
page, as well as any link to a Planet Green Forum. The link to the Planet Green 
newsletter archive [also] brings me to an error message.” I also noted, however, that the 
“featured quiz: is your sex sustainable?” was still operative and I could watch any of 37 
video clips under “Health & Beauty.” But on February 16, 2013, I wrote, “Today I tried 
to go to the Planet Green website and was redirected to the homepage of MNN.com, or 
Mother Nature Network” where there wasn’t a trace of Planet Green content. “Some of 
Planet Green’s website seems to exist at pg.treehugger.com,” I noted. Eventually, I 
observed that Planet Green’s “advertiser-friendly” content (for example drag racing 
segments from Mean Green Machines) was divvied up among Discovery’s other web-
holdings—TLC.com, HowStuffWorks.com, Discovery.com, etc. Much of its critical 
content, however, like news articles, calls to action, and links to petitions disappeared 
entirely. 
In addition to the web and television content, I also analyzed the industrial 
discourse surrounding Planet Green. I searched popular and industry press databases for 
all mentions of the channel. I read Discovery’s press releases, its annual reports, and its 
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corporate newsletters. I sought out interviews with the stars of shows, with 
representatives from Planet Green’s nonprofit partners, and with Planet Green higher-ups. 
Getting interviews was a challenge. Few of Planet Green’s nonprofit partners wished to 
speak with me and I exchanged emails with Eileen O’Neill’s assistant over three years, 
but was never granted an interview. However, several former top Planet Green people 
who are no longer at Discovery were enormously generous with their time, even 
explaining the ins and outs of cable business to me—Annie Howell and Laura 
Michalchyshyn. Steve Thomas and Jodi Murphy, hosts of Renovation Nation and Total 
Wrecklamation, respectively, were also helpful in taking me behind the scenes of Planet 
Green programming and the business decisions surrounding it. Although I did not 
explicitly draw from all of my primary materials in the final text of the dissertation, it has 
all informed my research. 
 
Chapter summary 
 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation focuses on the lead-up to Planet Green’s 2008 
launch. In it I analyze Discovery’s statements to the popular and trade presses, its press 
releases, its quarterly newsletters, its annual reports, its corporate websites, as well as 
personal interviews I conducted with a number of Planet Green insiders. I also analyze 
the broader green marketing conversation as it appeared in the trade press, alongside a 
number of green growth and natural capitalism manifestos, particularly those of Paul 
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Hawken (1999, 2007) and Al Gore (1992/2006), to map the larger discursive formation 
and structure of feleing that Planet Green both emerged from and responded to. 
I situate Planet Green as an industrial strategy that aimed to help Discovery 
maximize profits and manage the “crisis” in cable—a crisis, as I noted above, 
characterized by industrial fears of viewer migration, ad-skipping, US market saturation, 
and media “clutter.” I thus contextualize Discovery’s decision to launch Planet Green in 
the history of cable’s crisis, Discovery’s somewhat unique trajectory within this crisis, 
and the way in which ratings discourse and branding promise to help cable companies get 
a measure of control in the anxious and uncertain world of media business.  
In Discovery’s discourse—as well as the green marketing trade press discourse 
surrounding it—environmentalism as a theme lent itself to strong branding: it promised to 
attract relatively affluent and educated lifestyle clusters as well as “media-savvy 
millennials” (O’Neill quoted in Kaufman 2007). In this way, Discovery pinned its hopes 
on the emergence of “green” as a legitimating discourse in the contemporary television 
landscape (Levine and Newman 2012); the company hoped that “green” would 
reinvigorate the medium in an era in which, as Elana Levine and Michael Newman point 
out, industry conceives of people who still watch their television sets in real time and sit 
through commercials in derogatory and often feminized ways. 
Planet Green not only resonated with a trade press discourse that enthused about 
the profitable possibilities of green marketing, it also resonated with a second highly 
optimistic conversation that was concerned less with whether environmentalism made 
good marketing sense (something often dismissed as “greenwash”), and more with the 
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notion that making money and saving the planet could be brought into harmonious 
alignment through green growth and “natural” capitalism (Gore 1992/2006, Hawken, 
Lovins and Lovins 1999, Hawken 2007). In a number of ways, this discourse provided 
the structure of feeling (Williams 1977) in which Planet Green came to make sense, not 
simply as “good business,” but also as “doing good” at a particular moment in time. But 
if Planet Green aimed to enlist environmentalism as a branding strategy to maximize 
profits in an era of crisis, it would also have to contend with the fact that a great many 
advertisers were far from convinced that attaching their brands to environmental themes 
was a good idea. 
My argument in this chapter is two-fold. On the one hand, it is crucial to view 
Planet Green as commercial to the core, but on the other hand, it was never guaranteed to 
be commercially successful. Thus it must also be viewed as an effort to overcome both 
the essential unpredictability of consumers and the industrial anxieties and environmental 
contradictions when it came to green branding in particular. Drawing from scholarship on 
the television’s “will to govern” (McCarthy 2010, Ouellette 2002) I analyze Discovery’s 
struggle to overcome industrial anxieties through branding. Following Anna McCarthy, I 
argue that this struggle was characterized by “fantasies” and “governmentalizing dreams” 
of media decision makers. Specifically, in her analysis of postwar sponsored 
programming, McCarthy analyzes how television came to occupy a “privileged place” in 
governing ambitions of political and social elites as an ideal medium for governing, not 
“from above” or through state dominance or repression, but rather through “a process of 
cultivation that presumes individual liberty and seeks to preserve it through the ever 
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evolving medium of citizenship” (1). This occurred not so much because television 
actually worked to shape the minds of the citizenry or cultivate values aligned with elite 
interests ranging from class hierarchies to the tenets of the liberal capitalist democracy. 
Rather, television created a space “for the sponsor-citizen, a hybrid institutional entity 
embodying the period’s technocratic fantasy of benign, voluntarist self-rule” (7) in a 
process that, despite the vast discrepancy between its governing aims and achievements, 
was amazingly effective in its “capacity to galvanize elites” (8). 
It is in this sense that I use the term “fantasies”: to describe the outsized optimism 
and impossibly ambitious governing goals evidenced in the discourse surrounding Planet 
Green. These are not fantasies in the sense of private hopes and dreams, though they do 
have an affective dimension for they are rooted in a structure of feeling where worries 
about climate change, media decision makers’ class position, and the contemporary 
promises of branding come together. Planet Green’s governing ambitions were rooted 
less in the feasibility of the project than in an optimism that is inextricable from a 
performative project working to overcome the deep contradictions between profits and 
planet saving that would soon come to threaten Planet Green’s existence. In other words, 
I use the language of “fantasy” not to imply that I have gained privileged access to the 
interiority of Discovery executives, but rather to stress that when Discovery spokespeople 
professed intense optimism and certainty about the compatibility of environmentalism 
and profitable television, their statements were based less on certainty about the “reality” 
of a what they called “awakening” green consumers and “armchair environmentalists,” 
than they were part of a performative discourse working to make it so.  
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Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 examines how the governmental fantasies mapped out in Chapter 1 
materialized in the multiplatform Planet Green brand in its initial slate of commissioned 
programming and branded web content. I point out that the “quality” popular press 
dismissed Planet Green, both for its commercialism (on grounds both “high” and “low” 
since it “upscaled” green living and relied on “crass” product placement) and for its 
environmental contradictions. However, focusing solely on Planet Green’s consumer 
orientation and its environmental “hypocrisy” tells us very little about its significance. I 
argue that Planet Green must be taken seriously at the place where branding meets 
neoliberal governmentality in a new environmentalism.  
In this chapter, I focus primarily on the governing aims and objectives that can be 
seen across Planet Green’s media content from 2008 to 2010. (In Chapters 3 and 4 I 
return to questions of uncertainty and struggle as I delve more deeply into Planet Green’s 
structuring anxieties, ambivalences, and contradictions.) Planet Green materialized as an 
elaborate project to enroll advertisers, celebrities, and, most crucially, consumer labor in 
enacting a branded environmentalism. Through media content that featured brands 
“doing well by doing good,” or dispensing environmental advice, or engaging in 
environmental philanthropy within the Planet Green branded media universe, Planet 
Green worked to transform co-branding into a process that would not only symbiotically 
maximize brand value, but would also co-confer and co-confirm eco-legitimacy. In this 
way, Planet Green’s media content worked to situate branded actors as authorities and 
enablers of the new environmentalism.  
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But since brand value, as I have already explained, relies upon “subsum[ing] and 
appropriat[ing] what consumers do with the brand in mind as a source of surplus value 
and profits” (Arvidsson 2006, 7), Planet Green must also be understood in terms of the 
way in which it worked to enlist consumers in co-producing its branded 
environmentalism through governmental means. I argue that Planet Green worked to 
enact a “green governmentality” for upscale consumers. This was a corporate biopolitics 
realized through consumers’ uptake of a whole range of “technologies of the self,” to 
help them self-shape as green consumer citizens. These green consumer citizens 
promised to be valuable to brands beyond maximizing profits, for their everyday work on 
the self and home also promised to help to resolve the tensions between profits and 
planet-saving—a project crucial to Planet Green’s very existence in a deregulated media 
environment. It is in this way that Planet Green must be viewed as a cultural component 
to neoliberal fantasies of planet saving wholly within the realm of the market.  
I argue that Planet Green worked to guide and shape individuals’ environmentalist 
impulses, remake them as a source of brand value and profits in three overlapping, 
though often contradictory, templates for green consumer citizenship. The first aimed to 
cultivate upscale consumers who would desire green consumer products and services—
from biodynamic wines to luxury hybrid vehicles—to realize a green good life. The 
second aimed to democratize green living through offering tips for relatively inexpensive 
lifestyle changes (advice for choosing eco-friendly toothpaste, for example) and enlisting 
ordinary consumers in a self-shaping regime that made green living “easy” and “fun.” 
The third aimed to cultivate informed and engaged citizenship through environmental 
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news programs and online articles as well as online “discussion forums” where they 
could put this citizenship into practice. Through these templates, Planet Green worked to 
subtly guide and shape individuals’ environmentalist sensibilities and everyday activities 
toward, on the one hand, the aims of brand value, and on the other hand, though in 
inextricable ways, it also aimed to operate as a cultural component to neoliberal 
governance (Ouellette and Hay 2008) by calling on consumers to help manage the 
environmental externalities of a radically deregulated market. 
 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 insists that branding be understood not as an achievement, but as a 
process fraught with uncertainties. In Planet Green, branding environmentalism for 
television involved an ongoing struggle to overcome a range of anxieties about both 
consumers and environmentalism. Some of these were industrial fears, overtly articulated 
in the trade press, about unruly consumers who, when addressed with green messages, 
might get bored, overwhelmed, skeptical, or offended, thus changing the channel and 
refusing to co-produce Planet Green’s and its sponsors brands. Others were fears that 
were part of a broader, though certainly related, problematization of environmentalism 
that was addressed through a continual effort to simultaneously incorporate and repudiate 
the “tree-hugging” or “granola” figure. This problematization was undergirded by fears 
of partisan politics, of the feminized and labor-intensive connotations of green lifestyle, 
of the unhipness and earnestness associated with tree huggers, and of the “doom and 
gloom” associated with hardcore environmentalists. While Discovery presented Planet 
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Green’s programming strategy as the result of the company’s steadfast commitment to 
entertainment and credibility, my analysis reveals tensions between environmentalism 
and advertiser-friendly television. 
On the most obvious level, Planet Green worked to ease these tensions by 
following mandates of “strong branding” to the letter and quite explicitly responding to 
worries expressed in the press in its programming and web content. But I argue that this 
explanation, while accurate and important, misses a more crucial point: that Planet 
Green’s strategy for managing these tensions involved an elaborate effort to “post” 
environmentalism. I draw from Angela McRobbie’s (2004) definition of postfeminism 
which, she argues, is not simply “backlash” against feminism, but rather an “ambivalent 
and fearful response” to feminism. Postfeminism is “an active process” that is an 
“undoing” of feminism. It works to undermine feminist gains of the 70s and 80s through 
an ongoing process that incorporates feminist values through the tropes of “freedom” and 
“choice” while feminism as a political movement aimed at gender justice and equality is 
“cast into the shadows,” positioned as dated and no longer necessary (McRobbie 2004). 
Postfeminism invites women to achieve according to normative measures success and 
social and cultural inclusion “on the condition that feminism ‘fades away’” (McRobbie 
2004 referenced in Banet-Weiser 2012). 
Planet Green worked to position itself as a branded social movement by posting 
environmentalism in ways that have much in common with postfeminism in McRobbie’s 
sense. Planet Green’s branded environmentalism would be a “new and improved” 
response to a purportedly impotent, unhip, and “old” (and, implicitly, unprofitable) 
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environmentalism. Planet Green posted environmentalism by strategically drawing on the 
specific tropes of postfeminism—sexist imagery and storylines positioned as “ironic,” for 
example—as well as postfeminism’s more general strategies, such as the simultaneous 
incorporation and repudiation of “old” forms of, in this case, environmental politics and 
situating personal empowerment within brand culture as the key to self-realization and 
planet saving within this post-environmental movement. 
 Posting was a crucial strategy in Planet Green’s branding of environmental 
politics, in its effort to transform environmentalism from its multiple and contradictory 
manifestations as social and politics movements into a brand culture (Banet-Weiser 
2012). For Planet Green, posting was a rehabilitative project that aimed to “solve” 
environmentalism for television. Posting worked to “move beyond” the “problems” 
environmentalism posed to branding including partisan politics, earnestness, anti-
consumerism, and greenwash. Planet Green did so by situating entrepreneurialism, 
personal empowerment, and implicitly, I will suggest, ambivalence as key technologies 
of the post-environmentalist self. 
 
Chapter 4 
Planet Green underwent significant changes over its four years of existence, 
culminating in its 2012 rebranding as Destination America. In the first three chapters of 
this dissertation, however, I focus exclusively on the initial slate of Planet Green’s 
programming—the commissioned shows aired during 2008 and 2009 (with the addition 
of Living with Ed, which was acquired almost immediately and was consistent with 
  29 
Planet Green’s original sensibility). In Chapter 4, I analyze Planet Green’s brand shifts 
and eventual demise.  
I begin by tracing the programming changes themselves. I show that there was a 
distinct shift away from explicitly environmental and pedagogical shows toward shows 
that very often did not have environmental themes and avoided overt advice. These 
shows were loosely united by a theme that Planet Green called “visionaries”—it featured 
people involved, for example, in techno-scientific innovation with military applications 
(Dean of Invention) or high cultural cache (as the molecular gastronomists on Future 
Food) or individuals entrepreneurializing small-town hobby farming (The Fabulous 
Beekman Boys) or, close to the end, a professional competitive eater (Suzilla: The Mouth 
that Roars).  
Yet, as Planet Green’s regular television fare consistently de-emphasized 
environmentalism, the brand was also acquiring and airing independent environmental 
documentaries that were often quite critical of capitalist business as usual and 
consumerism. The acquisition of these documentaries is aligned with Discovery’s long-
standing commercial strategy to differentiate its brand through the documentary genre 
and build a huge archive of proprietary content to monetize in various ways. For Planet 
Green, since no new “green” programming would be commissioned, the documentaries 
also likely represented an easy way to maintain a semblance of brand coherence while 
investing in content that had high cultural cache at a time when documentary was 
“absolutely a buyer’s market” (van Messel quoted in Variety 2011) and could potentially 
be aired on any of Discovery’s channels in the event of Planet Green’s cancellation. But I 
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also suggest that acquiring and airing these documentaries at this stage in Planet Green’s 
existence had traces of an environmentalist impulse that cannot be written off entirely—
indeed, the documentaries were in many ways more critical than any of the original “dark 
green” programming with which Planet Green launched. Although Planet Green’s brand 
coherence seemed to be disintegrating, I show that there remained a distinct—if 
unconscious—pedagogy that resulted from the divergence of Planet Green’s effort to air 
programming that was fully advertiser friendly on the one hand, and overtly 
environmentalist on the other. 
In the second part of the chapter, I zero in on Planet Green’s cancellation, which 
Discovery spokespeople explained by arguing that green was a trend in which consumers 
were no longer interested, that ratings showed that people were not watching the channel, 
and that programming about the environment was “just not entertaining.” Rather than 
taking these explanations for granted, I situate trends, ratings, and entertainment as 
crucial discourses in the performativity of television brands. And in the case of Planet 
Green, these discourses do not tell the whole story, for the backdrop to Planet Green’s 
unraveling was Discovery’s astronomical success on Wall Street and advertisers’ ongoing 
reluctance to attach their brands to an explicitly environmentalist channel—Planet Green 
was unable to garner sponsorship dollars sufficient to justify its existence to Discovery 
higher-ups. Discovery’s cancellation of Planet Green in this context speaks volumes of 
the limitations of profit-oriented planet saving in neoliberal times. 
  31 
Chapter 1: Green governmentalizing dreams 
 
Introduction 
 On April 5, 2007, Discovery Communications Inc.—parent company of such cable 
networks as the Learning Channel (TLC), Science Channel, Animal Planet, Military 
Channel, History Channel, and Discovery Channel—sent out a press release announcing 
plans to launch Planet Green, a multi-platform media brand entirely devoted to 
environmentalism. Planet Green, the release enthused, would be “a global, cross-platform 
initiative” with a cable TV network and websites in the US, a programming block and 
websites (in both Spanish and Portuguese) in Discovery’s Latin American markets, a 50-
hour block on Discovery Networks Asia, another on Discovery’s channels in China, and 
a special slot for Planet Green content on the UK’s Discovery Real Time’s Big Green 
Build Night, which would also launch in 2008 (Discovery Globe 2008). 
In the US, Planet Green would take the place of the poorly performing Discovery 
Home channel and begin with a $50 million dollar programming budget, which promised 
to deliver all-new content 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Online, PlanetGreen.com and 
its sister site TreeHugger.com would offer video-on-demand (VOD) and mobile device 
content as well as “interactive tools and comprehensive ‘how-to’ resources” for green 
living with news, games and quizzes, discussion forums, consumer advice, and original, 
short-form eco-themed videos (Discovery to Dedicate 24-Hour TV Network 2007).  
The Planet Green initiative would extend beyond Discovery’s proprietary media 
platforms to include “scientific explorations” to environmentally endangered sites around 
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the world, a “PlanetGreen Innovation Conference” to showcase new technologies “and 
bring together top business leaders, leading scientific experts, and top conservationists” 
(Discovery Communications Inc. 2007). Discovery promised to assemble a “World 
Renowned Advisory Board” of “the world's most preeminent scientists, researchers, 
innovators and environmental leaders” to advise the company’s environmental initiatives. 
The Planet Green brand would partner with a broad range of not-for-profit environmental 
organizations engaged in on-the-ground delivery of environmental services and 
protections around the world.2 The initiative would also involve an educational 
partnership between Discovery Education, Siemens Foundation, and the National 
Teachers Association; Discovery’s own “Discovery Education Green” would offer 
standards-based K-12 educational content to “empower students to make more 
environmentally conscious decisions” (Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 2008). 
Finally, under the Planet Green initiative Discovery would “green” its Global 
Headquarters in Silver Spring, MD, with ambitions to achieve the U.S. Green Building 
Council’s third highest “silver” rating for Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design (LEED). By “Living and Working Green” the company hoped to demonstrate “its 
commitment to responsible operations” (Discovery to Dedicate 24-Hour TV Network 
2007).3  
In short, Planet Green would be a broadly articulated and highly elaborated 
attempt to build a multi-media, multi-platform, environmental brand—the first and only 
                                                
2 These organizations included Ashoka, the Environmental Media Association, Global Green USA, Global Inheritance, The Green 
Belt Movement, National Resources Defense Fund, National Wildlife Federation, Oceana, The Ocean Conservancy, The Nature 
Conservancy (Discovery Communications, LLC. 2009). 
3 In January 2008, the building’s green improvements—including low-flow toilets, collecting rainwater for lawn irrigation, removal of 
non-essential light bulbs (such as those in vending machines)—had achieved a LEED Platinum rating, according to the 2007 rating 
system, the highest classification possible (Lazo 2008). 
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of its kind. It would operate as a context for advertisers, employees, TV personalities, 
web users, TV viewers, “experts,” not-for-profit organizations, as well as K-12 students 
and teachers, to carry out environmental action, all within the Planet Green branded 
universe. 
This chapter investigates why it made sense to Discovery to launch an 
environmental media brand at a particular historical juncture. In doing so, I make three 
arguments. First, I argue that Planet Green emerged as an industrial solution to a “crisis” 
in contemporary US cable business, marked by anxieties about competition for ad dollars 
given the enormous number of content delivery platforms, fears that viewers were “ad 
skipping” and “migrating” to online content, and worries about how to continue to grow 
despite a saturated US cable market. In this milieu, Discovery became a publicly traded 
company for the first time in its history.4 Newly vulnerable to the vagaries and growth-
imperatives of the so-called free market—but also newly positioned to profit from 
them—Planet Green promised to help Discovery manage cable TV’s contemporary crisis 
in ways that not only reflected the larger industrial wisdom on “strong branding” but also 
grew out of Discovery’s particular history of differentiating its brand from “mass appeal” 
broadcast television through high-production value “educational” and “nature-focused” 
programming and involvement in civic activities with educational and environmental 
themes (such as its Discovery Education K-12 media brand). Discovery has long 
mobilized nature-focused education as what Elana Levine and Michael Newman (2012) 
call a “legitimating” discourse, using normative and classed tropes of cultural legitimacy 
in profitable branding activities.  
                                                
4 For a discussion of the larger cultural context of financialization, see Karen Ho (2009) and Randy Martin (2002), 
  34 
Second, I argue that, Discovery’s discourse surrounding the launch of Planet 
Green was marked by what Ien Ang calls a “rhetorical tone of certainty”—certainty about 
the commercial viability of green TV. Discovery worked to make a case that the cable 
market was “ready” for green TV by announcing the existence of a huge consumer group 
of “armchair environmentalists” ready to be “activated” and “awakened” into the green 
space of eco-friendly consumer capitalism. However, I also argue that these statements 
were “performative” in the sense that they did less to describe an extant “reality” than 
they worked persuade advertisers of the existence of this group and the viability of the 
channel. In this way Planet Green’s launch cannot be understood without attention to the 
deeply anxious and ambivalent space of green marketing as it comes together with the 
equally anxious discourse of audience research. Planet Green involved an elaborate effort 
to manage a range of anxieties and uncertainties specific to the meeting of green 
marketing and media branding, particularly those that cluster around industrial fears of 
unruly consumers. Thus I interrogate Discovery’s claim that it launched Planet Green 
because the market was “ready” for green TV (i.e., that there was existing demand). 
Although it is crucial to situate Planet Green in the context of the broader surge of green 
marketing claims, corporate social responsibility campaigns, and consumer lifestyle 
choices, this context is not sufficient to explain Planet Green’s emergence as a response 
to consumer “demand” in any straightforward sense. Rather, I argue that Planet Green 
was not describing the “reality” of existing demand, but rather working to actively 
construct markets and audiences in the course of managing anxieties about their 
unpredictability (Lury 2004, Moor 2007). 
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Finally, I argue that, while the launch of Planet Green was a commercial strategy 
to the core, the fact that Discovery launched the brand in the face of such uncertainty, 
anxiety, and ambivalence within the broader discourse on green marketing suggest that 
something more was at play. Specifically, I argue that in Planet Green, a particular 
“structure of feeling,” in Raymond William’s (1977) sense, came together with a long 
history of what I call “fantasies” of governing through television on the part of media and 
cultural elites, which I trace from Anna McCarthy’s (2010) work on postwar sponsored 
TV programming, which worked to shape good informed and rational citizens for the 
liberal-capitalist democratic state, to its contemporary manifestation analyzed in Laurie 
Ouellette and James Hay’s (2008) work on television’s role in neoliberal 
governmentality. Planet Green’s highly classed structure of feeling was shaped by “green 
growth” and “green capitalism” discourses as well as contemporary anxieties about 
environmental destruction and global warming, and it provided the backdrop for a 
branded governmental project: Discovery promised that Planet Green that would organize 
individuals toward the place where brand value met planet saving. 
When I speak of the governing “fantasies” of Discovery insiders, I am using the 
term in McCarthy’s sense. McCarthy points out that the postwar programming she 
analyzes was significant in the elaboration of liberal-capitalist rationalities of rule not 
because it was actually successful in influencing television viewers, but rather because a 
whole range of members of the governing classes were “seduced” by television’s 
governing potential (McCarthy 2010, 8). Likewise, when I discuss Planet Green’s 
conception in terms of governing fantasies, I do not mean that I have gained privileged 
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access to either Discovery decision-makers’ emotional interiority or to their “true” 
motives for creating the Planet Green brand. Because “fantasy” also describes a process 
by which seemingly impossible things are imagined—or in the case of branding, 
performed—into possibility, I believe the term gets closest to describing a central theme 
in the discourse surrounding Planet Green: the intense and outsized optimism 
surrounding its highly ambitious goals and they ways in which these are not simply 
“rational” commercial decisions, but are rooted in a larger structure of feeling. That is, I 
wish to emphasize that when Discovery spokespeople professed certainty about the 
compatibility of environmentalism and profitable television—a discourse I will address 
throughout this chapter—their statements were based less on certainty about the “reality” 
of this compatibility than they were part of a what, following Celia Lury (2004) and Liz 
Moor (2007), I will refer to as a “performative” endeavor working to make this 
compatibility so.  
Planet Green was rooted in a contradictory fantasy where utopian dreams came 
together with totalitarian ones: utopian because it imagined that a TV brand could resolve 
the environmental consequences of unfettered capital fully within the realm of the 
market; totalitarian because it could only do so by fully managing consumers’ behavior 
and enlisting them in a particular vision of branded environmentalism, for it was only 
through consumers’ labor that the tensions between planet saving and profits could be 
resolved. 
In this way, branding environmentalism must be understood as a dimension of the 
broader dispersion of governmental functions across societal institutions and the 
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population in the context of neoliberal policy reforms—in this case, the defunding, 
devolution, and deregulation that has characterized environmental policy since the 1970s. 
Zealously committed to “voluntary” corporate “self-regulation”—which, in brand culture, 
has less to do with environmental urgency than with enabling profitable forms of being 
green (e.g., co-branding with a green media universe)—Planet Green sought to enact a 
context in which doing so would appeal to advertisers through the biopolitical promise of 
brands, their unique capacity to “administer life” by subtly guiding and shaping 
consumers’ everyday activities toward various corporate aims. 
 
Part 1: Managing the Crisis in Cable 
In the first part of this chapter, I argue that Planet Green promised to help 
Discovery manage the “crisis” in cable business as the company went public in 2007. In 
order to understand why Planet Green contained this particular commercial promise, it is 
crucial to understand the way in which cable has come to see itself as “in crisis” over 
recent decades, the constitution of this crisis, and Discovery’s particular relationship to it. 
In turn, it is necessary to take seriously the way in which the multiplatform Planet Green 
offered “solutions” to each dimension of this crisis by bringing “strong branding” 
together with the kinds of cultural legitimacy and brand differentiation linked to green 
marketing and corporate civic engagement. 
 
History of cable and the evolution of a “crisis” 
 Although, as I noted at the outset of this chapter, Discovery launched Planet  
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Green into a moment in US cable television that was characterized by extreme 
competition and anxieties about growth, consumers, and advertiser dollars, this has not 
always been the case. On the contrary, the early discourse surrounding cable was shot 
through with promises of democracy. The discourse enthused about an idealized version 
of cable that would offer viewers a whole range of programming choices and points of 
view not available on broadcast television. While, as Sarah Banet-Weiser, Cynthia Chris, 
and Anthony Freitas (2007) explain, programming diversity was indeed facilitated by the 
low barriers to entry that characterized cable during its early years, cable’s utopian 
promise was far from inevitable. In the 1970s, cable became a commercial system. The 
FCC rolled back regulations initially designed to stem cable’s growth, advertising on 
cable grew rapidly, and the rate of cable installation in US homes surged. Over the next 
three decades, the cable industry experienced a huge “growth spurt” (19). Established 
media companies started entering the cable market and squeezing out smaller companies 
with fewer resources. Media consolidation left control of cable in the hands of a few large 
companies, and multi-system operators (MSOs) (carriers like Time Warner or Comcast) 
came to dominate most of the market (Banet-Weiser, Chris and Freitas, Cable Visions 
2007). 
Over the same period, anxiety about consumers’ capacities to escape 
advertisements became a central theme in industry discourse (Turow 1997). Such 
anxieties intensified over the next decades with the rise of remote controls, pay-per-view 
content, recording devices (like VCRs), the proliferation of media choices, personal video 
gaming, home computers, and online media content. Ien Ang characterizes this crisis as a 
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“revolt of the viewer”: when viewers began to “time shift” by watching taped shows on 
their own schedules, “zip” past ads on pre-taped programs, and “zap” between channels 
with remote controls, TV industry experienced this as a loss of audience manageability. 
TV companies found themselves increasingly required to convince advertisers of the 
value of their audiences in order to sell them viewers’ “eyeballs.” Industry’s anxiety 
about audience unpredictability manifested in attempts to acquire more specific and 
“finely tuned” information about audiences through increasingly sophisticated audience 
measurement techniques (Ang 1991). From the 1970s on, media audiences were 
segmented into more and more specific “lifestyle” groups who could be targeted with 
tailored advertising messages in on niche television networks designed to appeal to their 
unique identities (Turow 1997).  
As channels proliferated and cable operators faced heightened competition 
amongst themselves, vying for viewers and advertiser dollars, one audience-management 
strategy was to create “branded media formats.” Such formats promised to more 
“efficiently” target audiences by producing a “distinctive identity” or “personality” of a 
given media vehicle—that is, a brand—that members of “a target audience would see as 
reflecting their identity.” Branded media formats aim to target particular lifestyle clusters, 
or “niches,” of affluent consumers “in a buying mood” in order to sell them to 
advertisers. This “slicing up” of society intensified throughout the 1980s and 1990s as 
firms sought to construct and target more and more specific niches of consumers (Turow 
1997, 91-92). 
 By the 2000s, Turow notes an ongoing sense of “crisis” registered by advertisers in 
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trade journals. Although continuous with trends in decades prior, the context of a 
changing media environment and increasingly sophisticated data-mining techniques, 
firms worried even more about gaining and maintaining the trust of “valuable” consumers 
and overcoming ad-skipping technologies. This led to a range of solutions including 
intensified product-placement in TV shows, the use of interactive components to TV that 
call upon viewers to participate in the show/brand on multiple platforms to encourage 
deeper and more sustained involvement in the show and its sponsors, and encouraging 
consumers to disclose detailed personal information and actively seek out customized 
marketing messages. 
By the time of Planet Green’s 2008 launch, these worries had intensified in the 
context of even greater competition among still-proliferating media content platforms, an 
increasingly saturated US cable market, and a deregulating and privatizing international 
broadcasting market. By now, the number of cable channels had become enormous. 
According to the California Cable and Telecommunications Association, between 1980 
and 1989, the number of cable channels increased from 28 to 79. In 1995, the number 
reached had reached 139, climbing to 171 by 1998, and 280 by 2002 (History of Cable 
n.d.). The percentage of marketing budgets devoted to TV had declined. Ad-skipping 
technologies also continued to multiply. And television business and advertisers 
ceaselessly worried that audiences were “migrating” away from the TV set to online and 
video-on-demand content with their computers and mobile devices.5 These modes of ad 
                                                
5 When reflecting on Planet Green’s failure, a former PG executive noted that trying to speak to a younger audience missed the boat 
because, “let’s be frank, most, a lot of college/university students don’t even get cable. Right? They watch TV on their devices—
iPhones, iPads, smart phones” (Michalchyshyn 2013) and a Planet Green television personality similarly said, “viewership patterns 
have changed.” I asked if he was referring to mobile devices, “Yeah, I mean, do you even own a television?” He was incredulous 
when I said I did (Thomas 2013). 
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skipping and “viewer migration” upped the ratings ante: poorly rated not only risked 
losing ad dollars but additionally risked getting moved to a higher, more expensive 
channel tier—or worse, dropped entirely—by MSOs (Howell 2013). For publicly traded 
media companies, the mandate to generate shareholder value is compounded with 
pressure to generate ad dollars. And on top of this, industry was describing the US cable 
market as “saturated” (i.e., dwindling opportunity for increasing the US subscriber base 
as it reached a “fixed” maximum), producing a crisis for an entire industry in a system 
that requires endless growth. In this context, practices like re-branding, branded 
entertainment, aggressive international expansion, and interactive, multimedia content 
have become key industrial strategies in an ongoing effort to manage the crisis in cable.  
 
History of Discovery 
Before I discuss the specific ways in which Planet Green’s branding resonated as 
a crisis-management strategy for Discovery at a particular moment in the history of cable 
business, I want to emphasize that Planet Green was not simply a natural consequence of 
broader historical tendencies. Rather, Planet Green was a situated solution to the way in 
which cable’s crisis came together with Discovery’s particular historical trajectory as the 
company grew from a small, niche television network (the Discovery Channel) into a 
multi-platform, multi-channel mega brand, which it did precisely through transforming a 
kind of educational, nature-focused mission into a profitable global enterprise. Planet 
Green was an opportunity to leverage Discovery’s particular resources and advance its 
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particular goals (especially as they pertained to going public) in the larger context of the 
cable crisis.  
As I will show, Planet Green mobilized environmentalism as a legitimating 
discourse in much the same way that Discovery had long mobilized educational and 
nature-focused programming: as a form of brand differentiation and niche marketing as 
well as a rationalizing framework for aggressive international expansion and the 
privatization of education. When the Discovery Channel appeared on US cable in 1985, it 
promised to offer “all documentary all the time,” a project that, Cynthia Chris explains, 
seemed risky given the highly competitive cable market, the huge barriers to entry, and 
the prevailing industry wisdom that documentary was out of fashion.6 But although 
documentary is often elevated above the “crass commercialism” of entertainment media, 
it was hardly separate from commercialism for “Discovery strategically reinvigorated 
[the] out-of-vogue TV genre [of documentary] to engineer a niche market” (Chris 2002, 
7). 
The documentaries were mostly science and nature-themed, emphasizing 
“entertainment” through efforts, for example, to create narratives through which viewers 
could identify with animals, transforming nature into a “familiar domain” (Pierson 2005). 
Such programs have great commercial value since, as Simon Cottle writes, “they 
generally have a long ‘shelf life’” and are highly exportable, since “their subject matter 
and universal appeal can seemingly cross different cultures, and they can easily be 
repackaged and dubbed” (Cottle 2004, 86). Further, such documentaries cost about half 
as much to produce as scripted drama, hour for hour, adding to their commercial appeal 
                                                
6 Discovery founder John Hendricks’ search for funders in 1982 yielded no backers until his 212th attempt (Mjos 2010, 20). 
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(Chris 2002). Through this strategy, the Discovery Channel experienced staggering 
growth over its first fifteen years, with four basic cable channels, eight digital tier 
channels, multi-media holdings, a chain of brick-and-mortar Discovery stores and 
presence in 145 international markets (Guider 1997 referenced in Chris 2002, 7). 
Discovery’s growth was enabled by the rise of niche marketing in the US and 
trade liberalization and privatization of the airwaves globally. Discovery built its market 
share by expanding into international markets—often capitalizing on the withdrawal of 
state support from, as well as the increasing privatization of, formerly state-owned media 
systems. Discovery’s success in its cable channels produced capital and brand value—as 
well as cultural legitimacy—that facilitated its expansion in non-television projects that 
likewise blurred the boundaries between making money and providing public services, 
particularly in its K-12 brand, Discovery Education (Chris 2002, Mjos 2010). 
Discovery’s emphases on natural history, science, exploration, and documentary 
was useful for brand differentiation and as a corrective in the face of a long history of 
public criticism that television was failing to serve the public interest. The hope was that 
Discovery’s emphasis on documentary and educational programming would help to stave 
off such criticism and help to justify trends toward deregulation and privatization (Chris 
2002). This was enabled, in part, by Reagan-era policies gutted public funding for 
documentary production, at the time of Discovery’s emergence, there was a “gap” in TV 
programming (Mjos 2010). By inserting itself into this gap, Discovery was able to 
position itself in a kind of public service role. In this way, Discovery’s very existence 
played a role in justifying cable itself to governments and regulators. For example, when 
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Discovery founder John Hendricks was seeking investors and carriers in 1986, John C. 
Malone, owner of cable operator Tele-Communications Inc. (TCI), took over a 
controlling stake in Discovery and committed to run the channel on its distribution 
networks. Although the channel was struggling financially, a Discovery executive 
explained that “it was great for [cable operators like TCI] because they could turn around 
and say to the governments and authorities and say: ‘look, there's quality on cable... We 
have the Discovery channel’” (Comer-Calder quoted in Mjos 2010, 21). 
Civic engagement and business have always operated hand-in-hand for 
Discovery, folding “civic responsibility” into aggressive brand building, transforming 
civic responsibility itself into a commercial enterprise. Education, for example, has been 
key to Discovery’s brand-building strategy throughout its history.7 In 1989, Discovery 
was one of a number of cable networks and telecommunication companies to offer free 
educational content and teacher-training workshops to public and private schools through 
a service called Cable Alliance for Education (which later became Cable in the 
Classroom). Although the educational media did not contain advertisements, for 
Discovery (and the other brands sponsoring the service) Cable in the Classroom 
programming helped to cultivate and reinforce investment in Discovery’s brand among 
students, teachers, and parents. It thus operated as a form of brand extension at the same 
time that it laid the groundwork for Discovery’s later educational initiatives (Chris 2002, 
15), such as Discovery Education (DE), DE’s partnerships with Siemens, and the 
Discovery Channel Global Education Partnership, which builds learning centers and 
                                                
7 Further, Discovery’s educational programs had only “recently become profitable” as of the September 2, 2009 writing of USA Today 
reporter David Lieberman. 
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communications infrastructure, offers teacher training and Discovery branded educational 
content in Central and South America, Africa, and Eastern Europe (2009 Annual Report 
2009).8 
Never separate from commercialism, Discovery folded this service mission into 
aggressive brand-building activities. Discovery entered the US media landscape at a time 
when attention to branding was already accelerating in the context of deregulation, which 
opened up cable television to investors and fragmented mass broadcast audiences into 
niches and media companies increasingly worried about how to set their brands apart in a 
“menu” scenario of proliferating cable channels (Mjos 2010, 50-51). Discovery did so by 
building its brand with a mission.  
Discovery was somewhat insulated from these industrial conditions, the “crisis” 
in cable, for much of its history. One contributing factor, as I have already discussed, was 
the fact that Discovery had laid claim to “quality” educational television, which had 
provided multi-system operators incentive to carry the network irrespective of its ability 
to generate advertising dollars. Even more significant, however, was the fact that, until 
2008, Discovery operated as a privately held company. Discovery’s private status meant 
that the company faced less pressure to generate short-term profits9 and allowed it to 
focus on long-term growth (as well as any number of other commitments held by its 
decision makers). 
                                                
8 DCGEP describes itself as “a public nonprofit organization dedicated to harnessing the power of television in under-resourced 
schools around the world to improve student learning, teacher effectiveness, access to information and community involvement in the 
schools” that partners with Chevron, Discovery Communications Inc., and Coca Cola (Discovery Communications Inc. 2009). 
9 Cynthia Chris points out that Discovery’s private structure and historical reliance on commissioned programming sometimes opened 
up space for political and social critique. Discovery’s private structure also meant that it was not beholden to structures of public 
funding, allowing the provision of support and distribution of work “too political” for public funding (Chris 2002, 22). Its private 
structure further meant that it could continue to invest in new brands, even if they failed to generate profits during their first few years, 
since Discovery’s shareholders were interested in long-term asset growth (Mjos 2010, 26). 
  46 
 All of this began to change in 2006, however, when Discovery replaced long-
time CEO Judith McHale with David M. Zaslav, a former corporate lawyer and then-
senior executive at NBC Universal (Siklos 2006). Aggressive growth was foremost on 
Zaslav’s agenda. For him, operating as a private company hindered Discovery’s ability to 
pursue this goal. Thus, upon joining the company, he embarked on steps to take 
Discovery public, announcing plans to complete the process on June 4, 2008, the very 
day of the launch of Planet Green.10  
Although risky, Zaslav expressed that this context of “crisis” also presented the 
opportunity for aggressive growth. Going public, he argued, would give the company 
“more agility and strength in our drive to be bigger and more efficient and stronger” 
(Ahrens 2007a). It would mean that the company could borrow to pay for acquisitions, a 
key dimension of its growth strategy (after the company went public, PetFinder.com and 
TreeHugger.com became part of the Discovery suite) (Ashton 2008), which would free 
up existing cash for new programming (Ahrens 2007a) and other projects like rebranding 
and building satellite infrastructure for international HD content delivery. 
What is unstated in Zaslav’s comments is that Discovery would also now feel 
cable’s crisis far more acutely than it had as a privately held company. The possibilities 
opened up by going public would also become both instrumental and obligatory for 
managing the broader crisis in cable business. In line with this contemporary industry 
wisdom, Discovery hoped that the move would allow it to invest in (1) strong branding to 
                                                
10 The process to go public began in 2005 when Liberty Media Corp. spun off its 50% stake becoming the publicly traded Discovery 
Holding Company (McClintock, 2005). The move was met with skepticism on Wall Street and in the trade press since the remaining 
50% of Discovery was still controlled by cable operator Cox Communications and Advance/Newhouse Communications, Discovery 
Channel and TLC’s ratings (McClintock 2005) and ad sales were down (Martin, 2005). Also, Discovery’s historical lack of disclosure 
was frustrating analysts (Goldsmith, 2005). 
 
 
  47 
“break through the clutter” of multi-channel, multi-platform delivery possibilities, (2) 
video-on-demand and online, interactive content to multiply and intensify engagement 
with brands and advertisements to cope with “migrating audiences” and to target a 
younger demographic (3) aggressive international expansion to continue to grow into 
“untapped markets” despite the already “saturated” US cable market. In other words, 
going public both opened Discovery up to all the risks of the broader “crisis” in cable at 
the same time that it promised to enable aggressive growth within this uncertain context11 
and Planet Green was, it seemed, uniquely suited to be mobilized toward these aims. 
 
Planet Green as a crisis management strategy  
It is likely no coincidence that Planet Green launched at the very moment 
Discovery became a publicly traded company and thus faced heightened pressure to 
justify itself—to MSOs, to shareholders, to advertisers, and to the public. Wall Street was 
skeptical of the company given its history of poor disclosure. According one former 
Discovery executive, demonstrating “responsibility” to Wall Street as the company went 
public was one of Planet Green’s promises (Howell 2013) since, as Zaslav told the New 
York Times in 2007, “Today, green means responsible” (Siklos 2007). 
                                                
11 Zaslav bought out Cox Communications’ 25% stake in the company in the spring of 2007 and in 2008 Malone’s Liberty Media 
(50% stake) and Advance/Newhouse (25% stake) agreed to combine their shares of the company (Dempsey and Hayes, 2008). The 
fully combined company went public on September 18, 2008. It worked to make itself known to potential investors and improve its 
reputation on Wall Street through highly publicized channel re-brandings including Planet Green, Investigation Discovery, and the 
Oprah Winfrey Network (OWN) (Dempsey and Hayes). Part of the strategy to go public had been a branding effort to better articulate 
a sense of “responsibility” to company operations. The socially/environmentally responsible efforts connected to Planet Green 
promised to add “responsible” value to the Discovery brand, as then-SVP of communications and public affairs at Discovery and a 
member of Planet Green’s launch team reflected in a 2013 interview, “when you’re going public, you’re thinking about… stock price 
and relevancy and value… having a channel like [Planet Green], that spoke to responsibility of everybody… added to its value” 
(Howell, 2013). 
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Green TV also promised to allay concern that going public would negatively 
impact the “quality” of Discovery programming: would Zaslav have to go “low-brow” to 
get ratings? wondered a Washington Post reporter. Zaslav countered such worries by 
emphasizing Discovery’s continued commitment to “high-quality, knowledge-based 
content…” (Zaslav 2008), assuring readers “We don't have any wet T-shirts; we don't 
have any girls behaving badly” (Ahrens 2007b), and cutting programming that was not 
sufficiently “on brand” with Discovery’s mission to “educate and inform” (Ashton 2008). 
For Zaslav, “quality” programming was itself a business strategy that fit neatly into his 
international expansion goals: “At our core we have the best content, the stuff that really 
satisfies curiosity… That is what works best around the world” (Ashton 2008).  
Planet Green emerged within this effort to demonstrate “responsibility” and 
continued commitment to a set of brand ideals. It was part of a business strategy to re-
brand a poorly performing network in order to maximize profits, it offered opportunities 
for “strong” branding, it could be repackaged for international distribution, and promised 
to be aligned with “quality” television with its aims to “educate and inform.” Of 
Discovery Home’s rebranding as Planet Green, CEO David Zaslav explained, the channel 
“is doing well economically” (false, according to cable analyst Derek Blaine quoted in 
Levin 2008) “… but it’s not serving this higher purpose” (Siklos 2007). Green TV would 
be no less profitable than other themed channels, but it would operate on a plane above 
financial gain.  
“Green” also promised to legitimate new advertising strategies in an ad-skipping 
era by positioning product placement and branded entertainment. In answer to 
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advertisers’ worries about ad-skipping, and to allay the fear that overt product placement 
will irritate consumers (Boorstin 2008), Planet Green offered a whole array of sites for 
branded entertainment that promised to be “tasteful” rather than “crass” or “annoying,” 
thanks to Planet Green’s ethical bent (Thomas 2013). Further, as I will discuss in later 
chapters, the fact that brands appeared in narratives as enabling actors in the story of a 
greener future, meant that there was not simply a commercial logic to their presence in 
the shows, but also an ethical and educational one (Thomas 2013). Green lifestyle TV 
showcased eco-friendly home improvement, transportation, food, makeup, clothing and 
other “lifestyle” products within consumer advice segments (Crupi and Moses 2008). 
General Motors signed up to sponsor the channel early on and a range of shows 
constructed narratives around GM products (for example, Greensburg (2008-2010), 
Mean Green Machines (2008)).  
Other programs were structured around new technologies, fast “green” vehicles 
(Mean Green Machines), green building products (Renovation Nation (2008-2010), 
Greenovate (2008)) and brands. The cooking show Emeril Green (2008-2010) took place 
inside a Whole Foods Market and taught viewers how to incorporate branded foodstuffs 
into their daily routines. The docudrama series, Greensburg (2008-2010) was sponsored 
by SunChips, and prominently featured General Motors, Brita, and DuPont products. 
Lifestyle shows like Battleground Earth (2008), G Word (2008), Wa$ted! (2008-2010), 
and Living with Ed (2009-2010) offered viewers mini-lessons on green consumer 
products by a range of brands. By fully integrating a sponsor’s brand into its TV content, 
Planet Green (like reality and lifestyle TV in general) promised to manage consumers’ 
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use of ad-skipping technologies while also adding green value to sponsors’ brands. In this 
way, green itself can be understood as a legitimating discourse, offering a pro-social 
rationale for aggressive international expansion, capitalist growth, and ongoing relevance 
within an industry in “crisis.” 
 In addition to legitimating brand and product placement, Planet Green would also 
address worries about “migrating audiences”; it would capture them by moving into 
online and video-on-demand content. In 2008, Discovery viewed Planet Green as a “key 
brand” for expanding into mobile technology (Discovery Globe 2008). Planet Green 
worked to move into the online space through its websites. Planet Green would also have 
a short-form video channel on Verizon’s “V CAST Video” service (alongside other 
Discovery brands like Animal Planet, Discovery Kids and TLC) (Discovery Globe 2008). 
To assuage industry worries that mobile content might pose a threat to the “integrity” of 
television brands, Discovery developed Planet Green’s web content in ways that were 
aimed at mitigating this potential risk. As O’Neill explained prior to the channel’s launch, 
“The Planet Green Web site … can be a promotional platform” for the Planet Green 
channel while “TreeHugger will act as a great third leg between the TV component and 
the Planet Green Web site… All three need to feed each other effectively, in cross-
pollinating content and viewers and community. In terms of having content available 
that’s synergistic, we want to make sure our audience/viewers move across all three” 
(Kaufman 2007). The web sites offered content that complemented Planet Green’s TV 
offerings, but did not make any full-length episodes available. One had to tune into the 
TV channel to complete the brand experience. Planet Green also had a YouTube channel 
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and an iTunes channel, but again, neither of these made TV content available in full. 
Rather, a range of TV shows were made up of a series of informative mini-segments (i.e., 
step-by-step recipe demonstrations, DIY project instructions, lifestyle tips, or lessons on 
new technologies) that could stand alone in online videos, abstracted from the broader 
context of the show, without sacrificing coherence. Planet Green thus sought to control 
its content as tightly as possible while still making the brand available for interaction for 
free online. 
 Planet Green also promised to play a key role in Discovery’s efforts to expand into 
markets outside the US. Like other media companies that are heavily invested in the 
cable model, Discovery worried about a “saturated” US cable market—a problem that 
cannot be managed by luring “migrating” US consumers back to the set. New US cable 
subscriptions had slowed significantly in previous years and a repeated industry refrain 
stated that most individuals only watch 16 of their 100-plus available channels 
(Lieberman 2007). By 2008, there was widespread consensus within US media business 
discourse that long-term growth required aggressive expansion into international markets 
(Ashton 2008).  
Although Discovery has had international presence since the launch of Discovery 
Channel in the UK 1989 and as of 2008, was already present in 170 countries, boasting 
growth in Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Europe, Middle East and Africa in its 2008 
annual report, it continued to describe international markets as “under-penetrated” by pay 
TV (Annual Report 2008). At this time, Planet Green was promoted as part of 
Discovery’s internationalization strategy as the company planned on “leveraging its green 
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programming strategy and global interest in the environment around the world” (Annual 
Report 2008). The London Times called Discovery’s foray into green “a brave new 
world” asserting, “David Zaslav wants to conquer the world and if along the way he can 
help save it, so much the better” (Ashton 2008). As noted at the outset of this chapter, 
Discovery planned Planet Green programming blocks and/or web content in its UK, 
Discovery Latin America, Discovery Networks Asia, and Discovery China (Discovery 
Globe 2008).12 Planet Green offered Discovery the opportunity to build a brand in 
multiple markets. Rather than being US specific, Planet Green content promised “global” 
resonance, addressing worldwide problems by focusing on everyday details that promised 
to attract affluent consumers internationally.13 
Finally, the re-brand of Discovery Home as Planet Green would address the cable 
crisis through its promise to “break through the clutter” by bringing environmental 
responsibly together with branding to differentiate the channel within the high-stakes 
media context “of cultural fragmentation and niche marketing” (Ouellette 2012, 66). And 
environmental television, according to Discovery, was uniquely positioned to do this. 
Between Planet Green’s 2007 initial announcement and its 2008 debut, Discovery 
released statements averring that an environmentally themed media brand was a site of 
                                                
12 As stated in Discovery’s quarterly newsletter, GLOBE in 2008, “In the first quarter of 2008, Planet Green was introduced in Latin 
America under the tagline DESCUBRE EL VERDE. DESCUBRE EL VERDE includes special programming and interstitials on 
Discovery Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Kids and Discovery Home & Health, as well as content offerings and interactive tools 
on the websites: descubreelverde.com (in Spanish) and descubreoverde.com (in Portuguese). Discovery Networks Asia also launched 
a Planet Green programming block on Discovery Channel in March 2008 throughout the region. (Another programming block in 
China was launched on Discovery Channel in April 2008, sponsored by ŠKODA Auto.) The Planet Green block in Asia launched with 
50 hours of programming in 2008, from relevant stories produced out of the region, to global specials that celebrate, preserve and 
protect the environment. The block kicked off with a six-part premiere series, FEARLESS PLANET. In July 2008, the Big Green 
Build Night launched on Discovery Real Time in the UK, featuring a programming block from Planet Green in the U.S.” (Discovery 
Communications 2008). 
13 Descubre el Verde/Descubre o Verde did indeed launch in both Spanish and Portuguese. And as of the time of this writing, a 
YouTube channel continues to hosts its branded videos. Big Green Build Night also began airing on Thursday nights on Sky Channel 
250 (Discovery Real Time) with Planet Green’s Renovation Nation and other green home/building shows. I could find evidence 
neither confirming nor disproving the launch of the Discovery Networks Asia block, nor the Discovery Channel in China block. 
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capitalist possibility. For example, in 2008, Discovery declared 40 to 50 percent of the 
US population “armchair environmentalists.” Armchair environmentalists included a 
“group of consumers, 60 million of us, who are awakening to green and contemplating 
attitude or activity changes” Discovery’s Eileen O’Neill told TV Week. “They need more 
information and inspiration to activate in a way that is helpful to our planet,” she 
explained (Kaufman 2007). Discovery’s conclusion was based on unreleased internal 
research conducted in 2007 and was one of a collection of claims the company made in 
the lead-up to the launch of Planet Green. This group of consumers, Discovery argued, 
did not simply exist, but was also available, possessing an openness to “activation” by a 
media brand; Discovery promised that Planet Green’s content would “activate the 
armchair environmentalist in all of us” (Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 2008).  
 In addition to announcing this purportedly extant group of consumers, Discovery 
also cited a range of evidence to demonstrate that the time was ripe for green TV. For one 
thing, there had been recent—and apparently successful—debuts of other eco-themed 
shows, such as HGTV’s 2007 eco-themed, reality-based sitcom, Living with Ed (which 
Planet Green would soon acquire), The Sundance Channel’s 2007 series The Green 
(Stelter 2008). Further, Discovery executives explained that Planet Green was, in part, a 
response to the popularity of the 2006 11-part HD series, Planet Earth (produced in 
partnership with the BBC and aired on the Discovery Channel US the previous year). The 
series garnered 65 million viewers, according to the Washington Times’ Karen Goff, 
making it “the most-watched cable event of all time” (Goff 2008) and flooding the 
network with audience requests for similar content (Stelter 2008). Further, Planet Green’s 
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President/General Manager, Eileen O’Neill pitched the channel by referring to the 
broader fashion for green branding and eco-lifestyle choices, explaining that Planet 
Green’s “programming reflects what is going on in the overall social landscape… People 
are being more active [in the green movement] than ever” (Goff 2008). When TV Week 
asked Planet Green’s Eileen O’Neill what impelled Discovery to launch the channel, she 
stressed that corporations and consumers are “awakening to green” citing a few “seminal 
moments” over the past year and a half, including “Tom Brokaw’s No. 1 special on 
global warming [Global Warming: What You Need to Know (2006)], Al Gore’s 
documentary [An Inconvenient Truth (2006)] or the horrendous weather we’ve had [she is 
likely referring to Hurricane Katrina]. All those things lined up, as well as all aspects of 
the marketplace, where corporations to consumers started awakening to green” (Kaufman 
2007). Planet Green, she promised, would “address the needs of consumers who are 
awakening to greenness” (Kaufman 2007). Zaslav gave Planet Green his own vote of 
confidence, telling the New York Times, “We're pressing on the accelerator here… We 
think [Planet Green] has a real chance to be a flagship brand for us” (Stelter 2008). 
 
Part 2: Green marketing, ratings discourse, and the performativity of brands 
What I want to argue, however, is that Discovery spokespeople’s unequivocal 
optimism about the commercial possibilities of green branding must be understood as 
both performative and deeply anxious in ways that reflected the broader discourse on 
green marketing at the time. The statements of Discovery spokespeople (and, as I will 
show, of other proponents of green marketing) were performative in the sense that the 
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optimism about the possibilities of green branding was not based on knowledge of an 
existing “reality” about, for example, market readiness or “green consumers.” On the 
contrary, this “reality” is actively produced through this discourse. And despite the 
professed certainty about commercial possibilities of environmental marketing, this 
discourse was also always haunted by the essential uncontrollability of consumers, an 
uncontrollability that proponents of green marketing ritually disavowed.  
Anxiety about consumer uncontrollability is not always immediately apparent. 
Certainly, some analysts celebrated green marketing: “Green is a category companies 
want to be in,” a cable analysis executive, told the New York Times. “Whether you're an 
automaker or a bank or a petroleum company, somewhere in your marketing plan is 
something referring to the environment” (Lico quoted in Stelter 2008). The website 
Sustainable Brands hailed green marketing as “recession proof” (Sustainable Life Media 
Editor 2008) and green-branded products were everywhere.  
But Planet Green was hardly launching into a market in which these sentiments 
were the norm. A great many commentators cautioned marketers against venturing into 
the highly risky terrain of green marketing. Indeed, despite the surging numbers of green 
product claims and brands in 2007 and 2008 and the massive investment companies were 
making in green product claims and branding, it would be disingenuous to present faith in 
green marketing as some kind of broad consensus.  
 On the contrary, Planet Green’s and other market researchers’ sanguine 
statements about a market ready for green goods and services were never simply about 
reporting the currents of consumer “demand” in a straightforward or “objective” sense; 
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rather, they constituted a performative discourse that aimed to disavow and assuage 
broader industrial anxieties about combine making money with green messages. Some of 
these anxieties concerned the economic downturn (Neff 2008) and government 
regulations (the FTC was revising their Green Guides ahead of scheduled, opening the 
door for regulatory crackdowns on claims not supported by “reliable evidence” 
(Cummings 2008)). But the bulk of industrial fears within the green marketing discourse 
constellated around consumer unruliness. For instance, AdWeek’s Mark Dolliver 
cautioned marketers in May 2008, “consumers aren’t as devoted to the planet as you wish 
they were,” citing their reluctance to change their behavior as well as their “skepticism 
and indifference” regarding green claims, despite expecting companies to demonstrate 
environmental commitments (Dolliver 2008). He calls the green marketing environment 
“inhospitable” to marketers, complaining that consumers are willing to “talk the talk”—
that is, surveys indicate that they care about the environment, favor environmental 
standards and regulations, and criticize companies with poor environmental records—but 
not “walk the walk” by instituting behavioral changes in line with green consumer 
lifestyles. And on top of this, companies were operating in the context of what he called 
“a turbid current of anti-corporate sentiment” (based on results from an Associated 
Press/Stanford University/Ipsos Public Affairs poll). Consumers, he writes, have “a basic 
distrust of corporations”; and looming on the horizon was the term “greenwashing,” just 
becoming common parlance among consumers skeptical of corporate efforts, threatening 
to foment consumer backlash (Dolliver 2008).  
 It was these anxieties, it seems, that Planet Green’s promotional discourse was 
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most concerned with alleviating—and, indeed, Planet Green’s very existence was 
incumbent upon doing so, for if its advertising team could not convince advertisers to buy 
time on the channel, it would not be long for this world. Fortunately for Discovery, there 
was a whole discursive formation that was already managing industrial anxieties about 
green marketing by offering up knowledge about green consumers to render them 
manageable and predictable and offering explicit strategies for speaking to them in a way 
that “works.” This was an anxious discourse, always contending with the unknowability 
of its object. Marketers’ and market researchers’ efforts to find and capture the “green 
consumer” manifested in the production of a range of psychographic groups—identifying 
them, constructing their profiles, detailing instructions for targeting them, and doing so 
through marketers’ normative assumptions, yielding a range of “shades” of green (“light” 
to “dark” depending on the extent to which consumers prioritize environmentalism in 
their purchasing decisions).  
 The seemingly least risky target group for green marketing messages included 
consumers who are “aspirational,” or those who have not yet committed to “green 
lifestyle” but aspired to (they are much like Planet Green’s “armchair environmentalists” 
and “awakening” green consumers), who should be encouraged to make behavioral 
changes in “baby steps” (Dolliver 2008). People who are already environmentalists were 
also an appealing audience for green branding messages, but were also most likely to 
scrutinize companies’ environmental records and practices, so had to be addressed 
“transparently”—all the more important when addressing those who were highly 
networked and interactive online.  
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Discovery’s acquisition of the already established and “trusted” TreeHugger 
brand—along with its cross-linking with PlanetGreen.com—promised to address these 
“greenfluencers,” who could be enlisted to use their everyday, unpaid, communicative 
labor as free mobile advertising for brands that they liked, but this highly communicative 
group was at least as apt to register displeasure at green claims as they were to promote 
them. Further, “greenfluencers” tended to be under 35 and some marketers questioned the 
wisdom of targeting young people with green product claims, given research suggesting 
that it is “older folks” or “matures” who tend to purchase energy-efficient appliances and 
locally grown foods (Dolliver 2008), so it was a good idea to target them.  
 Marketers believed moms were “a promising audience for green-marketing 
efforts” for a handful of reasons: they believed that having children produced concern 
about the long-term health of the planet, that environmentally conscious children might 
scrutinize mom’s behavior, and that moms tend to become more intensely focused on the 
immediate and everyday details of the household. However, marketers worried that 
moms would be unlikely to do something unless it offered a “tangible benefit” to her 
family and household (Wilbur quoted in Dolliver 2008). Planet Green would address 
women as well as “new parents” through highly calculated tactics that it elaborated in the 
Discovery-sponsored “Good and Green Marketing Conference” which offered workshops 
that promised that, through green messages, marketers could “deepen their connection 
with women” who were increasingly “in a green state of mind” (Ganshirt quoted in Neorr 
2007).  
 One AdWeek essay outlines a strategy that bore such uncanny resemblance to 
  59 
what would soon become Planet Green’s brand strategy that it seems impossible that 
Planet Green’s marketing team was not influenced by it. The author recommends that 
potential green consumers be addressed as “awakening” to green, but still confused. They 
might exhibit inconsistent behaviors, such as driving an SUV but boycotting Exxon, or 
eating organic foods but purchasing the 8000-mile transported Fiji bottled water. The 
unprecedented availability of information on the Internet had both “empowered” and 
“bewildered” awakening consumers. They care, but are easily derailed. In the face of 
these purported realities, marketers must approach them with messages that are clear, 
honest, and offer them hope (Hough 2007). The author implies that the knowledge, skills, 
and capacities that consumers bring to a brand must be contained and delegitimized. 
Consumers must be re-educated to enact their environmental desires and investments in 
line with brands.14  
 By promoting Planet Green as “solutions oriented” and a “fun” and “easy” 
corrective to the “intimidating” deluge of green messages (Planet Green Defines Eco-
Entertainment 2008), Discovery spoke directly to this problematization of consumer 
unruliness is as “confusion” and promised advertisers that it could solve it. That is, if, as 
this discourse suggests, consumers are “confused” rather than unruly, Planet Green could 
“solve” consumer unpredictability with branded education—or at least it can in this 
performative discourse. “Confusion” becomes a stand-in to explain the range of 
possibilities that result when individuals with complex subjectivities and ethical 
investments encounter green claims in a marketplace of consumer choices. In this way, 
                                                
14 It is not that such sentiments—anxiety and ambivalence about what consumers will actually do with brands—do not structure other 
marketing discourses. Rather, that it seems to be more pronounced, here. Co-creation seems to be shut down at every turn. 
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this discourse also always involves a process of disavowal—disavowal of the essential 
unpredictability of what individuals will do with green marketing claims, of whether such 
claims will “work” as intended. While this disavowed reality certainly generates anxiety, 
the language used here, the very language used in Planet Green’s promotional materials, 
works to assuage the marketers’ anxieties by erasing consumers’ complexities and 
offering clear instructions that promise tangible and positive results. 
Despite the fears that characterize green marketing, however, Discovery 
executives’ statements to the press averring the existence of “armchair environmentalists” 
or consumers “awakening to green” are marked by a “rhetorical tone of certainty” in the 
sense written about by Ien Ang nearly two decades prior. Ang observes such a tone 
among the voices of television institutions in the 1980s as they attempted to manage the 
invisibility of the TV viewers with “crude simplifications” that purported to tell an 
“essential truth about a group of others” (Ang 1991). Such simplifications were industrial 
stereotypes of audiences generated through audience measurement techniques, such as 
set-top boxes and diaries which, when combined with demographic data, promised to 
“reduce the uncertainty, ease the anxiety” surrounding TV institutions’ inability to fully 
“know” the TV audience in the face of the imperative to pursue and “catch” them to sell 
to advertisers. This strategy, Ang explains, is “not just a technical matter, but a matter of 
control” (Ang 1991), an effort to achieve control over inevitably uncertain conditions. 
However, the tactics that industry uses to reduce risk “can only help to manage, not 
remove the basic uncertainty with which the TV institution has to live. There are no 
guarantees that actual viewers will comply to the codes, routines and synchronicities of 
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viewing behavior as designed by the institutions. Ultimately, then, the problem of (lack 
of) control amounts to one thing: the impossibility of knowing the audience” (Ang 1991). 
The reductionism of 1980s ratings systems may seem cartoonish today, offering 
only the crudest understanding of audience behavior by tracking whether the set was on 
or off and ignoring all of the lived dimensions of individuals’ TV viewing practices. 
Now, of course, consumer profiling and audience tracking strategies are far more detailed 
and specific, attempting to grasp the “intangible” aspects of individuals’ everyday 
activities and emotional attachments through a broad array of surveillance and data 
mining strategies. Now, industry stereotypes audiences less as “couch potatoes” than it 
figures them as “active consumers,” abuzz with potential that needs to be guided 
(“activated” and “empowered”) in particular directions. Planet Green’s “awakening” 
green consumers would be “activated in the green space” by offering them a brand 
experience and speaking to them in ways that reflect marketers assumptions about their 
identities.15  
But even though the Planet Green market research that “discovered” a pool of 
armchair environmentalists, and despite the fact that all the market research that produced 
knowledge about various green consumers was certainly far more sophisticated than the 
ratings strategies of the 1980s and 1990s, these contemporary approaches to “knowing” 
audiences remain industrial constructions. Neither Discovery nor marketers have 
privileged access to the “truth” of the individuals that they hope to transform into green 
consumers. Yet performing this knowledge as truth has become a key commercial 
                                                
15 Arvidsson explains that “brands work by enabling consumers, by empowering them in particular directions” and thus “embrace the 
general principle of what Nikolas Rose (1999) has called ‘advanced liberal governance’ – they work with the freedom of consumers” 
(Arvidsson 2006, 8), “they say not ‘You Must!’ but ‘You May!’” (Arvidsson quoting Barry 2001; Zizek 1999). 
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strategy within cable business—one that is surely performed with added urgency at times 
of crisis for, as Ang explains, the threat with which television contends is the loss of 
audience manageability. Planet Green attempted to manage this crisis—this threat of 
audience unmanageability—through an effort to render invisible realities and complex 
subjectivities predictable and profitable. And it did so not only through ongoing 
collection, refinement, and organization of knowledge about green consumers, but also 
through a discursive strategy wherein claims about this knowledge were marked by a 
rhetorical tone of certainty. 
But Planet Green’s effort to manage the unpredictability of audiences’ behavior 
extended far beyond gathering and performing knowledge about them. By folding this 
knowledge into a brand, it would work to guide and shape this behavior as well. Scholars 
of branding have pointed out that brands work to “govern at a distance” in the sense 
written about by Foucault, subtly guiding and shaping consumers’ everyday activities—
what they “do with brands” in their day-to-day lives—in line with firms’ aims and 
objectives (Arvidsson 2006, Banet-Weiser 2012, Lury 2004, Moor 2007). Foucault 
theorized governmentality as the dispersion of governmental functions across a range of 
institutions, specifically with respect to the liberal-democratic state. For him, 
governmentality describes efforts to maximize the health and wealth of a population by 
governing “at a distance” and “through freedom,” by enabling individuals to “govern 
themselves” through an array of technologies (Foucault 2008). As Tony Bennett (1998) 
summarizes, rather than centering the top-down sovereign power of the state, 
governmentality is characterized by efforts at “knowing, regulating and changing the 
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conditions of the population” (70) in order to enlist them in “programs of self-
management through which specific governmental objectives will be realized or carried 
through in and by the voluntary activities of individuals” (75). Scholars of branding have 
pointed out that the functioning of contemporary brands closely resembles 
governmentality in this sense. Through branding, firms attempt to “provide a propertied, 
micro-context of consumption” and offer individuals suggestions for how “a product or 
service can be experienced, related to, or ‘felt’” (Arvidsson 2006, 82). When successful, 
brands come to “occupy a valuable position in the life-world (or to use marketing 
terminology, the ‘minds’) of consumers,” writes Arvidsson. When brands achieve such a 
position, they can “subsume and appropriate what consumers do with the brand in mind 
as a source of surplus value and profits” (Arvidsson 7). Thus, brands operate to manage 
or organize individuals’ everyday use of brands such that individuals’ mundane activities 
will unfold in ways that are desirable to firms and “brand value.” In this way, brands can 
be understood “as a kind of ubiquitous managerial devices by means of which everyday 
life is managed, or perhaps better, programmed, so that it evolves in ways that can 
potentially generate the right kind of attention (and hence, brand value)” (7). Media 
brands thus works to governmentalize consumers’ everyday interactions with the brand 
toward the production of brand value. 
Planet Green attempted to do just that by drawing upon proliferating data about 
consumers’ “green” sensibilities and promising advertisers that it could construct a 
mediated environment in which individuals’ everyday activities would unfold in ways 
that helped them self-realize as “green consumers” and at the same time add value to 
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Planet Green’s and its sponsors’ brands. By watching the television shows, playing the 
online games, taking up consumer advice, attending marketing events, consumers’ 
quotidian activities generate value. In other words, the Planet Green brand would attempt 
to organize, as Adam Arvidsson explains, the “autonomous productivity” of individuals 
toward profits and brand value by producing coherent narratives about a Planet Green’s 
identity in which individuals could participate (Arvidsson 2006, 4).  
Yet the governmental functioning of brands is never guaranteed: what individuals 
do with brands can never be fully contained or controlled by the brand’s parent 
organization. Thus, despite huge investment in the “science” of branding, brand value is 
neither stable nor can it be taken for granted. The forms of measure with which modes of 
action are rendered “predictable” are “inherently subjective” and “arbitrarily chosen” 
(Arvidsson 2006, 134). As Arvidsson writes, “Brand values build on qualities like 
attention, association, loyalty and emotional or other subjective investments, that lend 
themselves to measurement only with great difficulty” (133-134). 
In the context of such uncertainty, the “rhetorical certainty” that characterized 
Discovery’s aforementioned claims about green consumers and markets, must be 
understood as crucial to the production of brands themselves. Such claims of certainty are 
performative in the sense written about by Celia Lury (2004) and elaborated upon by Liz 
Moor (2007) in their respective work on brands. Lury explains that the “brand as 
interface is a site—or diagram—of interactivity” and in this way the brand can be viewed 
as shaping or mediating, not determining, “‘exchange’ between producers and 
consumers” as consumers’ communicative labor is enlisted in the production of the brand 
  65 
itself; the “ongoing object-ivity” of the brand emerges in this two-way performative 
process (Lury 2004, 7). Moor adds that while branding is a “conceptual enterprise” 
because “it involves the formation of generalizations and abstractions” for example, 
generalizations based on ratings data and other market research or its “informational 
qualities,” the brand itself is constituted through performative and technical means, brand 
value is produced, it comes into being and into materiality, as the ongoing performative 
work of industrial actors comes together with the effort to “pattern information” in ways 
that aim to organize individuals experiences and behaviors (Moor 2007, 9). 
When Discovery’s Eileen O’Neill asserted the existence of a group of 
“awakening” consumers, or when Discovery executives announce the availability of a 
pool of “armchair environmentalists,” they were making “performative claims,” or, 
statements that “attempt to conceive of inalienable qualities and social phenomena (such 
as loyalty, commitment, passion) as things that can be measured, valued, and potentially, 
sold” (Moor 2007, 71). Such statements “are not so much descriptions of what actually 
happens as performative claims made by marketing people embedded within particular 
institutional contexts” (71) (for example, performative claims about the extent to which a 
green brand will succeed in operating as a platform on which consumers activities will 
unfold in ways that are desirable to advertisers). The value of green branding and various 
“truths” about the operations of a “green market” are actively produced (Lury 2004) 
through performative marketing claims, such as those made by O’Neill, and Zaslav. The 
“facts” governing green marketing are a range of interpretations by actors embedded in 
particular institutional contexts, of studies that were produced by researchers likewise 
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embedded specific institutional contexts. There is no single certainty or “factual” reality 
behind the claims about consumers or how to target them with green messages. Such 
statements purport to reflect an a priori reality, but are in fact actively engaged in making 
that reality in ways that are rooted in the assumptions, values, and interests of the 
individuals making the claims—in this case, those with an interest in profit maximization. 
When brands themselves are understood as performative (Lury 2004), green 
marketing discourse and Discovery’s statements can be viewed as part of how the green 
brand is performed for a range of audiences, and through which the brand accrues or 
loses value. Planet Green’s brand value was rooted less in what consumers are actually 
doing with the brand than in the success or failure of Discovery discourse in producing a 
story—a story about what consumers are doing, feeling, and thinking—in which 
advertisers, shareholders, and MSOs are willing to invest.  
While in some ways, Planet Green held potential to help the newly-public 
Discovery Communications Inc. manage the crisis in cable. It promised to overcome ad-
skipping, it promised to capture consumers who were “migrating” online, it promised to 
aid in international growth, and it promised to overcome unruly consumers through 
audience measurement and brands. Thus, in some ways, as this section has demonstrated, 
the “green” anxieties felt by marketers and media business higher-ups are managed in 
much the same way that general worries about invisible audiences and unruly consumers 
are managed across the board: through attempts to know consumers, detail specific 
instructions for targeting them, and build “strong brands” around this knowledge. But, as 
the green marketing discourse suggests, by venturing onto the terrain of 
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environmentalism, Discovery not only faced managing a set of anxieties produced by the 
“crisis in cable,” but was also contending with an additional set of anxieties specific to 
environmentalism.  
Given the heightened worries circulating within the green marketing conversation, 
it is difficult to argue that there was anything definite about the capitalist possibility of 
green marketing that compelled firms to embark on green campaigns. Certainly, green 
marketing tapped into broader industrial desires to “know” consumers, to establish 
certainty about how markets work, and to profit from this knowledge. However, I argue 
that Discovery’s decision to launch green television was not just a strategic response to 
desires for control over markets and consumers, but also representative of the deeply 
ambivalent way in which environmentalist sensibilities came together with the seductive 
pull of governing through branding for the industry elites and cultural intermediaries who 
were involved in Planet Green. 
 
Part 3: A green structure of feeling meets governing ambitions 
In some ways Planet Green presented a potential solution to a set of industrial 
problems facing a cable company on the brink of going public at a particular moment in 
time. But this doesn’t answer specifically: why undertake this huge experiment to center 
the solution to television’s crisis on environmentalism? Sure, Planet Green offered 
opportunities for international expansion, for video-on-demand, for generating web 
traffic, and for branded educational content. It also seemed to be a bold idea for 
“breaking through the clutter” and there was some sense that green lifestyle television 
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would attract affluent consumers. However, the uncertainty and anxiety about consumers, 
markets, and regulations that characterize the green marketing discourse make “market 
readiness” an insufficient explanation for Discovery’s decision to heavily invest in a 
multi-platform environmentalist brand. So, again, why would Discovery venture into 
territory—environmentalism—that seemed at odds with capitalist growth?  
In order to answer this question, I argue that the environmentalist impulses and 
designs of Discovery decision makers must be taken seriously. I do this not to celebrate 
them or suggest that they are somehow “authentic” desires separate from their 
commercial goals, but rather to argue that a particular “structure of feeling” came 
together with the seductive pull of governing through brands in a way that had particular 
resonance among media decision makers at a particular moment in time. I argue that this 
conjuncture is marked simultaneously by deep anxiety and by ambitions of control, and 
that it is crucial to analyze it in the context of the mounting centrality of brands—and the 
industrial actors behind them—to how environmentalism is thought and put into practice 
in contemporary culture.  
Raymond William defines structure of feeling as “social experiences in solution, 
as distinct from other social semantic formations which have been precipitated and are 
more evidently and more immediately available” (Williams 1977, 133-134). This 
“solution” is “a specific structure of particular linkages, particular emphases and 
suppressions, and, in what are often its most recognizable forms, particular deep starting-
points and conclusions” (134). A structure of feeling is about “meanings and values as 
they are actively lived and felt” (133). This “particular quality of social experience and 
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relationship” is historically specific and “gives the sense of a generation or period” (131). 
It involves the relation between seemingly “private” thoughts and a social experience at a 
particular moment in time. In analysis of a structure of feeling, one must attend not only 
to the ways in which media themselves are part of a “social material process” (133), but 
also to the “historically variable” and “complex relation of differentiated structures of 
feeling to differentiated classes” (134). 
For Discovery decision makers, it is safe to assume that this was a particularly 
classed structure of feeling, shaped by their position as high-level media professionals 
and the accompanying classed sensibilities. It is synchronous with broader cultural 
anxieties about the increasingly visible environmental externalities of unfettered 
capitalism: climate change, habitat loss and species extinction, pollution, desertification, 
destructive hurricanes, and other forms of environmental catastrophe. It is a structure of 
feeling that must be understood in relation to the rise of ethical consumerism and 
discourse of “green growth”—and the resonance of these phenomena within the 
liberal/democrat-leaning business community16 and upper-middle classes in the US—as it 
comes together with governing ambitions that have a long history among media and 
cultural elites (McCarthy 2010, Ouellette 2002). Planet Green’s governing aims centered 
on saving the planet through the wholly commercial space of cable branding and through 
activities that were not always rational but also affective—the realization of Planet 
Green’s governmental objective (since it was conceived fully within the logic of brands) 
was contingent upon enrolling individuals in the brand community such that their labor 
                                                
16 Discovery CEO David Zaslav makes campaign contributions in the tens of thousands of dollars to democrats running for office. 
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would not only co-produce the Planet Green brand, but also enable a privatized form of 
planet saving. 
It was in the optimistic discourse surrounding these governing ambitions that 
Planet Green departs from the green marketing discourse, which, as I noted, is structured 
primarily by anxiety about markets and consumers. In contrast, the discourse issuing 
from Discovery in the lead-up to Planet Green’s launch was structured at once by a sense 
of urgency about environmental destruction and climate change as well as intense 
optimism about the possibilities saving the world through television and the magic of 
brands—a sense that I locate in a “structure of feeling” (Williams 1977) that resonates 
with these media higher-ups at a particular moment in time. Specifically, when Discovery 
announced plans to launch Planet Green, it not only made a case for the channel in terms 
of “demand” or “market readiness” it also argued that there was a “need” for green TV 
given climate change and other forms of environmental destruction and that television 
was uniquely positioned to “bring green to the mainstream.”  
Planet Green’s particular brand of environmentalism was structured by a utopian 
promise of “saving the world” through television. Discovery higher-ups claimed that 
Planet Green was a response to a “need” for such programming given the “vitally 
important issue of climate change” as Eileen O’Neill told the Washington Times in 2007. 
She continued, “The reason this network needs to exist is that there is a real problem with 
climate change… And we can help people make changes in their lives that will help 
change the world” (Baschuk 2007). The Planet Green marketing team likewise 
emphasized an environmental mission: “With climate change and environmental issues 
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accelerating at alarming rates and consumer awareness reaching new levels, an 
information and content vacuum existed in the media landscape,” wrote the Planet Green 
marketing team in their submission to the Mark awards. “While environmental 
programming and content existed in pockets,” it went on, “there wasn’t a dedicated 
television platform connecting the state of the environment with viewers” (Planet Green 
Launch Marketing Team 2009). A former Planet Green executive explained that 
Discovery hoped that its unique positioning—as a powerful media firm with a hefty 
programming budget, along with a mission to both “entertain” and “educate”—could 
“bring [environmentalism] more to the forefront in the larger population… Discovery had 
the big brands and big names and ability to reach millions and millions of people…the 
goal was to make [environmentalism] a little bit more mainstream” (Howell 2013). In 
other words, she emphasizes Discovery’s unique potential for being an advocate for the 
environment. 
The promise that TV could be a force for environmentalism seemed to be quite 
appealing to Discovery insiders, though I say this with the acknowledgment that their 
statements were also always performative and thoroughly imbricated in the commercial 
logics of branding. People at Discovery were “very excited” about Planet Green, one 
executive told me. “Everybody was behind it. It had a lot of support from all 
departments… it was an extremely big, successful launch” (Michalchyshyn 2013). 
Another executive remembered that “everybody was extremely excited about the launch 
… A lot of people had vested interest in it… it was exciting! Because it was something 
that was loud and fun and interesting” (Howell 2013). She also emphasized a felt 
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investment in environmentalism at Discovery, that it was “important” to the company; 
she listed its sustainability efforts—recycling, efficient heating and cooling, the LEED 
certified headquarters building—noting, “As a corporation, [environmentalism] was an 
important thing to them. I believe it still is” (Howell 2013). Celebrities signed on in 
droves, including actors Leonardo DiCaprio and Adrian Grenier, celebrity chef Emeril 
Lagasse, “Science Guy” Bill Nye, rapper Chris Bridges aka Ludacris, Tom Green of 
“bum bum song” fame, comedian (and host of the TBS Dinner and a Movie) Annabelle 
Gurwitch, news anchors Tom Brokaw and Bob Woodruff among others. Those who 
appeared on the channel explained that they favored endorsing something they “really 
believed in” and “for our kids” rather than something “stupid” as rock star Tommy Lee 
reflects before the channel’s launch (Levin 2008). 
 Planet Green promised celebrities more legitimate and “authentic” forms of 
programming than the “crass commercialism” elsewhere in popular media. “I was 
definitely not down to do another reality show, because we have too many of those, and 
they're stupid," rock star Tommy Lee told USA Today. “But we're doing something for 
our kids” (Levin 2008). When an interviewer asked celebrity chef Emeril Lagasse, whose 
Planet Green show Emeril Green would be located inside a Whole Foods Market, how he 
stays “authentic,” Lagasse responds, that he isn’t “really about” doing product 
endorsements. “For me” he explained, “it's not only about selling the product; it's really 
about believing in what it's all about… [the partnership with Whole Foods and Planet 
Green] is really important to me ... turning the average person on to sustainable growing 
or organically grown, pesticide-free foods” (Hampp 2008a). For Lagasse, the 
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environmental bent of Planet Green fit with his self-concept and personal brand: “for 
over 30 years, I've been growing organic foods. I was using them when people didn't 
know what organic was or how to spell organic, especially for my restaurants. [‘Going 
organic’ on Planet Green is] no stretch for me at all because I've been in that environment 
for so long” (Hampp 2008a). Similarly, Steve Thomas (of PBS’s This Old House), who 
would host Planet Green’s eco-home improvement show Renovation Nation, explained, 
“my personal mission is to promulgate green building practices or sustainable building 
practices” (Thomas 2013) and Planet Green promised to be a platform to enable that 
mission.17 
 Such hopes for the possibilities of environmental television were expressed not 
only by those actively involved with Planet Green, but also were also evident in the way 
in which the notion of TV with an environmental mission resonated with media decision-
makers beyond Discovery Communications.18 For example, the Washington Post 
described advertiser interest in Planet Green as “intense” (Ahrens 2007a) and the Planet 
Green marketing team won several advertising awards for the channel’s launch. PR Week 
awarded it “Consumer Launch of the Year” (Launch of the Year 2009) while the Cable 
and Telecommunications Association for Marketing granted the Planet Green marketing 
team a Gold Mark Award in the “Brand Image and Positioning – Campaign” division 
(Mark Award 2009). Perhaps actors on these award-granting bodies shared Discovery’s 
                                                
17 For Thomas (2013), negotiating the imperatives of contemporary media business through his personal mission opened up space to 
refigure product placement, such as the three-way partnership between his show, the car company Saturn, and Habitat for Humanity, 
as an innovative and “tasteful”—rather than “hokey” or “offensive.” Across the celebrity discourse, there is a sense that this kind of 
programming is different from other kinds, was more legitimate than the “crass commercialism” elsewhere in popular media. By 
participating in Planet Green, these celebrities could realize desires for a kind of ethical authenticity within media and brand culture. 
18 The approval expressed through the practice of this award granting may seem surprising when placed alongside the initial dismissals 
of the Planet Green project in the trade press. I argue that it speaks to the ways in which a whole range of competing performativities 
are involved in commercial media culture—from profound anxieties about profits to the kinds of desires for “authenticity” (for 
example, in “art” or “doing good”) that, as Sarah Banet-Weiser (2012) has argued, are central to brand culture. 
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assumptions about the alignments of environmentalist sensibilities with cultural 
legitimacy and a “will to govern” through television. 
 
Green Growth 
I argue that the performative statements of intense optimism about the 
compatibility of commerce and world-saving, alongside the serious concern about the 
threats posed by human-created environmental crises like climate change, habitat 
destruction, species extinction, and pollution, are rooted in a structure of feeling shared 
by the writing of Paul Hawken (1999, 2007), Al Gore (1992/2006), and others who 
embrace and promote a set of philosophies including “Natural Capitalism” and “Green 
Growth.” These philosophies are marked by deeply felt objections to environmental 
despoliation and deeply felt faith in the possibilities of a better capitalism. Gore and 
Hawken are both troubled by what they perceive as the immorality of human and 
corporate hubris and a loss of intimacy with nature, a position that is historically rooted in 
the writing of people like Thoreau and Emerson and is, of course, in many ways is 
predicated on privilege. The environmental crisis, for them, is framed as a spiritual crisis 
as much as an economic one.  
The authors call upon what they call the “business community” to restructure its 
thinking around environmental problems. They draw upon a long history in English-
language motivational speaking and writing by pointing out that “crisis” in written 
Chinese is made up of two characters, one that signifies danger and anther that signifies 
opportunity (Gore 1992/2006, xxii-xxiii, for example). (Fluent speakers, however, have 
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pointed out that this is based on a convenient, if slight, mistranslation.) The climate crisis 
represents a chance for privileged and powerful people to take responsibility, which 
promises personal pleasures, good feelings, and the restoration of a kind of spiritual 
“balance” within oneself. At the same time, the climate crisis represents a business 
opportunity, as former president Bill Clinton’s writes in his back-cover endorsement of 
Hawken’s Natural Capitalism, the book “basically proves beyond any argument that 
there are presently available technologies, and those just on the horizon, which will 
permit us to get richer by cleaning, not spoiling, the environment.” The “green growth” 
and “natural capitalism” discourses provided a structure of feeling in which Planet Green 
made sense.  
It may be tempting to dismiss Planet Green decision makers’ environmentalist 
impulses as hypocritical or disingenuous. However, as Sarah Banet-Weiser has 
persuasively argued “Rather than generalize all branding strategies as egregious effects of 
today’s market, and think wistfully of a bygone world that was truly authentic, it is more 
productive to situate brand cultures in terms of their ambivalence, where both economic 
imperatives and ‘authenticity’ are expressed and experienced simultaneously” (Banet-
Weiser 2012, 5).  
In bringing environmentalism together with making money, Planet Green drew 
upon Discovery’s long history of the interrelation—not separation—of commerce and 
civic action. For example, it offered a range of specifically environmental educational 
programs. Discovery Education partnered with Siemens Foundation and the National 
Science Teachers Association in the “We Can Change The World Challenge.” The 
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challenge was aligned with K-12 state standards, and promised to “inspire” students 
toward developing “green solutions” for their schools and communities and “transform” 
them “into active citizens for a greener tomorrow” (Discovery Globe 2008). Discovery 
Education Green, a K-12, state standards-aligned media content service promised to 
“help teachers integrate Green lessons into their curriculum and empowers students to 
make more environmentally conscious decisions” (Planet Green Defines Eco-
Entertainment 2008). Finally, Discovery partnered with GM to co-creating “Live Green 
Teacher Grants” as part of Discovery Education (Hampp 2008b). 
 These initiatives do not represent a cooptation of education, but rather transform 
environmental education as a process of branding. For example, how educational content 
gets selected, produced and sold, or how educational events, such as competitions for 
grants or awards (such as the middle school competition for a new science building, 
making the distribution of educational resources contingent on the entrepreneurial 
abilities of middle-schoolers), the citizenship projects toward which it gets articulated all 
get reshaped through the imperatives of branding. The blurred boundaries between 
branding and civic duty, I argue, are part of this larger industrial structure of feeling. 
 In addition to the promises of this marriage of civic responsibility and brand 
value, I argue that Planet Green appealed to media decision makers as their 
environmentalism came together with the governmentalizing promises of brands. 
Discovery positioned Planet Green as an educational channel—specifically to give people 
tools to become better, more eco-minded citizens. When Zaslav announced the channel, 
he legitimated Planet Green’s environmentalist promise—its claim to eco-credibility to 
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rolling out what was in many ways framed as project of citizen reform—through the 
rhetoric of the “trusted brand.” “The Earth has been central to Discovery since John 
Hendricks first chose the planet to represent our brand” Discovery CEO David Zaslav 
reminded readers in the April 2007 press release announcing Planet Green’s impending 
launch. He explained that Discovery’s “worldwide credibility” made it uniquely suited to 
launching what would be “the most comprehensive and trusted global resource for 
celebrating, preserving and protecting the planet" (Discovery to Dedicate 24-Hour TV 
Network 2007). He pointed out that Discovery had always been an advocate of 
environmental protection—especially in the realm of wildlife preservation (Siklos 2007). 
Discovery’s acquisition of the website TreeHugger.com would only add to Discovery’s 
pro-planet, pro-social mission: "Bringing TreeHugger.com into the Discovery family 
gives it the resources to continue doing what it does best: bringing green living to the 
masses” Discovery’s president of digital media, Bruce Campbell, told the Washington 
Post (Ahrens 2007a). Zaslav told the London Times, “People should go away from 
watching Planet Green and be inspired a little bit” (Ashton 2008). He promised 
programming that was “documentary” in orientation, not “reality” and hoped that viewers 
would “[come] back [to Planet Green] for a bit of nourishment, along with your 
entertainment” (Ashton 2008).  
 Zaslav’s promise of “nutritious” programming and Campbell’s pledge to “bring 
green to the masses” resurrect discourses historically associated with educational 
television and the emergence of US public service broadcasting in the 1960s. In her study 
of PBS, Ouellette (2002) notes that when Newton Minnow famously condemned 
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commercial television as a “vast wasteland” in 1961 or when the New York Times’ Jack 
Gould described the mass audience as “childlike,” mindlessly consuming “candy” instead 
of nutritious “spinach” (quoted in Ouellette 2002, 33), these commentators were painting 
the mass audience in implicitly classed and gendered terms. They were expressing 
(usually white and male) elites’ anxieties about stereotypes of such “lazy feminized 
masses” as soap opera-addicted housewives and working-class “Joe Sixpacks” passively 
consuming broadcast offerings (Ouellette 2002, 33). Ouellette points out that educational 
television was conceived not only to redeem television from the “vast wasteland,” but 
also with a governmental project of cultivating “responsible citizens” with aims of 
Eurocentric “cultural uplift” and individual “maturation”—goals that were shaped by and 
validated the tastes, values, and knowledge of “the sophisticated, college-educated, 
intellectually oriented, implicitly white minority” who conceived educational television 
as an effort to combat what they perceived as broadcast TV’s “cultural mediocrity” 
(Ouellette 2002, 45).19  
 Although Planet Green was not conceived as an overt project of “uplift” for the 
masses, Zaslav reanimates this discourse to differentiate Planet Green from the “trash” 
television available elsewhere and his comments tap into the same deeply classed and 
gendered discourses that cultural elites mobilized in the 60s. Yet while public television 
framed its public service mission in terms of attracting disadvantaged populations to 
“‘better’ television” (19), Planet Green courted affluent consumers. Planet Green never 
tried to distance itself from commercialism but rather refigured commercialism itself as a 
                                                
19 Ouellette also points out that public television emerged in the context of the great society rhetoric and programs of the 1960s. It was 
framed by some reformers, such as Walter Lippmann, as a solution to “cultural poverty” and mass culture. “Good” television offered 
“cultural enlightenment” that was Eurocentric and reflected and reproduced the tastes and values of the white, educated elite. The 
promise was the “democratization” of access to this culture through making “quality” programming available on the public airwaves. 
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site of environmentalist possibility. Planet Green was in many ways unabashedly 
commercial, constructing and courting what Ien Ang calls an “audience-as-market,” 
consumers to sell to its advertisers, it also, seemingly contradictorily, imagined an 
“audience-as-public” in Ang’s sense, made up of citizens to be “reformed, educated, 
informed, as well as entertained – in short, ‘served’ – presumably to enable them to better 
perform their democratic rights and duties” (Ang 1991, 29). Planet green positioned itself 
as a multimedia “public service” to “bring green to the mainstream.” Discovery’s initial 
Planet Green press release described the brand as “a forum” where “like-minded 
individuals” wishing to learn about the world and “make a difference” could gather to, 
for example, measure their carbon footprints, get green consumer advice, and find 
“reliable status reports” on a range of environmental issues including climate change, 
endangered species, deforestation, and the melting of polar ice caps (Discovery to 
Dedicate 24-Hour TV Network 2007). Through Planet Green’s content, individuals could 
be transformed into greener citizens.  
 While the conception of the “audience-as-public” and the “audience-as-market” 
may appear to be in conflict, Ang (1991) points out that the seemingly distinct 
constructs—“audience-as-market” and “audience-as-public”—are only “relatively 
conflicting” for both are rooted in a struggle by media institutions to conquer and control 
the audience.20 Ang describes the way in which media institutions that address their 
audience as a “public” and citizens to be reformed as “paternalistic” in Raymond 
Williams’ sense, “an authoritarian system with a conscience” (quoting Williams 1976, 
                                                
20 In fact, the tensions between audience-as-public and audience-as-market are far from unique to Planet Green, for the distinction 
between them is historical, not natural, and processes of broadcast deregulation since the 70s have made audience-as-public 
increasingly resemble audience-as-market. 
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28). In such a system, the relationship between audience and institution is understood in 
“cultural and ideological terms” transmitting the tastes, values and habits of the ruling 
majority, in addition to a “sense of cultural responsibility and social accountability” that 
stands in contrast to gratifying audience “wants” (Ang 1991, 28). While Planet Green 
insisted that it would be “entertaining” in addition to “nutritious,” the way in which 
Zaslav mobilized the rhetoric of the “trusted brand” plays on the same kind of 
paternalism, positioning Discovery as the authoritative arbiter of what counts as “green” 
and promising to “bring” it to “the masses.” Further, despite the fact that Planet Green 
was operating in a context where branding wisdom figures the relationship between 
consumers and brands in terms of a kind of managed freedom, in which individuals’ 
“spontaneous” use of brands would co-produce their value (Arvidsson 2006), Zaslav 
takes up a regressive “transmission” or “hypodermic” view of communication: rather 
than inviting varied participation, as do brands, by imagining an audience as “a public” 
Planet Green conceives of its audience as “receivers” of its environmental messages (Ang 
1991, 29). 
 In this way, Discovery’s Planet Green project was rooted in a structure of feeling 
in which the meeting of this fantasy of environmentalism with this fantasy of control had 
particular resonance. The discourse issuing from Discovery tapped into the world-
changing promises of green growth discourse and the compatibility of making money and 
doing good. Indeed, the promise of Planet Green was as much an expression of 
environmentalist dreams, as it was pursuit for profit. The discourse surrounding Planet 
Green itself, especially in the early months, was structured by a promise that a media 
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brand could be an, albeit top down, activist force as well as a site of activism—a promise 
that Planet Green could be an environmentalist intervention and at the same time provide 
a context for the environmental interventions of fans, celebrities, and corporate sponsors.  
 
Governmentalizing dreams, biopower, neoliberalism 
 While branding is always entangled with a control impulse, as I have already 
discussed, in Planet Green this impulse came together with a “will to govern” in a 
broader manner as well. The biopolitical promise of branding makes it “seductive” in 
Maija Nadesan’s (2008) sense. She writes, “Biopower is seductive because its logics, 
technologies, and experts offer, or at least purport to offer, tools for societal self-
government. Biopower’s mantra of the rational administration of life promises means for 
realizing the elusive cybernetic fantasy of a society of self-regulating individuals” 
(Nadesan 2008, 3). In the case of Planet Green, the “environmentalist desires” I have 
been discussing are not so much “authentic” as they represent the coming together of a 
particular structure of feeling with the seductive dream of this kind of “governing at a 
distance.” The appeal of such governing must be understood within a long history in 
which television came to be viewed by media and cultural elites as an ideal mechanism 
for disseminating lessons for good citizenship. Further, this is a history that complements 
in crucial ways the taking hold and intensification of neoliberal rationalities of 
government from the postwar era to the present. 
For example, as Anna McCarthy (2010) has shown, in the 1950s social and 
cultural elites came to view mass-appeal television as an ideal vehicle for cultivating 
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citizenship qualities that complemented Cold War liberalism (ironically, however, they 
also worried about the stupefying effects of such TV’s “cultural mediocrity” (Ouellette 
2002)). They conceived of ideal citizens who were “mature,” rational, self-managing and 
moderate selves who would conduct themselves “intelligently” in the realms of politics, 
the arts, and the market, and look favorably upon the equation of democracy with the free 
market (McCarthy 2010). These elites developed sponsored programming aimed 
simultaneously at nurturing these qualities and consolidating their own classed interests. 
Sponsored postwar television programming, she argues, helped “implant the neoliberal 
program in U.S. political culture” less through “its influence on the so-called masses” 
than through “its capacity to galvanize elites” (8). 
As liberalism intensified into advanced or neo-liberalism with the “reinvention of 
government” in the 1980s and 1990s—an ongoing process of public sector downsizing, 
dismantling of welfare programs, and valorization of market deregulation, public-private 
partnerships, and privatization of historically state responsibilities—government has 
become increasingly reliant upon a citizenry that is self-managing, self-responsible, 
enterprising, risk averse, and requires no intervention on the part of the state. Laurie 
Ouellette and James Hay have demonstrated that television—specifically the 
inexpensive-to-produce and highly profitable genres of lifestyle and reality-based 
television that proliferated with the explosion of niche media in recent decades—has 
become particularly useful to neoliberal rationalities of rule. By taking lifestyle as an 
object of assessment and intervention, by extolling privatization, volunteerism, 
entrepreneurialism, and personal responsibility, and by offering individuals a whole range 
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of resources for working on their everyday conduct in line with these values, 
contemporary reality and lifestyle television urge individuals to actively participate in 
their own government (Ouellette and Hay 2008). 
Although Ouellette and Hay focus centrally on the ways in which reality and 
lifestyle TV has inserted itself as a mode of social service delivery, instructing struggling 
individuals in self-care and personal responsibility so as not to be a burden to the state 
(see also Ouellette 2012 and Ouellette 2004 for other examples of this). Planet Green, 
was a second tier cable channel that hoped to address relatively affluent consumers. 
Representing what I will call “a green governmentality for upscale consumers,” Planet 
Green would work to enlist individuals’ everyday practices and labor in alleviating 
industrial anxieties and resolving the contradictions that emerged in the process of 
reconciling contemporary branding with saving the planet. 
 Planet Green’s televised and online pedagogies of citizenship would not separate 
from commercialism, but rather work to over come the contradictions of public sector 
downsizing and environmental regulation in the privatized space of cable branding, 
calling upon private individuals, corporations, and environmental not-for-profits to come 
together in voluntary and mutually beneficial ways. Discovery imagined that it could 
build a kind of branded utopia in which consumers’ active engagement with Planet 
Green—their TV watching, their online interactivity, their uptake of green tips and 
products in their everyday lives—would be fully structured toward “coproducing,” in 
Arvidsson’s sense, a range of green brands (including celebrity brands, product brands, 
media brands, and their own self-brands). This branded utopia that would organize 
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individuals’ environmentalism into something that would work for brands and, in turn, 
organize advertisers’ activities in a way that would work for environmentalism. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the discourse surrounding Planet Green’s early 
branding articulated a very specific fantasy of planet saving—one which, I argue, 
resonated with a larger structure of feeling in which the investment in the governmental 
powers of brands came together with a class-inflected concern about environmental 
destruction and investment in business-as-usual market structures. In part, Planet Green 
was promoted as a paternalistic project that bore the legacy of educational television, 
with its project of citizen reform. But Planet Green also promised to transform 
environmental governing in line with the aims profit maximization. In Planet Green, 
Discovery hoped to realize a new kind of environmentalism within the constraints of 
media business. This was an environmentalism that would be neither fake nor 
hypocritical, just highly orchestrated. Planet Green can be viewed as a kind of experiment 
that attempted to answer, “What would it mean to fully organize consumers’ 
environmentalism?” This was a question that would generate enormous anxiety, as I will 
discuss in the next chapters, given the impossibility of realizing this dream. But at the 
outset, insofar as the marketing and industrial discourse conceived of consumers’ 
autonomous environmentalism as an obstacle to corporate environmentalism—such as 
consumers willing to “talk the talk,” but not “walk the walk”—Discovery developed 
Planet Green to address the notion that corporations can’t do environmentalism if 
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consumers don’t cooperate (this, of course is only one problematization of corporate 
environmentalism; corporate environmentalism could be conceived differently if we 
think outside of the mandates of a radically free market). In the face of all of green’s 
potential risks, in the face of the myriad reasons why green might either fail or threaten 
brands and profits, Discovery would build a universe that promised to counter all of these 
risks by organizing the affects and activities surrounding environmentalism according to 
strict criteria—criteria that aimed to alleviate industrial anxieties and to organize 
consumers against a range of potential outcomes that are not only unprofitable, but are 
also perceived threatening to brands’ ability to “be green.” In this way, the industrial 
fantasy of control over consumers became likewise a fantasy of (the feasibility of this 
kind of top-down corporate) environmentalism, and vice versa. For Planet Green, 
branding—with its governmentalizing dreams—contained the promise of overcoming 
unruly consumers for the environment. 
Planet Green would not only enact these “solutions” to cable TV’s crisis, 
Discovery spokespeople would also perform their viability—largely for an audience of 
advertisers—in a larger industrial discourse. Part of this performative discourse involved 
proposing that Planet Green would not only provide consumers with a range of resources 
to self-realize and self-govern as green consumer-citizens but also provide them with a 
whole media environment in which they could enact their environmentalist activities and 
sensibilities in a way that would be productive for Planet Green and its advertisers’ 
brands. 
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It is not surprising that the Planet Green project appealed to media higher-ups 
because it promised to operate as a mediated form of governance, guiding consumers 
toward brand building activities in ways that also resonated with specific very fantasies 
of environmental clean-up. These fantasies—while surely not entirely cynical for these 
cultural intermediaries—were contingent upon choice-based modes of agency in a 
radically free market. They imagined a fully privatized environmentalism aligned with 
both corporate profits and neoliberal rationalities of rule, working to repair the 
environmental consequences of unfettered capitalism in the realm of the market (that is, 
through unfettered capitalism itself). Planet Green was conceived as a kind of utopian 
context in which this apparently contradictory project would work. Through performative 
and governmental means, Discovery hoped to guide advertisers and consumers toward 
activities that could to resolve the tensions between profits and activism, between 
commerce and politics, between attracting eyeballs and reforming citizens, and between 
consumerism and conservation. I argue that this produced a highly ambivalent and 
anxious space, in ways that I will explore further in the remainder of this dissertation. 
Branding environmentalism for television involved extensive performative work to 
disavow the irresolvability of these contradictions; and part of this disavowal was the 
practice of branding itself, for “strong branding” promised to help firms control and 
predict markets. Planet Green worked to resolve these contradictions through the pursuit 
of a god-like level of control, which, as I will show in later chapters, for all its 
governmental dreams, even branding could not realize. 
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Chapter 2: Branding, governmentality, and the new environmentalism 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1, I examined the way in which Planet Green emerged within a 
complex industrial structure of feeling as it came together with ambitions of governing 
through brands. In this chapter I delve into the way these materialized in the 
multiplatform Planet Green brand. I extend the argument I made in Chapter 1—that for 
Planet Green, the process of branding was linked to a control impulse from the get go. I 
show that contemporary branding is structured in ways that bear remarkable resemblance 
to what Foucauldian scholars call governmentality. This resemblance, however, is more 
than coincidental, for brands and branding have become increasingly involved in 
neoliberal forms of governmentality (see Moor 2007, Banet-Weiser 2012, Ouellette 2012 
for examples of this). For this reason, this chapter insists that analysis of what is 
sometimes called “green governmentality,” which I will define shortly, increasingly 
demands attention to brands. Planet Green offers a quintessential example of the meeting 
of branding, governmentality, and what I am calling “the new environmentalism.” This is 
a form of environmental governance that gains its legitimacy not from the state, 
democratic process, or collective struggle, but rather through the logic branding itself. 
This chapter seeks to examine what this form of governance looked like in the highly 
detailed and elaborated example of Planet Green, taking seriously what environmental 
possibilities were opened up and what were shut down. 
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Although Planet Green’s content changed significantly over its four years of 
existence, in this chapter (as well as the next), I zero in on its initial slate of programming 
commissioned and aired in line with Planet Green’s original mission and brand identity, 
for this programming is the clearest articulation of Discovery’s particular dream of 
environment saving through brands. It was on June 4, 2008, not quite a year after 
Discovery had initially announced its plans to launch the brand, Discovery 
Communications Inc. rebranded its Discovery Home channel as the “first-ever 24/7 eco-
lifestyle network” (Planet Green Launch Marketing Team 2009). The new channel 
exploded onto the scene with an enormous publicity launch with marketing events that 
doubled as environmental action. Planet Green “greened” Major League Baseball games 
along the East Coast, handing out prizes to randomly-selected individuals engaged in 
“green” behavior. In Times Square, it “greened” billboards and staged a bicycles 
giveaway. It held an Earth Day tree planting and an outdoor clean-up session at the 
Indianapolis 500. Working to bring individuals’ existing fan investments in, for example, 
professional baseball or car racing, as well as their environmental sensibilities into 
alignment with the business imperatives of the brand, Planet Green’s launch offered a 
preview of what would soon become a fully branded environmentalism. 
As Planet Green rolled out its initial slate of programming and web content, it 
elaborated this branded environmental activism through programming ranging from 
environmental news (Focus Earth (2008-2010)) to game shows (Go for the Green 
(2008)), from documentaries (Greensburg (2008-2010)) to cooking shows (Emeril Green 
(2008-2010)). Celebrity-studded programs, such as the eco-themed faceoff between 
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rocker Tommy Lee and rapper Ludacris aka Chris Bridges (Battleground Earth (2008)) 
educated viewers about environmentally-friendly products and ways to conserve energy 
at home. Magazine-type shows (G Word (2008)) offered lifestyle tips, instructions for 
green DIY projects, mediated fieldtrips to visit eco-entrepreneurs, and lessons on new 
green technology. A number of home renovation shows demonstrated eco-friendly 
improvements while a spoofy reality program showcased “eco-don’ts” and offered cash 
prizes to featured “eco criminals” who reduced their ecological footprints on TV 
(Wa$ted! (2008-2010)).  
Billing itself as “the multiplatform media destination with a mission,” Discovery 
promised that Planet Green would be “the center for the new green conversation, 
speaking to people who want to understand green living and to those who truly want to 
make a difference in meeting the critical challenge of protecting our environment.” Its 
“unique content, tools and information” would “enlighten, empower and most important 
entertain.” The television component would do so in tandem with its “leading eco-
lifestyle website TreeHugger.com”—a recent acquisition that focused on eco news, 
science and technology and already had a devoted following of users—as well as the 
brand new “solutions-oriented PlanetGreen.com” (Planet Green Defines Eco-
Entertainment 2008). Online, individuals could find lifestyle tips, additional information 
on the television shows (including how to become a contestant), consumer tips, news bits, 
quizzes and games, discussion forums, and opportunities to “get involved.” They could 
find tips for “greening” one’s commute to work or school, be “sustainable on the cheap,” 
a guide to “better biking” DIY projects, “organic A-Z” green holiday traditions, “join the 
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conversation” on forums and discussion boards—and later on Facebook and Twitter. 
They could learn about “less-is-more lifestyle,” greener travel and vacationing, public 
transportation, hybrid cars, pollution, tips for greening up investing, home renting and 
buying, weddings and sex practices, workout routines, skin care and babies. If individuals 
wanted to choose favorite celebrities based on green criteria, they could do that too. They 
could even learn how to plan a greener funeral (Planet Green Homepage 2009). 
When the channeled launched, however, the “quality” popular press greeted it 
with measured derision.21 For Boston Globe TV critic Matthew Gilbert, green TV was no 
more than a marketing ploy, a savvy move by advertisers eager to tap into an emergent—
and affluent—green consumer group. Most of Planet Green’s programming, he argued, 
showcased a consumerist good life that was “unbearably posh and fashionable,” “shallow 
and self-satisfied,” and hopelessly commercial (Gilbert 2008). The New York Time’s 
Alessandra Stanley wasn’t convinced by the channel’s “wide and at times inconsistent” 
definition of environmentalism, given advertisements for Dow Chemical, a company with 
a horrendous environmental record, and celebrity chef Emeril Lagasse’s breezy shopping 
trips or super-caloric recipe demonstrations during his Whole Foods Market-based 
cooking lessons (Stanley 2008). 
While it may be tempting to dismiss Planet Green for its commercialism, its 
corporate sponsorship, its inattention to structural issues, its focus on consumer lifestyle, 
or, most troubling to commentators, its environmental contradictions (i.e., “hypocrisy”), 
doing so tells us very little about its significance. The features of Planet Green that open 
                                                
21 This derision represents a different discusive formation, that of the “quality press,” than that of media spokespeople and advertisers 
talking to each other in the trade press. This “quality” discourse is structured far more by classed forms of “taste” than by advertiser 
anxieties. 
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it up to the kind of criticism registered in the press are not unusual in ethical and 
environmental lifestyle media—nor in green marketing more broadly. Planet Green 
emerged in the context of an enormous surge in environmental branding and lifestyle 
media, which I laid out in the introduction to this dissertation. These brands that make of 
the “green space” are undeniably commercial—and obviously preoccupied with 
individual lifestyle choices. However, one would be remiss to ignore the way that they 
are also increasingly involved in how we govern ourselves as climate change, pollution, 
extinction, habitat destruction, deforestation, desertification and other forms of 
environmental degradation continue apace, and with increasing media visibility. Lifestyle 
has become a key site of environmental governance. At the same time that environmental 
policy has been deregulated and its enforcement agencies defunded in favor of corporate 
“voluntary self-regulation,” we have seen a rise in rebate and incentive programs that 
reward individuals for the purchase of energy-efficient home appliances like furnaces and 
water heaters, windows, and hybrid vehicles. While some of these programs are 
government sponsored, they are also dispersed across societal institutions, a great deal of 
which are brands. Dismissing Planet Green—the most elaborate and highest-profile green 
lifestyle brand to date—risks missing what it can tell us, not only about the role of brands 
in the larger proliferation of this kind of governance, but also how very contradictory 
branding environmentalism can be. Most crucially, I argue it fails to see the way in 
which, as I will show, Planet Green was actively involved in both producing and doing 
what I call a “new environmentalism.”  
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I understand this new environmentalism as a particular manifestation of 
contemporary environmental governance. It situates brands as authorities and enabling 
actors in a privatized form of planet saving that doubles as profitable branding in a 
cluttered and competitive media environment; and it offers individuals a range of 
resources to help them self-govern as green consumer citizens and members of the Planet 
Green community. In calling this environmentalism “new” I am highlighting its 
alignment with new forms of privatized public service that proliferate in the context of 
neoliberal roll-backs of the social safety net. As environmental historians have pointed 
out, there is nothing new about the involvement of the private sector in how 
environmental issues get addressed. Oil and gas companies, polluting industries, the 
waste disposal industry, various other elite (e.g., hunting/sporting) and industrial interests 
(like the timber industry, which has a stake in conservation, for example) have actively 
participated in shaping regulatory policy and the agendas of “establishment” 
environmental organizations, at least since the early 20th century (Gottlieb 2005). Nor is 
there anything new about market-based approaches to environmental regulation. Since 
the Reagan administration, the US has witnessed ongoing efforts to systematically 
dismantle the environmental policy apparatus by deregulating industry, devolving 
enforcement responsibility from the federal government to states and municipalities, and 
defunding enforcement budgets to starve much environmental regulation into 
inefficacy.22 Environmental policies increasingly emphasize—not regulations, strict 
limits on emissions, or binding timeframes for achieving target improvements—but 
                                                
22 This is a process which, in turn, has helped to position regulation itself as frustrating “red tape” for th states and municipalities that 
could no longer afford enforcement. 
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voluntary, marketized programs that seek to incentivize voluntary compliance (Andrews 
1999/2006, Gottlieb 2005). Finally, neither is there anything new about the role of media 
as a technology in these processes. “The environment” was a media darling throughout 
the 1970s in a manner that hardly contested what Robert Gottlieb (2005) calls the “urban 
industrial order”; by 1990 the Earth Day celebration was conceived from the get go as a 
media event that was framed by “need for individual action” and operated as a platform 
for environmentalist-themed PR efforts on the part of polluting industries (Gottlieb 
2005). 
What is new, or, at the very least, specific to the contemporary form of US 
neoliberalism, is the extent to which the state’s central purpose is to ensure the “freedom” 
of the market and, with this, the extent to which government has become reliant, not only 
on a citizenry that is self-governing and a corporate sector that is self-regulating, but also 
on the voluntarism of these same entities to help overcome the environmental 
contradictions of a radically free market.23 
In this analysis, I make two main claims. First, I argue that Discovery worked to 
set the stage for green branding through a number of industrial interventions (for 
example, marketing conferences, advertising awards, market research, and the creation of 
Planet Green as a branding platform). In doing so, Discovery positioned the Planet Green 
brand as site at which the possibilities of green branding could be realized for corporate 
sponsors, for non-profit partners, for celebrities, and for Discovery itself. This involved a 
cyclical process that was both technical and ritualized. In branding environmentalism, 
                                                
23 Andrew Hoffman (2001), for example, argues that this history of industrial or corporate environmentalism can be loosely organized 
into four eras: “industrial environmentalism” in the 60s, “regulatory environmentalism” in the 70s, “environmentalism as social 
responsibility” between 1982 and 1988, and “strategic environmentalism” between 1988 and 1993. 
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Discovery not only worked to create a market for these green brands, but it also worked 
to enact a process in which this range of brands would co-confer and co-confirm eco-
legitimacy. This kind of legitimacy, as I am using the term, is not a predetermined 
“authentic” or “truth-telling” environmentalism. Rather, it something that is produced 
within the performative process of branding (indeed, like branding, such legitimacy 
depends upon, as I will discuss shortly, “consumer co-production”). Never an either-or 
proposition (i.e., either profits or environmental legitimacy), in Planet Green profitability 
and environmental legitimacy would be inextricable and mutually enabling. 
Environmental legitimacy, then, is not simply ideological, but is materially and 
discursively productive: in Planet Green’s range of brand partnerships, Discovery was 
actively engaged in performing and enacting a new environmentalism.  
This green co-branding, however, could not be complete without consumers, 
whose labor was required to “co-produce” (Arvidsson 2006) the brands and, in this case, 
co-produce the green authority and the new environmentalism that the branding process 
aimed to enact. Thus my second argument is that, at every stage, this branding of 
environmentalism enabled forms of what Foucauldian scholars call “green 
governmentality” that enlisted upscale consumers by offering them an array of branded 
“technologies of the self.” Specifically, the branding of environmentalism on the 
industrial side (i.e., Discovery’s effort to make green branding appealing and 
economically rational for actors like advertisers, celebrities, and nonprofits) materialized 
in a multiplatform lifestyle brand that put forth a whole “art of living” (Foucault 1990). 
Guided by a range of authoritative eco-discourses that were indistinguishable from 
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brands, Planet Green offered individuals tips and techniques, forms of measure, tools for 
self-assessment, and interactive platforms. By engaging with these resources in their 
everyday lives, individuals were invited to self-shape as green consumer-citizens and 
members of the Planet Green brand community. In this way, Planet Green offered a 
template for green consumer-citizenship that promised to be directly productive for 
brands—productive, for example, of brand value and branded eco-legitimacy—at the 
same time that it called upon individuals to self-govern for the environment. 
In the first section of this chapter, I briefly review the critical literature on 
branding, with special attention to the ways in which branding comes together with forms 
of neoliberal governmentality. I address the way in which environmental governance is 
increasingly approached through forms of what scholars call “green” or “eco-
governmentality” or “environmentality” (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006, Hart 2011, 
Kusno 2011, Luke 1995, Methmann 2011, Rutherford 2007). Branding is rarely made 
central to analysis of green governmentality. Yet branding is a fundamental dimension of 
contemporary environmental intervention and manifests in the proliferation of green 
lifestyle media, eco-friendly products and services, corporate environmental 
responsibility campaigns, and public-private and not-for-profit partnerships. I argue that 
analysis of environmental governmentality requires close attention to brands and further, 
that Planet Green offers an ideal case study for doing so. In the second section of this 
chapter, I lay out Planet Green’s branding strategy, demonstrating that at every turn it 
worked to simultaneously enable forms of branding and forms of governmentality. And 
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in the third section of this chapter, I offer a more detailed analysis of three templates for 
eco-consumer-citizenship that the Planet Green brand aimed to enable.  
 
Part one: Branding, neoliberal governmentality, and the new environmentalism 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that Planet Green was conceived on the basis of 
a governmentalizing impulse that came together with hopes of saving the planet through 
branding. Discovery executives hoped that the Planet Green brand would “activate” 
consumers in the “green space” of eco-friendly consumer capitalism and work to guide 
these individuals’ activities in line with the interests of advertisers. This of course is not 
surprising given the contemporary cultural purchase of the belief that brands—with their 
unique affective, practical, narrative, and spatial qualities—can successfully shape 
individuals’ behavior and emotional investments. This confidence in the potential of 
branding—or at the very least, this felt imperative to brand—is not limited to media firms 
and product manufacturers, but, as a number of scholars have observed, extends to 
nonprofits, religious organizations, political and social movements, and even selves 
(Banet-Weiser 2012, Moor 2007, Hearn 2012). Brands provide a context and a range of 
resources that are aimed at “empowering” individuals to enact the details of their lives, 
their social relations, and their everyday activities in ways that are productive for brands 
(Arvidsson 2006). As Liz Moor has explained, through practices of branding, brand 
managers work “to organize human and technical productivity in line with various 
strategic ends”; they do so by mobilizing “various aesthetic and cultural themes and 
signifiers… to support projects that are essentially about governance” (Moor 2007, 11). 
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The governmental promise of branding makes the practice especially appealing to 
TV business (as well as ad-supported media business more broadly). TV has long been 
engaged in a struggle for control over the television audience—an inherently invisible 
and unpredictable entity (Ang 1991). Historically, television firms have sought control by 
using ratings to render television audiences visible and predictable in order to sell them to 
advertisers. Branding, which gained popularity among TV firms in the 1980s, offers the 
promise of not simply knowing the audience, but guiding it toward particular ends. 
In this way, branding bears remarkable resemblance to what Foucauldian scholars 
call governmentality. Governmentality involves the dispersion of governmental functions 
across a range of institutions and authoritative discourses. Rather than top-down efforts to 
“force, control or dominate,” governmentality involves “forms of action and relations of 
power that aim to guide and shape… the actions of others” and “the way we act upon 
ourselves” (Cruikshank 1999, 4). Governmentality describes a process of “governing at a 
distance” through a proliferation of discourses, techniques and resources—what 
Foucauldian scholars call “cultural technologies”—to aid individuals in governing 
themselves in line with certain goals.  
The concept of cultural technologies draws from what Foucault called 
“technologies of the self” in his work on the role of ethics for the male members of the 
ancient Greek ruling classes and has much in common with the advice and resources 
disseminated through the Planet Green brand. According to Foucault, these Greeks 
conceived of one’s self and one’s freedom as an ethical problem (Foucault 2003, 136). 
Rather than a rigid moral system of do’s and don’ts, ethics involved a “whole art of 
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living” enabled by an array of “technologies of the self,” or tools and strategies to assist 
one in caring for, working on, scrutinizing, reflecting upon, and evaluating one’s self. 
Such “technologies of the self…permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with 
the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, 
thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (146). The uptake 
of such techniques aimed to enable self-government through an ongoing process of 
knowing and mastering one’s self and one’s conduct. In Foucault’s summary, 
technologies of the self for the ancient Greeks included techniques like writing, 
reviewing and reconsidering past action, self-disclosure and verbalization, self-scrutiny 
and ongoing contemplation (158). Environmental lifestyle brands (as well as brands 
associated with what is more broadly termed “ethical consumerism”) tap into this very 
impulse to work on oneself through “tips and techniques” of self-reflection and self-
mastery and the uptake of various practices and products in order to live a kind of 
“beautiful green life.” Although we cannot simply extend Foucault’s work on Antiquity 
to the present—not least because, in contemporary culture the aims and objectives of 
such techniques align less with becoming a just ruler of others, as it did for these Greeks, 
than with the rationalities of neoliberalism—the attention to the minute details of 
everyday life and the ongoing work on the self discussed by Foucault offers insight into 
contemporary regimes of self work. And, as I will show, Planet Green was entirely 
structured around disseminating such tips and techniques, and offering them in the 
context of a range of branded authoritative discourses to guide their uptake. 
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While the role of technologies of the self in strategies of branding may seem 
unconnected to larger questions of governance, Planet Green, with its slate of reality and 
lifestyle television, follows a great many other shows in these genres that operate, as 
Laurie Ouellette and James Hay (2008) argue, as a “cultural component” to neoliberal 
governance. Since the 1980s, with the “reinvention of government” into what is now 
called neoliberalism—an ongoing process of public sector downsizing, dismantling of 
welfare programs and the environmental regulatory apparatus, the valorization of a “free” 
market, increasing public-private partnerships, and the privatization of historically state 
responsibilities—government has become increasingly reliant upon a citizenry that is 
self-managing, self-responsible, enterprising, risk averse, and requires no intervention on 
the part of the state. As I discussed in Chapter 1, reality and lifestyle television can be 
viewed as a “cultural technology” that works to “govern at a distance” by enlisting 
individuals in “personal programs of cultivation” (Ouellette and Hay 2008) structured by 
neoliberal discourses of personal responsibility, entrepreneurialism, risk-aversion, and 
volunteerism.  
Such scholarship on TV’s role in neoliberal rationalities of rule has often focused 
on the ways television has become a mode of social service delivery by providing tools 
for needy individuals to take care of themselves so as not to be a burden to the state (see, 
for example, Ouellette and Hay 2008, Ouellette 2012, Ouellette 2004). In the case of 
Planet Green, however, the second tier cable channel addressed an audience ostensibly 
already thriving under neoliberal political and economic conditions. The channel 
assumed homeownership, disposable income, and that needs for shelter, safety, 
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healthcare, and other forms of security were already being met. Rather than safety or 
security, Planet Green promised self-actualization through green living (See Ouellette 
and Hay 30). Planet Green elaborated a green governmentality for upscale consumers. It 
worked to enlist individuals’ everyday practices and labor in alleviating industrial 
anxieties and resolving the contradictions that emerge in the process of reconciling 
contemporary branding with saving the planet. 
In the context of brand culture and convergence media, the governmental 
functioning of TV that Ouellette and Hay discuss plays out not just on television, but also 
through the kinds of sustained brand engagement that multimedia interactive content 
enables. In Planet Green, individuals were offered not just television programming, but a 
whole branded universe that encompassed not only Planet Green’s brand, but also those 
of its sponsors and the channel’s affiliated celebrities. By moving between branded 
platforms, individuals could access a range of tools for self-work and guiding advice and 
incorporate all of this into their everyday lives (see Ouellette and Wilson 2011 as another 
example of this). 
As a technology of neoliberal governance, then, the resemblance of branding to 
governmentality is more than coincidental. Planet Green attempted to do what Sarah 
Banet-Weiser calls the “branding of politics.” Banet-Weiser insists that the branding of 
politics not be reduced to “another binary corporate appropriation and some vague ideal 
of progressive politics” (Banet-Weiser 2012, 126). Rather, it is part of a broader shift that 
“The US is witnessing, and participating in, a shift from ‘authentic’ politics to branding 
politics as authentic,” illustrated by practices like “corporate social responsibility, in 
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which corporations use a social issue (such as environmental concern or poverty) as a 
platform not only to sell products but also to further their brand” (126). Banet-Weiser’s 
broader argument is that “the emergence of brand culture in the contemporary moment 
means that realms of culture and society once considered outside the official economy—
like politics—are harnessed, reshaped, made legible in economic terms” (126-127). 
Practices like the branding of politics under brand culture blur the distinctions between 
corporations and consumers (127). Such branding is not simply commodification. Rather, 
“branded politics by definition also involves coproduction with consumer activists, where 
people act politically by consuming” (128). Following this line of reasoning, Planet 
Green ought not be understood as a false form of politics. Rather, Planet Green worked to 
reshape environmental politics by transforming itself into a social cause and a green 
future. 
As a green governmentality for upscale consumers, Planet Green departs from 
much of the literature on what is variously called “eco-” or “green governmentality” or 
“environmentality,” which is focused on the notion of “nature” as it comes to be subject 
to forms of measure, authoritative knowledge, and management and thus brought under 
neoliberal rationalities of rule as “instrumental rationalities” come to govern the “policing 
of ecological spaces” (Luke 1995, 65) and a proliferation of environmental experts, 
professionals, forms of measure, and authoritative discourses, particularly about risk and 
risk management as “the administration of life” comes to encompass not just individuals 
and populations, but the natural environment as well (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006, 
  102 
54).24 While this literature provides a useful backdrop, I argue that without attention to 
brands, our understanding of green governmentality is not complete. Further, the 
particularities of Planet Green as an explicitly commercial enterprise aimed at upscale 
consumers not only requires specific analysis but also offers insight into green 
governmentality—as well as green branding—more broadly. Certainly Planet Green was 
fully preoccupied by authorizing particular kinds of actors to solve a specific construction 
of environmental crisis. But Planet Green is less interested in “nature” as an object of 
assessment, measurement, and management than it is in the upscale consumer as such. 
Nonetheless, it intersects with these forms of green governmentality/environmentality in 
that it is wholly entwined with this larger dispersion of ecological governance made 
legible and practicable through the economic rationalities associated with a radically free 
market.  
Thus, to analyze Planet Green in the context of brand culture and as a 
governmental technology requires not simply examining its television shows, but also 
looking at the whole Planet Green brand: how Discovery worked to create a market for it, 
how it took shape in its launch, and how its initial programming came together with 
contemporary regimes of governance. For Planet Green, as we will see, branding was a 
process of both enacting a particular future in which, for example, commerce and 
conservation come together, but also demonstrating this strategy and all the practices 
                                                
24 Green governmentality manifests in sustainable development trainings (Hart 2011), carbon trading/carbon offsets and the “discourse 
of ecological modernization” (Baeckstrand and Loevbrand 2006), discourses of “sustainable” or “green cities” (Kusno 2011), 
voluntary carbon abatement, and a range of equivalencies (carbon sinks in the form of forests, for example, and carbon in the form of 
industrial pollution, the “techne of commensuration” making carbon tradable (Methmann 2011, 13)). Stephanie Rutherford points out 
that green governmentality is productive of “regimes of truth, subject positions, representations of reality, practices of rule, and kinds 
of morality” (294). That is, if we are to understand “the truth about the environment is made, and how that truth is governed,” it is 
crucial to examine contemporary constructions of the environment in crisis, the production of knowledge around this crisis, and who 
“is authorized to save it” (Rutherford 2007, 295).  
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associated with it in a pedagogical project. Planet Green invited viewers to invest in the 
possibilities of green branding. It modeled and enacted a green future in which 
individuals could self-realize as green consumer-citizens and bona fide eco-celebrities (as 
entertainers, experts and/or entrepreneurs) at the same time that human and 
environmental problems could be solved by brands. 
 
Part two: producing a “green space” for brands to become active players in the new 
environmentalism  
 As I discuss throughout this dissertation, there is a great deal of anxiety among 
firms about attaching their brands to environmental causes; it is believed that doing so 
opens up their corporate and industrial practices to heightened scrutiny. If Planet Green 
was going to persuade brands to sign on to the new channel, it had to do a great deal of 
work to make green marketing appealing. It had to produce and perform itself as a site of 
possibility first, at which environmentalism and brand building would be 
indistinguishable, and second, where the meeting of environmentalism and brand 
building would operate as a governmental technology, rendering consumer activities 
predictable and productive for this new environmentalism. In this way, Planet Green’s 
branding would be about more than persuasion for it would play an active role in shaping 
a green market and enabling the new environmentalism. 
In order to carve out a market space for Planet Green, Discovery began by 
intervening in the broader context in which green marketing and corporate sustainability 
took place. Planet Green was the “exclusive presenter” of the first annual Good and 
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Green Marketing Conference in November 2007.25 By presenting the conference, 
Discovery did not simply work to convince marketers that investing in green branding 
was a good idea (though, of course, it did this as well waxing enthusiastic about its profit 
possibilities in press releases), the conference itself can be understood as technical and 
productive, for it offered marketers tools, lessons, and workshops to learn how to put 
green marketing into practice. The month following the conference, Planet Green 
sponsored a new special division for green marketing at the 2007 Effie Awards 
(advertising “Effectiveness” awards). The new prize would “reward marketing 
communications efforts for eco issues, including sustainability, healthy lifestyle, energy 
conservation, green products or services, green business alignment, etc.” (Effies Go 
Green 2007).26 Discovery thus also participated in putting into place new modes of 
valuing, legitimating, and recognizing green marketing efforts.  
Not only did Discovery engage in these market interventions, it also worked to 
situate Planet Green itself as a partner in an environmental future. For example, in the 
lead up to the channel’s launch, Planet Green worked to position itself as a key actor in 
an environmental future. Its “first major content initiative” which aired on the Discovery 
Channel just before Planet Green’s launch was called, Ten Ways to Save the Planet (part 
of which was later repackaged for DVD in partnership with GAIAM as Discovery 
Project Earth (2008)). The series featured a range of large-scale, highly technological 
                                                
25 An annual green marketing conference, that began with this 2007 event held at the Chicago Cultural Center Nov. 29-30. The 2007 
and 2008 conferences were presented by Discovery’s Planet Green. The final conference, which occurred in 2011, was put on by the 
Daily Green and Good Housekeeping. 
26 Reassuring AdWeek readers that the green award category would be subject to the same exacting standards for “effectiveness” as the 
others, Effie executive director, Mary Lee Keane, explained, "Effie stands for effectiveness and our guidelines for the Green Effie will 
be just as rigorous as our other categories. Eco marketers will have to back up claims that they are making a difference” (Keane 
quoted in AdWeek 2007).  
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experiments. A Discovery press release described the program as an “ambitious series” 
that would “be a global effort to find solutions to the planet’s most serious environmental 
threats, and will work with the world’s leading eco-scientists to test innovative and 
ground-breaking ideas, including wrapping glaciers in thermal blankets to stop their 
melting, dropping thousands of saplings from planes to provide mass reforestation, and 
painting entire towns white to reflect the sun” (Discovery Communications Inc. 2007). 
The series itself promised to intervene in global environmental crises with made-for-TV, 
drama-packed, technological solutions. Discovery/Planet Green itself became a team 
member in the doing of environmental engineering, branding it as a solution to 
environmental crisis, and in turn branding Planet Green as an environmental platform. 
Planet Green also worked to legitimize itself as a bona fide eco platform through 
partnership with environmental not-for-profits. The environmental organizations would 
build Planet Green’s environmental credibility at the same time that the partnerships 
themselves would perform a productive role, situating for-profit media brands as a site of 
possibility for (a certain kind of) environmental action. Planet Green’s co-branding did 
more than simply “greenwash” a media firm’s brand through association with these 
historically legitimated sites of environmentalism. The co-branding itself was part of a 
reciprocal production of legitimacy. These partnerships were rolled into Planet Green’s 
governmental project as individuals were invited to “meet our partners!” online and 
participate in branded volunteerism, such as the Plant a Billion Trees project in 
partnership with the Nature Conservancy. Positioning itself as an actor in the new 
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environmentalism, Planet Green attached itself to forms of eco-legitimacy that could in 
turn be productive of green value for its own and its advertisers’ brands.  
When Planet Green materialized in its multiplatform brand, its television and web 
content can likewise be viewed as technical: at the same time that Planet Green worked to 
perform its brand as a site at which the possibilities of green marketing could be 
realized—profits, brand value and loyalty, for example—it also offer itself as a structured 
context to support and enable this very endeavor. Planet Green would be a platform on 
which brands could become green and “do well by doing good.” The advertising would 
be “corporate-focused” rather than conventional “product-focused” advertising 
(environmental marketing consultant Jacquelyn Ottman quoted in Goff 2008). Planet 
Green TV and web content would do more than simply “greenwash” for it would 
showcase a particular kind of environmentalism that could only be enabled by brands. 
While this is inextricable from the industrial fantasy laid out in Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation—that greener futures could be realized through brands—in its realization, it 
was far more than fantasy for brands were actively involved in the very doing of this 
environmentalism. 
 Specifically, Planet Green would provide a platform for large brands like Waste 
Management, General Motors, SC Johnson, DuPont, Clorox and others to position 
themselves as partners and key players in a green future, enabling a range of 
environmental action, from large projects of social service delivery, to personal projects 
of home and lifestyle makeover. Insofar as Planet Green was a site of this new 
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environmentalism (or, really, was this new environmentalism), these brands were literally 
crucial since Planet Green’s very existence was contingent upon advertiser dollars.  
The docu-drama Greensburg is perhaps the most elaborate example of this 
particular kind of branded entertainment. The multi-season series chronicled the green 
rebuilding of Greensburg, KS, a conservative agricultural town nearly destroyed by a 
tornado in 2007. The show’s “exclusive national and integrated sponsor” was General 
Motors—one of the narrative threads in the show followed a local Chevy dealer who was 
doing an eco-friendly rebuild of the dealership he lost in the tornado (Hampp 2008b). The 
narrative of the show worked alongside advertisements (commissioned from Discovery) 
that worked to align the GM brand with Planet Green’s “green-marketing messages” and 
the promotional spots celebrating GM’s “commitment to new technologies such as hybrid 
cars and hydrogen fuel cells” and its “‘Gas-Friendly to Gas-Free’ initiative” to improve 
the fuel efficiency of GM vehicles that use over 30 miles per gallon. This Discovery-GM 
partnership extended into the provisioning of educational services more broadly as 
“Discovery and GM have paired up on philanthropic and educational efforts, donating 
three Chevrolet Tahoe hybrid SUVs and a Silverado FlexFuel to the Greensburg city 
administration and co-creating the Discovery Education Live Green Teacher Grants” 
(Hampp 2008b).  
In this way, GM’s partnership with Discovery did more than “greenwash” the GM 
brand; it inserted itself in the doing of environmentalism itself. This kind of partnership is 
framed as a potential opening for “education” which is not an underhanded way to slip 
advertising past potential pupils unawares, but demonstrates the way, in the context of 
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branded edu-tainment, informing and advertising are no longer separate, as GM’s 
executive director of advertising and media operations, Betsy Lazar, said in a statement: 
“It's a great way for GM to educate and inform consumers about all we are doing in the 
area of sustainable transportation… Planet Green programs will attract consumers who 
also want to know what GM has to offer in terms of fuel-efficient cars and trucks, 
hybrids, and alternative-fuel vehicles” (Lazar quoted in Hampp 2008b). 
The narrative of Greensburg helped to position brands as uniquely enabling by 
organizing dramatic tension around “funding gaps” that would prevent residents from 
completing their green rebuilding projects. Invariably these were resolved when a 
celebrity or a corporation stepped in with a donation. SunChips cut a check for one 
million, while a personal phone call from Leonardo DiCaprio heralded another $400,000. 
Chevy/GM donated a fleet of vehicles and Brita became one of the public school’s 
“major sponsors” providing a branded filtration system and “filling stations” where 
students could bring their Nalgene/Brita branded water bottles. DuPont partnered with 
Habitat for Humanity to build a home for a Greensburg resident. If, as Sarah Banet-
Weiser has written, in brand culture, public private partnerships are not merely presented 
as the “best” but the “only” solution to social problems (Banet-Weiser 2012, 143), 
Greensburg offers itself as a quintessential example environment saving in brand culture. 
But the branded planet saving could only be realized through consumers whose 
volunteerism and enterprise would encourage corporations to self-regulate and make 
these philanthropic gestures. On the show, for example, residents demonstrated that they 
“deserved” corporate philanthropy by demonstrating their hard work and a can-do spirit 
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(overcoming losing their business or loved ones in the tornado, sticking it out to help 
rebuild the town, for example). The largess of corporate sponsors was always contingent 
upon a populace that embodied these ideals of neoliberal citizenship. This is not a 
random coincidence, of course, for if an environmental future is to be enacted in the 
context of a radically free market, neoliberalism demands that citizens take responsibility 
for themselves and/as the planet so the state does not have to and can instead continue to 
enact policy whose central aim is to support unfettered growth—a project that runs 
contrary to “green” goals from conservation to environmental justice. 
But on Greensburg, personal and collective appeals to the private sector can not 
only solve public problems but also are the only route for moving forward with an 
environmental agenda, since other residents might not be on board and there’s never any 
money elsewhere. Thus, while some residents are positioned as “naysayers,” corporate 
sponsors are always described as having done a “really nice thing” by funding or 
donating (and getting to place their brand on public buildings or services). Greensburg 
frames all action as matters of morally loaded voluntarism and strategic market 
engagement. Residents’ weigh the choice to stay or leave town (staying, paradoxically, is 
a marker of enterprise, a vote of confidence in a greener future). A “state of the art” 
school building, a “business incubator,” a town center, and a museum are all framed as 
entrepreneurial projects to better market the town (to, for example, business-sector 
investors and tourism). Rebuilding (and the docu-series itself) participate in branding the 
city to attract tourists, businesses, investors and philanthropist brands. Greener futures are 
recast as entrepreneurial projects only possible thanks to the largess of corporate sponsors 
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and voluntary stick-to-itiveness of residents. Greensburg doesn’t simply advance 
arguments for these solutions, it enacts them, modeling a green future through 
sponsorship, enterprise, and volunteerism. 
For other shows, these overt brand interventions were only occasional, as Planet 
Green was working to keep product placement “tasteful” rather than “hokey” or 
“annoying” (Thomas 2013). On the home renovation show, Renovation Nation, for 
example, most episodes feature host Steve Thomas (host of the long-running PBS series 
This Old House from 1989 to 2003) visiting people who are already engaged in an eco-
friendly building or renovation project. He teaches us about salvaging materials as well as 
building products made from recycled or low-impact materials. We learn about how to 
fashion cheap rain collectors and install non-branded solar panels. Thomas gives us specs 
on various home building products—the difference in insulation value of closed-cell 
versus open-cell spray foam, the kinds of environmental “tradeoffs” renovators make as 
they weigh the pros and cons of petroleum-based insulation—environmentally harmful 
because it, as Thomas says “locks up petroleum” but beneficial in the long term because 
it provides superior insulation, reducing energy use in heating and cooling.  
There are certainly moments when sponsors’ brands enter the narrative overtly. 
For example, in a series of episodes that showcased and enacted Renovation Nation’s 
three-way partnership with Habitat for Humanity and Saturn cars, Thomas sings the 
praises of Habitat which, is a “hand up, definitely not a hand out” (repeated ad nauseam, 
troublingly reassuring middle class viewers that Habitat had carefully separated 
“deserving” from “undeserving” poor, since recipients have to “earn” their new home 
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through some 250 hours of volunteer home-building labor). In the episode, Thomas cries 
out, “We’ll take my Saturn hybrid!” to the future Habitat homeowner as they take off to 
pick up bamboo flooring from a local retailer (Renovation Nation episode "Detroit, MI: 
Gift of Green" 2009).27 In another episode, the show surprises financially-struggling 
renovators (who are themselves only occasional features on the show as most of the 
guests are affluent) with surprise giveaways: “The folks at Sears are donating to you a 
brand new Kenmore elite refrigerator—super energy efficient—a brand new dishwasher, 
and also a brand new range… the latest and greatest and greenest in their product line!” 
Thomas tells one couple. He goes on to tell us about its superior qualities: high-velocity 
water jets that obviate the need to pre-rinsing, “smart” features that can measure how 
much cleaning is needed for a particular load to save up to 40% on water and 34% 
energy, etc. Pop-up boxes tell us that refrigerators account for 14% of home energy use 
and we learn about how the new electric range uses magnetic induction instead of heat a 
coil or gas flame, to save 70% of electricity (Renovation Nation episode "Tucson, AZ: 
Harvesting Desert Rain" 2009). 
But even without overt presence of sponsors’ brands, Renovation Nation and 
Planet Green as brands themselves were enacting the same project. The branding of 
environmentalism, here, goes far beyond advertising or product placement. The kinds of 
education about green appliances and incentive programs we see on Renovation Nation 
are increasingly central to contemporary environmental governance. Rather than state-
                                                
27 This is also a branding opportunity for Habitat as well as the cities of Philadelphia and Detroit. Viewers also learn about the role of 
Habitat in struggling neighborhoods and Philadelphia Mayor Nutter shows up to talk about how Habitat is about building 
communities, “we love Habitat here in Philly” he says. This demonstrates the way in which these privatized forms of social service are 
enabled by these kinds of partnerships and the same time that viewers are educated about the “good work” that Saturn and Habitat are 
doing for these places. 
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based efforts to regulate activities that degrade the environment or fund environmental 
enforcement agencies, we see federal programs like the Energy Star appliance ratings 
system and nongovernmental programs like Leadership in Energy and Environmental 
Design (LEED) certification, a program developed and maintained by the US Green 
Building Council28 that work to incentivize eco-friendly practices.29 Since such voluntary 
environmental governance operates according to a market logic—a logic in which only 
“demand” for Energy Star appliances and LEED certification can drive pro-environment 
action—in order for such interventions to “make a difference,” a great deal of voluntary 
uptake is required (typical fantasies about the environment-saving possibilities of such 
schemes imagine what would happen if “every person in America” made one of these 
small changes). In order to cultivate this “demand,” a whole educational apparatus has 
emerged. Labeling and certification programs as Energy Star and LEED necessitate 
education of, for example, contractors and consumers. In this context, Renovation Nation 
and Planet Green offered their own kind of branded citizen education, informing about 
and informally incentivizing30 home-greening projects. With its official partnership with 
the US Green Building Council (Howell 2013) and frequent mention of Energy Star-rated 
appliances, as well as its efforts to elevate the possibilities of environmental governance 
through appliance upgrades with pop-up textbox factoids—“If all homes in the US had a 
dishwasher with an Energy Star rating, it would save over 400 billion gallons of water a 
                                                
28 The US Green Building Council is a non-profit organiztion that has, among other things, also supported legislation strengthening 
and publicizing federal incentive programs for energy-efficient building projects. 
29 This tendency continues to bear out in recent legislative proposals like the Better Buildings Act of 2014 and the Streamlining 
Energy Efficiency for Schools Act of 2014, which seek to improve energy efficiency in commercial and public buildings not through 
regulation, but through education and incentives. 
30 This incentivizing was both affective (the show promised that renovating green would be fun and make us feel good because we 
were helping the earth) and economic (Renovation Nation always emphasized the long-term costs savings that energy efficiency 
would provide). 
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year”—the Planet Green and Renovation Nation brands participated in the dissemination 
of this particular technology of governance.  
 In this way, the branding of environmentalism involved, first, creating a platform 
on which brands could add value as green value—that is, it worked to transform “being 
green” into brand value—and second, it positioned brands as enabling actors in a new 
environmentalism; it worked to make adding brand value and doing this particular 
version of consumer-based environmentalism indistinguishable. But this was not 
sufficient to Planet Green’s broader project, for branding environmentalism also 
necessitated enrolling consumers in its realization. As I mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter, Planet Green involved a whole range of tips and techniques that individuals 
could take up to govern themselves in line with broader goals. This was crucial to the 
project, for consumer co-production is the normative measure of brand success. But what 
would guide individuals in the uptake of, for example, green products, services, and 
practices? How would these broader goals be articulated? Before we can analyze the 
particular templates for green consumer-citizenship that Planet Green laid out for its 
viewers and web users, it is crucial to first understand how branding environmentalism 
required the production of a cluster of new forms of environmental authority. Part of 
branding environmentalism was an elaborate project that aimed to produce brands 
themselves as environmental authorities.  
 
Branding eco-legitimacy and eco-legitimating brands 
 While it might be tempting to dismiss branded environmental authority as  
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“greenwash,” doing so runs several risks. For one thing, it risks naturalizing other forms 
of environmental authority as “authentic.” Yet the kinds of authority bestowed, for 
example, by academic credentials, professional or scholarly achievement, or endorsement 
by “establishment” conservation organizations (see Gottlieb 2005) are equally 
produced—not to mention deeply embedded in contemporary knowledge hierarchies in 
ways that are hardly free form the logics of the market (though their relationship to 
capital is often mediated by things like grants and donations or University/research 
institute support). Further, as we will see, Planet Green tapped into these kinds of 
authority at various points (though, as I will discuss, in ways mediated by brands).  
The second reason one ought to be wary of reducing branded authority to 
“greenwash” is that doing so risks missing the way in which power works, as Foucault 
(1978/1990) pointed out, not simply through concealing—greenwash would be an 
example of concealing, in his sense—but rather in a productive capacity. Specifically, in 
his analysis of the repressive hypothesis, he points out that sex was governed less by a 
“law of prohibition” than through to a proliferation of discourses, rules and norms 
regarding sex. Through this “discursive explosion,” sex was transformed into something 
that could be “administered” by experts and powerful institutions (Foucault 1978/1990, 
17). In the case of green branding, we likewise see a multiplication of experts and 
authoritative discourses that seek to guide viewer’s activities and environmental 
investments in particular ways. Thus, rather than pointing out that Planet Green’s 
environmental authority was dubious by some “objective” standard, I argue that it is more 
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useful to look at the process through which branded authorities were produced, and, in 
turn, what kinds of environmentalism this process enabled. 
I have already discussed Planet Green’s nonprofit partnerships, its branded 
environmental interventions, and its production of eco-branded entertainment. While 
certainly these activities were part of a larger process of working to add value-as-green-
value (and vice versa) to brands, they also did more than this. They helped to collapse the 
distinction between brands and environmental authority in ways that would become 
crucial to Planet Green’s particular kind of environmental governance. In Planet Green, 
brands themselves would become caring authorities, guiding individuals toward greener 
lives through detailed attention to her over her entire lifespan and intimate knowledge of 
her interiority. By working to transform eco-brands into authorities of environmental 
lifestyle, Planet Green set the stage to bring this form of environmental governmentality 
to bear on its particular branding project.  
In the programs I discuss in this section, Planet Green did this not though appeals 
to credentialed expertise nor peer-reviewed research nor experiential knowledge of 
environmental degradation,31 but rather through a ritualized performance in which co-
branding itself would both confer and confirm environmental legitimacy. Doing so would 
be crucial to enabling Planet Green as a technology of eco-governance, for a whole 
authoritative apparatus—discourses, experts, and markers of credibility—was needed to 
guide individuals in the uptake of Planet Green’s tips and techniques for green living. 
                                                
31 Though, as I note at various points in this dissertation, conventional forms of credentialed expertise and authority were also enlisted 
in the Planet Green project, from its “world class advisory board” to featured climate scientists and oceanographers. This will become 
relevant in the final section of this chapter when I discuss the way in which Planet Green worked to position itself in line with 
traditional forms of civic education, with informative news segments and resources to enable civil discourse and democratic 
participation. Planet Green was a highly contradictory endeavor, so each of its component mini-projects that I lay out cannot be 
regarded as having explanatory weight for making sense of the whole brand as though it told a tidy and coherent story. 
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The project of collapsing brands with environmental authority was expansive. It ranged 
from A-list celebrities to environmental professionals to small-time online green 
lifestylists to Planet Green sponsors. And all of it must be understood as part of a range of 
co-branding projects that extended beyond the Planet Green universe to enact this 
environmental future in which brands are environmental authorities, disseminating useful 
and credible (as defined within the branded universe) advice to viewers at home. 
Planet Green worked to construct a branded authoritative apparatus through three 
co-branding strategies. One, Planet Green it offered itself as a platform for celebrities to 
“green” their brands and enact their environmentalism. Two, Planet Green worked to 
enrolled small-time eco-brands—from lifestylists to small business owners—in the Planet 
Green brand community, promising to “make them into celebrities” (Annie Howell 
quoted in Maul 2008). Three, Planet Green worked to eco-legitimate large corporate 
brands and branded actors as enablers of environmentalisms, offering them a platform to 
provide everyday lifestyle resources and showcase large-scale philanthropic projects.  
 In this first mode of eco-co-branding, Planet Green offered green-minded 
celebrities a platform on which to perform their environmental sensibilities and expertise. 
For example, an amazingly eclectic bunch appeared on the eco-face off show, 
Battleground Earth. The show’s headliners were Mötley Crüe drummer Tommy Lee and 
rapper/entrepreneur Chris ‘Ludacris’ Bridges. The pair, along with their “ecorages” 
competed in a series of challenges ranging from recycling to water conservation. While 
Lee and Bridges themselves were not positioned as authoritative (not in the least—their 
eco-resistance and ingénue were a source of humor and narrative drama), their celebrity 
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friends appeared to give them eco-advice and offer viewers at home environmental 
factoids and energy-saving tips. We get advice from Taylor Swift, Cedric the Entertainer, 
Mötley Crüe’s Nikki Sixx, Meat Loaf, the Grateful Dead’s Mickey Hart and Bob Weir, P. 
Diddy, Questlove, Too Short, The Roots, Isaiah Washington, Dr. John, Ivan Neville, 
Outkast’s Big Boi, Kiss’s Paul Stanley and Gene Simmons, Phish’s Jon Fishman, model 
Summer Rayne Oakes, Paul Rodriguez, Craig Gass, Joe Bartnick, Joan Baez, Daisy 
Fuentes, Justin Fargas, American Football player Thomas Howard, Kirk Morrison, 
Oakland Athletics players, Michael Irvin and Flo Rida among others. Magic Johnson tells 
us that it isn’t hard to be green, it’s a “smart thing.”  
In segments called “pass it on,” a celebrity would address the camera directly, 
recommending an eco-friendly practice. Actress Persia White urged us to eat peanut 
butter sandwiches instead of hamburgers and Rapper Bun B implored us to “give the 
treadmill a rest” by running outside instead to save electricity. The “pass it on” segments 
appeared after every commercial break and were involved in a dynamic interplay with 
Planet Green’s popup textboxes—a feature on all of Planet Green’s shows. The popup 
boxes appeared on the screen and inform viewers about the environmental impact of meat 
or fish production, pollution and greenhouse gases, and they also recommend alternatives 
(“Vehicles consume half the worlds [sic] oil and produce 25% of its greenhouse gases”; 
or “Biking 1 mile instead of driving keeps 1 pound of CO2 out of the atmosphere”; or 
“Some factory fish farms are over populated causing increased disease and the need for 
antibiotics. Wild fish within miles of these farms test positive for antibiotics, making 
fresh fish nearly a thing of the past”).  
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For Planet Green, of course, this was part of its commercial logic, as Planet 
Green’s Eileen O’Neill explained, “The voices from Hollywood” promised to “help 
audiences find the network faster” (Eileen O’Neill quoted in Levin 2008). And for 
celebrities, the spots offered an opportunity to add green value to their brands.  
While it is easy to be cynical about these commercial aims, the co-branding 
process went beyond adding value. By positioning these celebrities as eco-
intermediaries32 and by situating their advice in relation to authoritative popup boxes in 
the context of the Planet Green brand universe, Battleground Earth worked to transform 
celebrity culture into a site at which environmentalism could be realized, enlisting these 
celebrities’ eco-sensibilities, brands, and self-branding labor in the process. But it also 
did more than this, for it enacted a ritualized process of co-branding that was also a 
process of co-legitimating environmental authority.33 
 The second way in which Planet Green worked to enable a proliferation (and 
legitimation) of brands-as-authorities extended far beyond Hollywood celebrities and 
music stars, though the productive strategies remained much the same: it worked to bring 
small-time green lifestylists and eco-product representatives into the branded universe of 
Planet Green. For these actors environmental authority and branding were mutually 
constitutive even before their partnership with Planet Green. But Planet Green would 
                                                
32 There is more to explore in the relationship of branded cultural intermediaries to branded authorities. Although they are not 
equivalent, teasing apart their alignments and departures is beyond the scope of this chapter. An alignment that is important for my 
purposes is that they are both authorized to speak within this branded governmental project. 
33 This also occurred on Hollywood Green with Maria Menounos (part of a partnership with NBC’s Access Hollywood), a weekly hour 
devoted to eco-celebrity news, gossip, and interviews. On the show, stars could come to peddle their lifestyle blogs and green fashion 
lines, share their eco-tips and give us tours of their new green baby nurseries. The show kicked off Planet Green’s opening lineup on 
June 4th and featured Brad Pitt, Julia Roberts and Leonardo DiCaprio. The Obamas appeared as did John Travolta, Miley Cyrus, 
Gwyneth Paltrow and many others. Hollywood Green’s repetitive showcasing of these branded actors as environmental actors, 
positioning them to disseminate advice in relation to authorizing popup info—indeed, it hardly mattered what the advice was for the 
object, here was the ongoing co-eco-branding process. 
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give them a bigger platform, affirming their expertise with popup boxes, and co-
legitimating their environmental authority through their presence within the Planet Green 
branded universe. The news magazine G Word was a key site for doing this. Aiming to 
“translate” the deluge of green information “into actions and resources for everyday life,” 
G Word and its team of “eco-minded experts” promised to “guide viewers through the ins 
and outs of green”—specifically in the areas of “home, design, gadgets, food, shopping, 
the latest science and tech innovations, fashion and much more”—and teach us about 
“preserving the environment and enjoying life at the same time” (Planet Green Defines 
Eco-Entertainment 2008). It featured a range of short segments “spotlighting businesses 
that are doing well by doing good” (Crupi 2008).  
 Clearly aiming to advance Planet Green’s commercial goals, promoting green 
businesses while bringing cheap-to-produce TV content to the network’s schedule, the 
segments also did more than this. Hosted by the G Word “eco-minded experts,” the 
segments were also part of Planet Green’s mission to, as Discovery’s SVP of 
Communications and Public Affairs Annie Howell explained in 2008, “take people 
known in the [green] space and make them into celebrities” (Maul 2008).34 The eco-
experts included a number of lifestyle bloggers, comedy acts, and authors. Jeff Yeager, 
the Ultimate Cheapskate, played a character who “kept it green” through his extreme and 
hammy horror of spending money. Troy Casey, the Health Nut of the website of the same 
name had a G Word gig hunting for things like a “carbon neutral lunch” or an eco-
friendly burial. The Keep it Green Girls Shelley Pack and Sarah Norton are a campy, 
                                                
34 It would be worth exploring how Planet Green’s co-branding was also an attempt to hitch the promises of celebrification that 
proliferate under post-Fordist regimes of work and the meritocratic fantasies of neoliberalism to a green future. 
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high-femme comedy duo who already had a small but devoted online following. 
Impractically clad in stilettos and miniskirts, Pack and Norton took Planet Green viewers 
on outdoorsy adventures to visit beekeepers, pig farmers, flower growers, to take 
camping lessons and more. Lori Harfenist of the news commentary and satire online 
video show The Resident became G Word’s “quizzer” asking people on the street what 
was better for the environment, fake or real Christmas trees, desktop or lap top 
computers, hand washing or using the dishwasher, etc. G Word’s Waste Sleuth Todd 
Sutton, also the owner of the “waste prevention, sustainability, reuse & recycling” firm 
(Sutton 2010), took Planet Green viewers to visit various recycling operations. Gregory 
Schaefer, organic chef, wine consultant, Hip Chef instructor and farmer as well as a 
member of the Second City Theatre Group, became G Word’s eco-cook. “Salvage 
Queen” Evette Rios, who rehabbed thrifted and found furniture G Word, has hosted home 
rehab-type shows on TLC and HGTV (and launched herself as a lifestyle expert and 
television host who subsequently appeared as a regular “crafter” and design expert on 
ABC shows, The Chew (2011-) and Rachel Ray (2006-), and now hosts CBS’s Recipe 
Rehab (2012-)). 
 The G Word segments, of course, helped Planet Green produce cheap content, but 
also helped to ritualize the transformation of a whole range of branded entities into green 
authorities. Since the segments took the shape of “field trips” to learn about various 
products, business and entrepreneurs, G Word was also a platform on which these small-
time eco-brands could add value while Planet Green worked to transform their specific 
expertise (which doubled as promoting their green burial service or pizza restaurant) into 
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a whole authoritative discourse of branded environmentalism.35 While on the one hand, 
Planet Green worked to provide a platform to launch these self-styled eco-experts into 
existing forms of enterprising celebrity (this was certainly the overt promise made in the 
trade press), in addition, by having these experts mediate our encounters with a range of 
green businesses, “translate” the business proprietors’ commentary, G Word situated this 
wide array of branded personalities as environmental authorities who, in turn, branded 
businesses “doing well by doing good” as key technologies for a greener future.36 
Finally, the third way in which Planet Green worked to multiply and legitimize 
brands-as-authorities was through co-branding with established “trusted” brands. For 
example, the cooking show Emeril Green, hosted by celebrity chef Emeril Lagasse, 
worked to situate Whole Foods Market as a site of eco-self-realization and authoritative 
green knowledge. According to a 2008 study by the marketing firm BBMG, which asked 
consumers to rank 20 companies, consumers believed Whole Foods to be “most socially 
responsible” of the bunch (Dolliver 2008). The “Emeril” brand also has enormous 
recognition and popularity. On Emeril Green, Lagasse helped individuals conquer “food 
                                                
35 From what I could gather, these were not paid promotional spots. I called up one of the business “doing well by doing good” in 
Minneapolis: Galactic Pizza. I asked the owner how the restaurant had ended up on G Word. He said that they just “called him up out 
of the blue.” The segment involved an interview with the owner as well as one of the superhero delivery drivers, and the G Word 
correspondent took the tiny, fuel-efficient electric delivery car for a spin on her own delivery mission. 
36 Greenovate, a documentary-style show following an eco-friendly remodel from beginning to end, had much the same project. It 
aimed to demonstrate how homeowners can “reduce energy bills and carbon footprints while increasing the value of their homes” 
(Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 2008) as an array of eco-professionals offer “personalized strategies” for achieving these 
goals (Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 2008). A voiceover offers a set of goals (i.e., improving indoor air quality, lower 
energy usage) while popup text boxes let us know that VOC paints can negatively impact a child’s development or “radiant heating 
can provide 30% to 40% energy savings” or facts about construction waste, low-flow faucets, dual flush toilets, cork or other 
“sustainably harvested” flooring, and energy star appliances. We also learn about green building products as well as the whole range 
of eco-experts we could hire to help with our own greenovations. The show also worked to bring branded forms of authority, measure, 
and expertise into a new environmentalism. At least “30 Eco brands” were “researched and integrated” into the show, according to one 
Synergy Productions producer’s online profile Monica Ramone (2013). These brands involved a range of professionalized, 
commercial eco-experts including “eco-brokers, ‘green’ home consultants, ‘non-toxic’ interior designers” (Planet Green Defines Eco-
Entertainment 2008) green home specialists, environmental analysts and many others. These experts were featured alongside forms of 
measure and knowledge produced through their commercial activities, from energy audits, to measure electromagnetic fields, to 
questions of green design, to locate and measure air leaks, etc., thus enabling solutions like the use of BioBased® spray foam 
insulation or Clear Skies Solar Shines solar panels. In this way, branded intermediaries are positioned as environmental authorities, 
their authority is performed and ritualized through the structure of the show, and their authority aims to brand these eco-businesses as 
technologies of a greener future. 
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fears” by addressing everyday problems of cooking and eating (they might feel 
“confused” and “intimidated” by an ingredient or they or their loved ones might have 
food allergies, restrictions, or limited palates). Emeril Green’s hapless guests were called 
upon to position themselves as blank slates through the application process in which they 
had to ham up a “food fear,” shaping themselves to convincingly fit into a deficit model 
in a way that would, not only land them on television, but set the stage for Whole Foods 
branded experts to guide them out of their intimidation.  
One call for participants read, “Planet Green is looking for residents in the 
Washington, D.C. metro area who love to cook but have a tough time making heads or 
tails of what's in the fridge, or are wondering how to be eco-friendly while still deep-
frying a turkey” (Emeril Green: Inside the Show 2008). Each episode begins with a 
testimonial video in which guests demonstrate, for example their inability to cook fish, 
the fistfuls of sugar and mesquite seasoning they compulsively add to everything, their 
chronic soufflé failure, or their struggles as single moms or with picky teenagers. “Help 
me, Emeril!” they plead at the end of their videos. Through this positioning, they submit 
themselves to these forms of authority and their problems were solved as they conquered 
a food fear.  
For example, in one episode, Emeril Green attempted to take a “die-hard meat 
and potatoes guy and make him change his ways by showing him a little leg” chicken leg, 
that is! On each episode, Lagasse diagnosed the pupil’s problem: Rodney, for example, 
has a case of “red meat syndrome: a problem of exposure, not exposed to a lot of fresh 
vegetables” (Emeril Green episode "Chicken Campaign" 2008). Enter Whole Foods 
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Market. Each episode of Emeril Green begins with an establishing shot of Whole Foods. 
Not only does the instructional cooking show take place inside the store, but part of the 
lesson is also a “shopping trip” through the aisles, during which Emeril and his guest 
pupil pause to receive advice from Whole Food’s fish mongers, butchers, and nutrition 
experts. These are interspersed with well-composed shots showcasing Whole Food’s 
bounty. While certainly this worked to position the Whole Foods store as site at which 
green subjectivities could be realized within a consumerist good life, but it also 
positioned Whole Foods itself as marker of authority, as uniformed Whole Foods 
employees appeared as “experts” offering mini-lessons on fish, tea, gelato, chicken 
(“natural” versus, “free range” versus “organic”).  
The show demonstrates a process of empowerment, a process to which viewers 
can submit themselves at home, not only by taking up Emeril’s recipes, the popup tips 
and factoids, and expert advice on the show, but also by heading online to find recipes 
and watch Emeril’s “expert clips” (for example, the “Whole Foods Green Expert,” the 
“Whole Foods Fish Monger,” the “Whole Foods Tea Expert,” the “Whole Foods Wine 
Expert,” the “Whole Foods Bakery Expert,” etc.). Viewers are invited to identify with the 
“food fear” of the guest and use all of Emeril Green’s resources to work on themselves to 
become “fearless” when it comes to shopping (at Whole Foods) and cooking, and to fold 
these resources into everyday life. In this way, the Emeril Green and Whole Foods brands 
become integral to self-realization. 
 Emeril Green teaches individuals to skillfully navigate Whole Foods and home 
cooking without financial constraints. And it aims to cultivate a consumer who would 
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realize their eco-selves through brands and consumer culture, enlisting them in this form 
of branded governance, enlisting them in helping to produce the authority of the Whole 
Foods brand and the particular solutions to environmental crisis that it offers.37 
In this way, Emeril Green was part of a larger project aimed at ritually 
transforming the Whole Foods, Emeril, and Planet Green brands into authoritative 
discourses of green living and, simultaneously, transforming environmental living in line 
with these discourses. The brands themselves are positioned as both authoritative and as 
resources useful in everyday life. Whole Foods promises not only to educate, but also to 
enable these new green practices. 
Through shows like Battleground Earth, G Word, and Emeril Green, Planet 
Green set up a kind of self-referential legitimating economy that was also co-branding: 
Planet Green gained environmental legitimacy from Whole Foods and vice versa, 
environmentalist celebrities added green value to their own brands by appearing on 
Planet Green and Planet Green was confirmed as environmentalist thanks to celebrities’ 
appearance on the channel. This process was absolutely crucial to branding 
environmentalism in Planet Green for eco-governing through television required not 
simply disseminating tips for eco-living, but also collapsing the distinction between 
brands and environmental authority in order to enable a form of governmentality that 
could corral unruly consumers toward its branded environmentalism. On Planet Green, 
eco-legitimacy was more than ideological and more than simply “greenwash.” Through 
                                                
37 Emeril Green is potentially progressive in that it takes seriously the minutia of everyday life, the struggles of single parenting and 
shows a commitment to superficial gender, racial and sexual diversity. It had a democratizing impulse—democratizing access to skills, 
information, knowledge, aiming to translate complicated questions into something “easy” you can do at home. The paradox, however, 
was that it was never democratic. For one thing, what is true about all of these dishes—except perhaps the ones aimed at a “food fear” 
explicitly related to cooking on a budget—is that they are incredibly expensive. One “simple, healthy” recipe, for example, involved 
an entire single fillet of halibut. Just for perspective, I recently splurged on a small halibut steak for a friend’s birthday dinner that was 
nearly 30 bucks. The side of the fish on the show was many times the size of mine.  
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ritualized and technical means, Planet Green produced a wide array of brands as enabling 
actors of the new environmentalism in ways that set the stage for the forms of 
governmentality and technologies of the self that I will discuss in the remainder of this 
chapter.  
 
Part three: Planet Green as a technology of the self  
 Branding environmentalism, however, required more than collapsing brands with 
environmental authority. It was crucial that these authorities also enlist individuals in the 
brand through a range of “templates for citizenship” that would simultaneously cultivate 
eco-sensibilities, eco-self governance, and members of the Planet Green community. 
When famous actors musicians viewers to skip the treadmill on Battleground Earth, or 
when the Keep it Green girls gave us a camping lesson on G Word, they were 
participating in the dispersion of governing through elaborating these technologies of the 
self.  
Like Foucault’s description of ethics for the ancient Greeks discussed above, the 
green “care of the self” offered by Planet Green likewise involved a number of “practical 
‘procedures’” (Foucault 1988 quoted in Ouellette and Hay 2008, 78): self-
assessment/lifestyle-assessment quizzes, resources for increasing and improving one’s 
“green” knowledge, tools for reflecting on that knowledge in online forums and 
discussion boards, suggestions and tips for the uptake of that knowledge in daily routines 
and decision-making, including how-to demonstrations and expert guidance for doing so. 
These techniques aimed to cultivate self-empowerment, personal responsibility, and tools 
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for rational-ethical decision making, all with an environmental bent. Planet Green worked 
to situate branded intervention and personal responsibility as solutions to a wide range of 
environmental problems, offering viewers tips and techniques to empower themselves 
privately in line with these solutions. Planet Green brought a green commercial logic to 
techniques of the self, attempting to stitch a neoliberal rationality of government to 
matters of everyday environmental saving.  
As Planet Green rolled out its initial slate of programming and web content, it 
offered individuals tools for encountering themselves, coming to know themselves, 
taking stock of their attitudes, knowledge and lifestyles through forms of measure and 
assessment. It invited them to submit themselves to experts and authoritative discourses, 
build their toolkits of eco-knowledge, and put this all into practices in their everyday 
lives. It offered resources for an ongoing project of greening the self, home and lifestyle. 
The Planet Green brand, along with the brands of its partners and sponsors, was a site at 
which this greener self could be realized. This would be an infinitely customizable life 
plan aimed at self-realization for the planet and for the Planet Green brand. 
As I discussed above, at every turn, Planet Green’s branding enabled technologies 
of the self and a green governmentality. In this section of the chapter, I will map three 
templates for citizenship that these technologies enabled. The first included shows and 
web content that worked to articulate green living to an unabashedly upscale lifestyle in 
ways that were undoubtedly related to Planet Green’s effort to perform the brand as a 
vehicle that would reliably deliver upscale and “aspirational” consumers to advertisers—
a crucial dimension of making environmentalism “work” for TV—but doing so, as I will 
  127 
show, also elaborated a particular governmental project. The second had a more 
democratic impulse, offering “simple” and “easy” tips that anyone could use. The third 
and last template I will address worked to produce the Planet Green brand as a site of 
civic education, public engagement, and civil discourse. These three distinct but 
interrelated templates occurred simultaneously—all within Planet Green’s initial slate of 
shows. 
 
Template 1: cultivating upscale consumers for the new environmentalism 
The first template for eco-citizenship that Planet Green articulated can be viewed 
as at once a kind of eco-pedagogy for the affluent and, for “ordinary” viewers, an 
aspirational technology that inserted itself where promises of upward mobility meet 
environmental self-governance. The programs were, to borrow a phrase from Maureen 
Ryan’s work on 1980s lifestyle media, “fantasies of material abundance on display” 
(Ryan 2014, 3). They reformulated a kind of Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous, 
transforming it for greener living and for an audience more ambivalent about material 
and consumer excess. In this way, these programs showcased what Kate Soper calls 
“alternative hedonism”: a green version of “the good life” positioned as a “seductive 
alternative” to resource-intensive “affluent, ‘consumerist’, Euro-American mode of 
consumption” (Soper 2008, 571). These television programs demonstrated just how 
pleasurable in the green life could be.38 While this green good life cropped up on a range 
of shows—on Supper Club with Tom Bergeron, viewers could witness celebrities indulge 
                                                
38 Emeril Green, for example, is a technology of a green consumerist good life, emphasized by its opening sequence that reads, “Real 
People, Real Problems, Easy, Healthy, Fresh, Natural Solutions.” Another cluster of words (mostly the names of vegetable), spring 
into view as Lagasse pushes a cart overflowing with vegetables, giving us the thumbs up. Finally, words like grass-fed, local, organic, 
farm fresh, free range, hormone free appear as Lagasse toasts us from behind his cooking range. 
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in haute green cuisine, artisan beers, and fine organic wines and the Access Hollywood 
spinoff Hollywood Green gave viewers a sneak peak into the glamorous lives of eco-
minded celebrities—the clearest examples of this particular dimension of Planet Green’s 
eco-pedagogy can be seen in World’s Greenest Homes and Alter Eco (6/4/08-12/1/08). 
On World’s Greenest Homes viewers were treated to exclusive tours—led by 
celebrity designer, Emmanuel Belliveau—of houses that were the stuff of techno-
scientific and sustainable design fantasy. We travel to Hamburg, Hong Kong, Melbourne, 
Boston, Seattle, and many other regions, visiting an array of “high-tech superhomes” and 
“experimental eco-dwellings,” all with what Planet Green called “top-notch green 
credentials and an array of mind-blowing eco-innovations” (Planet Green Defines Eco-
Entertainment 2008).39  
In each episode, we learn about the way that design meets environmental 
friendliness. In a visit to a converted store in Boston’s South End, for example, the host 
explains, “The mix of sustainable woods on white washed walls and dark stained floors 
really makes a statement”; homeowner Susan adds that the floor is white ash, sourced 
from an organization that “prunes forests to manage fire issues and help forests grow…” 
Their sleek Energy Star appliances get equal airtime (World's Greenest Homes episode 
"Claremont House" 2010). In North Branch, Minnesota the show tours a geodesic Dome 
                                                
39 We visit homes like that of romance novelist Stephanie Laurens, an “off-grid Aussie hideaway” (Oct 28 2008); or the Seattle area 
house built “in an exclusive conservation area and golf resort” “award-winning, 3,000 square foot home features superior insulation 
and eco-friendly finishes throughout” (Nov 7 2008); “In the heart of Silicon Valley, this 3,000 square foot Palo Alto home blends 
industrial chic with modern comfort. Perfectly oriented to capture sunlight, the home's green design includes passive solar energy and 
solar panels that generate 80 %...” (“Nov 20 2008); “Located in a reclaimed industrial site transformed into a green residential 
neighborhood, a grand home in Atlanta combines Southern charm with eco-friendly living. Then, an energy-efficient home proves it's 
possible to be green while going green” (Oct 15 2008); the D.C. same page, Oct 14 2008 “Only ten minutes from the White House in 
Washington, D.C, green pioneer and architect, Travis Price, cantilevered his four-storey steel and glass dream home over a cliff so it 
barely touches the forest below” (Oct 14 2008). Or, on Oct 9 2008 the upstate New York octagonal house “An hour North of NYC, 
and overlooking a lake and manicured grounds, Manny visits a two-storey, octagonal- shaped, energy-efficient super home. Then, 
perched high in the mountains of Oregon, a pioneering green home is cantilevered above the ground” (PlanetGreen.com episode 
guides). 
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Home, “nestled… on a 50 acre wooded lot, is a home called Bear Creek Dome.” 
Minnesota, homeowner Dennis explains that the home is 49 feet in diameter, and 33 feet 
high, including the cupola at the center. Belliveau adds that everything “is as natural and 
chemical free as possible,” and that the home features radiant heated floors and tripled-
paned, tempered glass windows, among many other eco-design features. All the while the 
camera pans lovingly back and forth over each design element, room, and “outdoor living 
space” (World's Greenest Homes episode "Bear Creek" 2010).  
World’s Greenest Homes has very little to say about the excesses of industrial and 
consumer capitalism or environmental degradation. It offers no factoids or popup bubbles 
about the tradeoffs of green building. Rather, eco-design, pleasure in living, and spiritual 
satisfaction come together, as the homeowners describe the features that they “love,” the 
possibilities for “entertaining,” and the spiritual satisfaction they gain from, for example, 
being at one with nature or doing the “right thing.” The tours dwell on the sensual as 
much as the technological. In the dome home, the “large kitchen spills into the dining 
room. There’s a living room and an entertainment area” the camera pans across the 
master bedroom and a luxurious master bath. “This is my wonderful kitchen,” says 
Dennis’s wife Tessa, “I love it here. It’s big, it’s very non toxic…” Dennis adds that 
“everybody congregates in this area” gesturing to the banquet-length kitchen island made 
from wood salvaged from an old Minneapolis brewery (Grain Belt), polished to a glossy 
sheen and situated carefully beneath rustic, exposed joists cut from a single, knotty tree 
from their own property. Dennis and Tessa explain that they love the “imperfect” look of 
reclaimed wood and lumber harvested from fallen trees. Further the reward of building a 
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green super home is as spiritual as it is environmental. In Boston, homeowner Fritz tells 
the camera: “One of the reasons we wanted to make the renovation as green as possible, 
is, kind of, we felt that it was the right thing to do” (World's Greenest Homes episode 
"Bear Creek" 2010). 
Alter Eco, a green lifestyle show hosted by actor Adrian Grenier, followed the 
Entourage star (though he actually appeared in relatively few episodes) and several of his 
youthful, attractive, and eco-conscious friends—“green guru Boise Thomas, sustainable 
style expert Angela Lindvall and eco-renovation expert Darren Moore” explained the 
Planet Green press release (Chua 2008a)—as they luxuriated in fine simple living, 
dabbled in DIY projects, and sampled organic wine as they “greened over” a 1920s 
Spanish-style house in Hollywood. The episodes focus on mini-projects and 
adventures—the team helps a local restaurant owner build a green wall, a neighbor 
construct wooden composters, and guest celebrities like graphic artist/designer Shepard 
Fairey green his studio—all to “make a stylish, earth-friendly difference in Los Angeles” 
(Team Planet Green 2008a). Certainly viewers learn about eco-friendly products and 
practices: high-efficiency windows, their and “U value” which a popup tells us “is the 
measure of heat flow through a material” and their “solar heat gain coefficient” which, 
viewers learn, “measures how well a window blocks heat from sunlight.” The show also 
teaches viewers about all the kinds of questions one should ask about the glues in particle 
board and chip-wood when one is trying to do a green renovation: whether board has 
VOCs (volatile organic compounds) and formaldehyde, for example. But the show is 
centrally concerned with rolling eco-sensibilities into a hip, leisured lifestyle. In the 
  131 
episode “Coachella,” for example Boise Thomas heads to the (very expensive) music 
festival, Coachella, in a Winnebago that, as a popup explains, is “outfitted with 
hydrogen-assisted fuel cell system.” The show doesn’t dwell on what that is or its 
environmental advantages—in fact, we get as many factoids about Coachella as we do 
about environmental building. As Boise and the driver roll through the beautiful 
Coachella valley, they pull over to admire a wind farm. Once at the festival, a woman 
leads Boise to his “luxury tent.” “Feel how soft this is!” she urges him to touch the 
complimentary bamboo bathrobe. “Whoa ho-ho!” Boise exclaims as a popup lets us 
know that “Bamboo fabric naturally lifts moisture, is antibacterial and hypoallergenic,” 
and Boise adds, “Feels amazing. I’m stoked!” The episode concludes with a shot looking 
out from inside the tent. Boise is silhouetted, lounging in an Adirondack chair in his new 
bathrobe, sipping a glass of wine as he gazes into the sunset. “This does not suck,” Boise 
says to himself. “Actually, this is kind of sweet,” he concludes, toasting the painted sky 
(Alter Eco episode "Coachella" 2008). 
While it may seem like a stretch to situate World’s Greenest Homes and Alter Eco 
as technologies of governance and branding in the sense I have been discussing. The 
pedagogies, here, were subtle and product placement was minimal. Aimed at upscale 
consumers, the stakes of taking up or rejecting the tips were centrally about pleasure and 
self-realization. The hosts and guests on the show did not shame viewers into submission 
to an ascetic low-impact lifestyle or scare them with discussions of environmental 
degradation and climate change. There was no invitation to take stock of one’s life or 
attitude, no pressure to self-assess or measure one’s own “carbon footprint.” No norms of 
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conduct were articulated. Indeed, although climate change, deforestation, drought, and 
pollution provided a vague rationale, draped causally in the background, there was no 
real urgency to the uptake of practices demonstrated on these shows. 
Yet World’s Greenest Homes and Alter Eco can be understood as offering what 
Maureen Ryan calls a “desiring object, a technology through which to imagine oneself 
performing an idealized and class-inflected” lifestyle (Ryan 2014, 8). These are 
aspirational shows, “upscaling” green living and offering aesthetic instruction to viewers 
at home—how to select beautiful “sustainable” objects, energy star appliances, and 
efficient windows, while luxuriating in eco-design. They showcased the transformation of 
salvaged or repurposed objects (straw-bale walls, reclaimed wood, recycled fabric, etc.) 
into the trappings of fine living, thus articulating the dream of a green good life while 
tapping into presumed desires for class mobility. Borrowing a term from Tania Lewis, 
these are “etiquette manuals” for making classed green selves (Lewis 2011). By offering 
this technology for green class aspiration, the shows aimed to cultivate a specifically 
classed eco-sensibility. It may be tempting to link this classed mode of address to an 
educated liberal professional middle class habitus, in Bourdieu’s (1984) sense—
especially since this audience is so regularly addressed by ethical consumer media and 
marketing. However, on Planet Green, class was highly contentious. As I discuss in 
Chapters 3 and 4, Planet Green was completely preoccupied by avoiding associations 
with a “liberal elite” and structured by a horror of driving away what it imagined were 
fully “entertainment-driven” mass audiences highly suspicious of education and advice. 
Planet Green’s programming thus worked hard to reduce class to pure affluence and 
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cultivate acontextual desire for eco-glitz and glam. The World’s Greenest Homes, Alter 
Eco, and Planet Green brands themselves were situated as resources that viewers could 
take up work on themselves, “green” their conceptions of “good taste,” and hitch their 
class aspirations and green sensibilities to the Planet Green brand. 
 
Template 2: “Democratizing” green living by cultivating self-responsible, economically 
rational selves 
 Although World’s Greenest Homes, Alter Eco, and Hollywood Green articulated a 
model for green consumer-citizenship that was quite clearly out of reach for most 
viewers, another cluster of content attempted a more purportedly democratic avenue for 
becoming an eco-consumer-citizen.40 Characterized by a more middle-class sensibility, 
rather than an elite one, these shows ritually insisted that green living was for “everyone” 
that it was “easy” and “fun.” With greater economic accessibility, however, came more 
emphatic—even didactic—pedagogical strategies. In the shows discussed above, 
environmental authority was distributed among the homeowners, the hosts, the 
celebrities, as well as the brands of Alter Eco, World’s Greenest Homes and Planet Green 
themselves. Together, they authorized and offered a technology for classed eco-aspiration 
that hardly insisted on the lifestyle changes or the eco-upgrades on the shows. In shows 
like Wa$ted! and Stuff Happens (6/4/08-12/16/08), on the other hand, didacticism reigned 
supreme. Norms were articulated, and forms of measure and tools for self-assessment 
were offered. Viewers were explicitly invited to work on their souls and everyday 
                                                
40 While I will not discuss them again, here, Renovation Nation and Emeril Green also had a ritually and resolutely democratic mode 
of address, endlessly reiterating that the practices they recommend were “easy” and “simple” and that “anyone can do it!,” though, of 
course, they also recommend practices that were very expensive and required enormous amounts of leisure time, not to mention the 
physical ability to do these elaborate cooking and building projects. 
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conduct in line with branded models of greener selves and lifestyles through techniques 
including lecturing and shaming, confession, self-reflection, and ongoing work on one’s 
everyday conduct. The shows aimed to cultivate a thinking approach to the details of 
everyday life. 
 As a mode of governing through branding, these shows address viewers “as 
beings possessing a certain freedom to act” and thus “in possession of the freedom to 
think about their actions—to interpret the predicaments of their actions in ways that lend 
purpose and legitimacy to the rationalities that underpin their conduct” (Binkley 2006, 
347, paraphrasing Rose 1999). By thus inviting viewers into self-governance the shows 
also invite them to both to act and to step back from action, “to conduct oneself, but also 
to conduct that conduct…to make oneself more efficient, more productive, cleaner, more 
communicative, loving, civil, or giving… the unthought and thus unfree act is, in every 
case, transformed into the reflexive act—the act thought about and justified by thought” 
(348). The shows offer viewers a whole range of tools—from economic equivalencies to 
information about environmental destruction and alternative products—to transform them 
into greener consumer-citizens who reflect carefully on the minute details of their 
everyday choices.  
For example, on Stuff Happens, “Science Guy” Bill Nye takes us through various 
domestic spaces and daily routines to explaining the ecological footprint of sushi dinners, 
litter boxes, and playing sports. With episodes entitled, “Garage,” “Bathroom,” 
“Kitchen,” “Bedroom,” “Attic,” “Beach,” “Sports,” “Breakfast,” and “Dinner,” Nye 
reveals the toxic chemicals lurking in garages and in pressurized cans of shaving gel and 
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the environmental impact of bacon and toilets and pharmaceuticals. The show combines 
live “person on the street” pop quizzes (for example, Nye stops passers-by to ask them, 
“What is the most dangerous beverage in the rainforest?” Answer: industrially grown 
coffee), science experiments in the television “lab,” classroom-type lessons on why 
(some) toothpaste threatens the survival of orangutans (it contains the palm oil-derived 
sudsing agent, sodium lauryl sulfate, and palm plantations are displacing orangutan 
habitat), and humorous, scripted exchanges that dramatize green teachable moments 
when Nye catches his friends and relatives committing eco-don’ts (like driving ATVs), 
thus modeling the teacher-pupil arrangement and practices of self-reflection and self-
work that we can take up at home (Nye’s pupils are reformed in the process of learning 
about, and reflecting on, the toxic particulate pollution produced by ATVs and the way in 
which driving them can contribute to the spread of invasive species when seeds get 
lodged in their tires). Animated sequences translate our daily practices (using toilet paper, 
eating chicken, shaving, throwing out wire hangers) into ecological and economic 
quantities (numbers of trees, dollars, food miles, gallons of water, pounds of pesticides, 
the number of homes that could be powered by an ingredient in shave gel, the number of 
miles the wire hangers thrown out yearly would stretch, untwisted and placed end-to-
end).  
While all of these are tools to think with, Nye also gives explicit advice to, for 
example, buy organic chicken, fair trade coffee, sodium lauryl sulfate-free products, use 
“green” dry cleaning services, recycle your sneakers, and donate your old clothes, instead 
of throwing them away. After a lesson on the links between intensive cashmere 
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production and desertification, for example, Nye recommends that viewers seek 
“alternatives” because “inexpensive cashmere is not reflecting the true cost of making 
cashmere.” In order for us, “we cashmere consumers” to “help solve this problem” it is 
viewers’ job “to decrease demand for cheap, not sustainably produced cashmere no 
matter where it comes from.” Rather than regulatory interventions, one can stop 
desertification by purchasing alpaca instead: “The wool from these llama-like animals is 
just as soft as cashmere, but a whole lot softer on the environment… so try the al-paca al-
ternative. And the next time you see a stack of cashmere sweaters that seems too cheap to 
be true—too inexpensive to be true—well, they probably are. Just leave them there! If we 
stop buying stuff like this, sooner or later it won’t be on the shelves” (Stuff Happens 
episode "Closet" 2008). In line with a larger “ethical consumerism” discursive formation, 
Nye calls upon viewers to pay what food author Michael Pollan (2006) has called the 
“hidden costs” of corporate and consumer capitalism, the externalized costs of industrial 
production. Nye articulates a range of equivalencies that “translated” environment saving 
into everyday actions one could take up at home (and likewise articulates environment 
destroying to our un-thought everyday actions). Through these tactics, the show connects 
global environmental problems to individual consumer choices, empowering “ordinary” 
consumers to “make a difference.” “Buy fair trade!” Nye enthuses. “Vote with your 
dollars!”  
If the pedagogy of Stuff Happens was not clear enough for Planet Green’s 
particular pedagogical project, Wa$ted! demonstrated the process of “ordinary” people 
submitting themselves to Planet Green’s eco-training regime. A reality “life intervention” 
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show, Wa$ted!, dramatized a eco-consumer citizen training and offering a range of 
technologies of the self to help both participants and viewers at home work on their 
attitudes, lifestyles, and souls. I will discuss Wa$ted! in considerably more depth than I 
have the other shows, for it most clearly articulates the way in which governmentality 
came together with branding in Planet Green, and in turn, what kind of environmentalism 
this convergence enabled. Hosted by Annabelle Gurwitch and Holter Graham, the weekly 
program intervened in households of “eco-criminals,” and offered them tips and 
resources for reducing their polluting behaviors and energy use. Reformed contestants 
were rewarded with a cash prize. Through a combination of parodic discipline, 
surveillance, confession and shaming, alongside an emphasis on self-awareness and self-
improvement that the show seemed to take quite seriously, Wa$ted! specified problematic 
behaviors and offered participants an array of corrective technologies to address their 
personal eco-don’ts. The show aims to prove “that American homeowners don't have to 
be extreme to be green” by taking “the average household full of eco-horrors” and 
transforming “it into a clean, green haven, saving participants serious cash in the process” 
(Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 2008).  
The narrative arc of the show resembled to other reality life intervention shows, 
albeit with a parodic and ambivalent slant: it was as delighted by the excesses of its 
“hardened eco-criminals” as it was disgusted by them and the hosts’ heightened 
performances as “eco-police” invited more humor than intimidation. Episodes of Wa$ted! 
began by establishing the participants as objects of intervention through a blend of 
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confession, surveillance, pathologization and auditing.41 Each “victim” addressed the 
camera to remorselessly own up to a litany of personal eco-crimes. For example, eco-
criminal Kisha says “It’s pretty easy to recycle, but I think we’re just a little lazy for 
that,” while her roommate, Donna, doesn’t “plan on doing anything to fix it.” Mock 
closed-circuit surveillance footage shows one of the women drop bottle after recyclable 
bottle into the garbage (and the recycling bin is right next to it!). A red police stamp of 
“GUILTY” is branded across the screen. “I don’t know any other way to live,” offers 
another of the women plaintively: “GUILTY!” (Wa$ted! episode "Sex and the City" 
2008).  
The hosts then descend on the household, armed with megaphone and a truckload 
of the household’s garbage. The criminals are called upon to know themselves by coming 
to know their own waste, recognize their behavior as problematic and excessive. The 
garbage is unloaded on their driveway or sidewalk in a spectacular heap. “Do you feel 
like you can justify all this garbage?” asks Gurwitch asks one couple of their yearly 1300 
lbs and calls upon them to take responsibility for individual items: “Whose is this?” she 
says, holding up inappropriate trash items (recyclables, clothing, packaging, metal water 
bottles) (Wa$ted! episode "He Said, She Said" 2008). Gurwitch presents statistics of the 
particular wasteful pathology from which the individual household suffers: “Of your 
1300 lbs of garbage, 375 is just packaging!” This functions not only to locate the 
specifics of the household’s dysfunction, but also becomes a teaching moment for 
offering eco-facts to the viewer, for whom an animated sequence explains “Every year 30 
                                                
41 Like that of Emeril Green, The Wa$ted! casting call urged individuals to position themselves as problematic and in need of 
intervention. Seeking “people with bizarre, energy-wasting habits” the call asked a contestants to submit a brief biography that 
explained why they believed their “family need[ed] an eco-makeover” (Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 2008). 
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million lbs of packaging, packaging—we’re not talking something that was used for 
something—is going into landfills across America.” The show thus brings participants 
“face-to-face” with their bad habits, leading them toward confession. Eco-criminal Laura 
uses her gas-guzzling SUV in her daily commutes. She confesses that it only “averages 
about 13 to 15 miles to the gallon” and that “ultimately, it shouldn’t be a commuting 
vehicle.” Or when faced with the evidence that her family generates 2000 pounds of 
garbage per year, Mary Lou Zeller tells the camera: “I am ashamed. I am embarrassed. I 
had no idea that we were producing so much garbage.” Here, the viewer is invited to both 
judge and forgive. In both cases, through the act of confessing, individuals, within the 
logic of the narrative, undergo a shift: they become subjects who can be addressed as 
feeling responsible for their effect on the environment and desiring to change. Thus, the 
confession serves not only to align the viewer with the hosts—the arbiters of eco-
norms—and distance her from the guilt of those on the show, but it also functions to 
negotiate shame, to produce excess as problematic, and, critically, to indicate the 
individual’s readiness to take on the corrective regime: it is a condition of eco-salvation.  
The narrative was organized around an “audit” of each household's ecological 
footprint: it measured its waste production as well as its consumption of resources in 
household energy use, water use and transportation. The results come with a shaming 
lecture: “All of us depend upon nature for the resources that we need, like land to grow 
our food and forests wood and for paper,” Gurwitch reminds us, “but if everyone 
consumed like you guys do, we would need more planets!” An animated sequence 
illustrates the size of the group’s property, and then the size of the “ecological footprint,” 
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which is specified in acres, then in terms of the group’s property, for example, “your 
ecological footprint is 81.9 acres, that’s 41 times the size of your property!” That is then 
translated into the number of planets we would need if everyone consumed the way that 
the group consumes (usually in the range of 5 to 9 Earths). The result of the audit acted as 
a baseline against which to measure that household’s improvement after submitting itself 
to a “green regime” for the next three weeks.  
While Wa$ted! is partially parodic, inviting viewers to distance themselves from 
the participants, it is pedagogical at the same time. Viewers are empowered with 
information via the mini-lessons cited above, as well as “ECO-TIPS” that appear in the 
bottom left-hand corner of the screen. It produced a range of norms and forms of 
knowledge through which viewers could self-assess and, both through the show and 
online (one could take advantage of the online ecological footprint calculator to take up 
the auditing techniques demonstrated on the show in one’s own homes), and it offered 
corrective tools to not only green one’s everyday life but also to save money. The hosts 
recommended tips and tools including, newspaper insulation, automatic composters, cloth 
kitchen towels, eco-friendly cleaners, color-coded recycling bins, CFL bulbs to replace 
incandescent bulbs, solar panels, and hybrid cars. They also suggest practices like 
curbing online shopping, replacing old energy-intensive appliances with new energy star-
rated ones, telecommuting, looking for an eco-friendly drycleaner, reducing the amount 
you drive your SUV, not leaving the fridge door open, switching to organic makeup [not 
money-saving in the short run, but linked on the show to personal health and risk 
avoidance, reducing exposure to such ingredients as lead and formaldehyde], and 
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changing other consumption and waste habits. It is a customized action plan specific to 
each group. The hosts introduce the “extra incentive” of the cash prize, equivalent to an 
estimate of the year’s-worth of “eco-savings” the group would achieve based on their 
three-week trial of implementing the techniques proffered. Viewers were invited to 
“extend their quality time” with the hosts by visiting Planet Green’s website, where they 
could “find additional tips, resources and insights” (Planet Green Defines Eco-
Entertainment 2008). The overarching logic of the narrative invites viewers to invest in 
participants’ journey to remake their souls and take responsibility for their eco-sins. The 
eco-don’ts demonstrated by those who appear on the show offer viewers tools for making 
sense of what not to do, enabling individuals to self-police. The parody is thus concerned 
not only with adding narrative interest to the don’ts of green living but also with the 
production of a subject who is available—that is, who will submit themselves in their 
freedom—to a green makeover. While viewers may take pleasure in the fact that we are 
not as bad as participants on Wa$ted!, the show invites us to invest in their journey 
toward good green subjecthood.  
When each episode concludes “three weeks later,” we return to evaluate the 
group’s adherence to the customized eco-program. Gurwitch emphasizes their “failures,” 
to add an element of dubious suspense (“failure,” within the logic of the show is, in fact, 
impossible), which are going to “hurt” both their “footprint” and their cash prize. 
However, we soon learn that, despite missteps, the participants have “taken [the program] 
to heart.” Their new “ecological footprint” is, inevitably a smaller one (albeit one that 
remains vastly larger than their property). The percentage by which it was reduced enjoys 
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verbal emphasis, but the number of Earths contestants still need to maintain their new, 
greener lifestyle is not considered. Instead they are presented with their prize and kudos 
from the hosts. The show closes with footage of the hosts enthusing about how “really 
proud” they are, which cuts to confessional shots of the reformed participants reflecting 
on their new moral outlook. Donna notes that “a lot of people think that you’re just one 
person…one person can’t make a difference, but one person really can make a big big 
difference…” (Wa$ted! episode "Sex and the City" 2008). Similarly, a college student in 
a fraternity house featured on the show concludes, “this whole experience really opened 
our eyes to everything that’s going on in the environment and what we can do…” 
(Wa$ted! episode "Fraternal Affairs" 2008). 
While Wa$ted!’s aim to empower individuals toward environmental subjecthood 
was potentially progressive, on the show, the greatest threat to the environment are not 
the policies of governments or the practices of industry and large corporations, but rather 
the particular pathology of the individual herself. Individuals are simultaneously blamed 
for the problem (in fact, with their “strange obsession[s] with burning carbon” and 
“online shopping addiction[s],” they are the problem (Wa$ted! episode "He Said, She 
Said" 2008)) and empowered to solve it. They can govern themselves through their 
freedom to make the right consumer choices. Making the right choices—and wanting to 
make the right choices—becomes simultaneously a means of self-realization, of saving 
money, and of doing good for oneself and one’s family, for humankind, for future 
generations, and for the planet. Wa$ted! focused on a makeover of the soul that is aimed 
at a realization that “one person can make a difference.” Within the narrative, living a 
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green life—even as it includes instructions for making small, manageable changes—is 
less important than believing in oneself as an agent vis-à-vis the environment, believing 
that one can do good through small, personal acts and consumer choices. 
In this way, Wa$ted! is a quintessential example of the new environmentalism as 
articulated by Planet Green. Through new products and self-empowerment, coming to see 
oneself as an agent of the new environmentalism, one can engage in environmental 
saving fully within brand culture. While only some of the practices specifically require 
the purchase of products, the entire program can only be realized through the Planet 
Green branded universe, as individuals bring tips and techniques from the television and 
website into their everyday lives. It extended and elaborated the pedagogy of Stuff 
Happens, demonstrating and rewarding its uptake in a “real life” household. 
The Planet Green websites fully supported this project. Viewers at home could go 
online to find an array of tools for acting on themselves in the manner that the show acted 
on its participants. In addition to the “ecological footprint calculator,” the site offered 
viewers games, quizzes and other tools for self-assessment, enabling the detailed scrutiny 
of their daily routines, green sensibilities, and eco-knowledge. One could test one’s eco-
savvy in quizzes like, “Would you fall for an eco myth?” “How good is your green 
vocab?” Do you “know the biodiversity hotspots”? What’s your “ocean IQ?” By taking 
the quiz, “How well do you know Climate Science? (Quiz)” you could test your 
knowledge of “the current state of climate change science” and its impact on “Sea level 
rise, the strongest greenhouse gases, deforestation, and more” (Planet Green quizzes 
2009).  
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One could also find tools for detailed scrutiny of one’s daily routines by finding 
out the environmental impact of everyday cleaning, cooking, shopping, and gardening: 
“Are you a green appliance guru?” a “green cleaner?” “test your organic gardening 
knowledge” to find out if you are a “composting pro.” Do you “know how much energy 
you’re using? Take this quiz to find out!” You can find out “your food’s carbon 
emissions” as well as its “water footprint.” What about a “Who owns your food?” quiz to 
test your knowledge of the brands you think you know and trust at the natural foods 
stores? You can test your knowledge of farmers markets, “green diet,” and “green” wines 
and beers: “Are you an eco-friendly eater?” “How green is your happy hour?” Test your 
travel habits to learn whether you are a “green globetrotter.” In the realm of “Fashion & 
Beauty,” individuals could take quizzes like, “How Green is your Wardrobe?” “Are you a 
green beauty?” and “What’s your clothing’s footprint?” 
One could work on one’s green-appeal in the dating marketing: “What’s your 
Green Celebrity IQ?” “Are You a Great Green Date?” or “An Ecosexual?” (Planet Green 
Homepage 2009). One could even take a deeper look at one’s psychological health and 
“Measure Your Eco-Anxiety Level” by answering questions like, “How panicked do you 
get when you think about global warming? When you watched An Inconvenient Truth, 
did you a) fixate on Al Gore's coif, b) try to calculate the carbon footprint of your organic 
Oreos, or c) wonder where you could stop for a bottle of Pepto Bismol-and then worry 
about the impact all that plastic will” have on the environment? (Chua 2008b). 
 Stuff Happens, Wa$ted! and Planet Green’s vast array of online lifestyle 
resources—thanks in part to their focus on the ordinary details of everyday middle class 
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life—have a far more inclusive and democratizing mode of address than, for example, 
World’s Greenest Home or Alter Eco. The range of online tools in particular made the 
recommended self-work appear even more accessible. But the seeming progressivism of 
this template for citizenship is rooted in a process that works to transform environment 
saving into matters of individuals’ “rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and 
consequences” (Brown 2005, 42). Specifically, this template posited that “going green” 
could “save green” and the planet by offering equivalencies that translated quotidian 
practices into quantities of land, distance, trees, and, significantly, dollars. Planet Green 
refigured environmental clean-up through forms of measure, equivalencies, and 
discourses of personal responsibility that are useful, not only to neoliberal rationalities of 
rule, but also to brands whose environmentalism is contingent on consumer “co-
creation.” Wa$ted!, Stuff Happens, and PlanetGreen.com’s self-assessment quizzes 
worked to imagine an environmentalism achieved through the production of “rational 
actors and impos[ing] a market rationale for decision making in all spheres” (Brown 40). 
This logic casts environmental action as economically rational and a site of self-
realization within the Planet Green branded universe. This economic logic, while useful 
for its branding and citizen pedagogy, also produced paradoxes. For one thing, it was 
precisely through the shows’ appeal to these ideals of neoliberal citizenship that the 
“democratizing” of this new environmentalism was done—the techniques of providing 
education for rational decision making and transforming “going green” an economically 
rational choice themselves promised to make this branded version of green living 
democratically accessible. But of course, green consumerism is often far from 
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economically rational under contemporary political and economic conditions—and hence 
hardly democratically accessible, as the practices were often very expensive and assumed 
things like car and homeownership.  
 
Template 3: Civic education, civil discourse, and public engagement 
 Finally, Planet Green worked to produce the brand itself as a site of civic 
education, public engagement, and civil discourse. While such activities are often 
associated conventional forms of democratic citizenship and the “public sphere,” Planet 
Green worked to incorporate them into the neoliberal logic of the overall brand, which, 
unsurprisingly, often created quite glaring tensions. In shows like Focus Earth, Supper 
Club with Tom Bergeron, and a number of online features, Planet Green worked to 
articulate this new environmentalism to a “serious” kind of public engagement, 
throwback to old PBS and educational television, working to produce good citizens who 
would engage in civil discourse and self-realize as informed and “active” citizens rather 
than irrational and impulsive consumers.42 As Ien Ang (1991) and Laurie Ouellette 
(2002) have both pointed out, while guided by a democratic impulse, televised efforts to 
activate citizens though information and opportunities for “engagement” are often 
“paternalistic” and “controlling” in their own right, equally implicated in the forms of 
governmentality I’ve been discussing throughout this chapter. Thus, it is crucial to not 
simply presume that these aspects of Planet Green were progressive and democratic, but 
rather examine what they contributed to its broader consumer-citizen pedagogy.  
                                                
42 Online could expand one’s ethical/activist knowledge based by “Watch[ing] a socially conscious film once a month” with a film-of-
the-month subscription that promised to deliver “thought-provoking, socially conscious, yet often little-known feature films, plus a 
few short selections, on diverse subjects such as human rights, grassroots democracy, food politics—and, of course…” the rest is cut 
off, but the context suggests, “environmentalism.” 
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Billed as an “eco-newscast,” Focus Earth, hosted by ABC’s Bob Woodruff, 
promised to cover “subjects ranging from climate impact, environmental policy, political 
debate and world events, as well as how climate change affects religious and cultural 
views and issues” by drawing “on the global resources of ABC News and its reporting 
team around the world” (Dolliver 2008). This “news you can use” aimed to “narrow the 
lens on” environmental issues and current events in order to “present news and 
information the average American can use in their daily life” (Team Planet Green 2008b). 
The online episode guides outlined a wide array of topics, from gorilla habitat loss in 
central Africa, to a digest of Department of the Interior's proposed changes to the 
Endangered Species Act, including links to the documents (Aug. 2008), coverage of 
issues of air pollution and the Beijing Olympics and air pollution, as well as the 
“disappearing” Louisiana coastline. They promise to explain “the role that climate change 
may play in U.S. national security” (Sept 13, 2008), and give us a primer on Denmark’s 
“energy independence,” the return of the grey wolf to the endangered species list, and 
eBay’s ban on illegal animal products (Oct. 20, 2008), California’s drought and the 
“Green Tech revolution” (March 20, 2009), as well as coverage of the G20 summit in 
London and the anticipated collapse of the Wilkins Antarctic ice sheet (April 11, 2009). 
But viewers who watched the show hoping for incisive exposés of environmental 
abuses, investigative reporting, or structural critiques would be disappointed. Resolutely 
aligned with Planet Green’s “solutions-oriented” sensibility, Focus Earth took on these 
issues by profiling actors who put their can-do spirit to work in a whole range of 
environmental interventions. With the exception of the episodes on global warming that I 
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discuss in Chapter 3, which were much harder to shape into this problem-solution 
structure (though the entire Planet Green brand, Focus Earth included, worked tirelessly 
to do so, relentlessly positioning “you” as the most vital agent of change), on Focus 
Earth, Planet Green problematized environmental issues in ways that gave way to 
solutions by change-making “visionaries.” 
 For example, in an episode about Hollywood “going green,” viewers learn about 
how “dirty” the movie and music business can be. This positions eco-innovations in 
special effects and musicians “greening” their studios and tours as a pressing kind of 
environment-saving (Underwood 2008). In a segment on the “dangers of eco-tourism”—
the ecological damage caused by so-called green vacations—brings us to the Galapagos 
Islands to see how “the very tourists who come to celebrate this unique eco-system may 
in fact be changing it forever.” While the segment does give us some clues about the kind 
of ecological damage such tourism is having, this functions largely to set up a man named 
Costas Christ, Global Travel Editor and columnist at National Geographic Adventure 
magazine, as an agent of change—and by extension, set up the viewers as potential 
change agents as they become better informed eco-tourists (Team Planet Green 2008c).  
 One episode that, at the outset, seemed to have promise for opening up structural 
critique was called “Environmental Injustice” (2009). Viewers received mini-lessons on 
environmental racism, specifically the waste facilities, polluting truck routes, and illegal 
dumping that goes unchecked in one predominantly Africa American neighborhood in 
the South Bronx, which had contributed to all kinds of health and quality of life problems 
for residents—the episode is particularly interested in asthma and obesity, attributed here 
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to residents’ reluctance to allow children to play outside due to particulate pollution and 
garbage in the local parks and green spaces. But rather than learning more about who 
these polluting companies are, or being encouraged to think about how to stop them, 
Woodruff explains, “From planting trees to creating bike paths to promote healthier 
lifestyles, they’re working to make this a better place to live.” Volunteers help to clean up 
trash. Residents do their part to “fight obesity” by getting physically active. A cut to a 
demonstration, not contextualized by the show, shows a handful of people holding up 
“Green Jobs not Jails” signs. 
 The show weaves these seemingly disparate activities into a narrative of planet 
saving. While most of the individuals featured in this episode are othered in highly 
racialized ways—chubby African American children are shown in doctor’s offices, heads 
cropped out of the frame, as an adult stretches a tape measure around their middle and a 
voiceovers and popup text boxes offer statistics on obesity—we do meet a “visionary” 
with whom we are invited to identify: the celebrated (but controversial) environmental 
justice advocate, non-profit founder/director, and industry consultant Majora Carter. The 
promotional web spot for the episode calls Carter “a prime example of changing the 
world one person at a time” (Team Planet Green 2009) and throughout the segment she 
mediates South Bronx for presumably middle class white viewers at home, informing us 
about the statistical links between predominantly Black and Hispanic neighborhoods and 
pollutant levels that exceed government safe limits. The causes, however, are not 
explored on the show. Absent of perpetrators and structural analysis, the narrative hardly 
paints a coherent picture of the power dynamics that operate where white supremacy, 
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capitalism, and environmental degradation meet. Rather, it is a can-do story of “greening 
the ghetto.” Viewers are invited to become informed citizens, savvy about environmental 
racism and people like Carter, in ways that are less about fighting structural inequality 
than about folding this savvy into their ongoing engagement with the Planet Green brand. 
While it is potentially progressive that Focus Earth named environmental racism 
as a problem, exposed the environmental impact of the music and movie industry, and 
uncovered the environmental damage that can be caused by eco-tourism, viewers are 
quite explicitly not called upon to identify personally with the environmental problems in 
ways that were shaped by a mode of address that presumed whiteness and relative 
affluence. They are not affecting their everyday lives. Rather, viewers are invited to 
understand themselves as “visionaries” who, as I will discuss in the next section, can self-
realize through consumer choice, volunteerism, and philanthropy.43  
As I have suggested, Focus Earth may seem like a throwback to early educational 
television, which, as Laurie Ouellette points out, engaged explicitly in education for good 
citizenship that “insisted that viewers learn, strive, pay attention, and, eventually, turn off 
the set and ‘do what has been suggested’” (Ouellette 2002, 46). But Focus Earth was 
characterized by far gentler ethos that did not “insist” but “invited” viewers into a new 
environmental consumer-citizenship by providing tools for them to become active, 
engaged, and informed in line with the demands of branding. For Focus Earth, in the 
                                                
43 In a special episode on environmental “visionaries,” for instance Bob Woodruff, addresses the camera: “There’s no doubting it,” he 
begins, “we’re facing some extraordinary environmental challenges. But were also living in a time of innovation and solutions thanks 
to the 6 inspiring individuals you’re about to meet. I like to call them heroes because they’re literally saving out planet from some of 
its greatest threats… and also renewing another important source of energy: hope.” But in fact, there is a seventh segment to the show, 
on “the unsung hero who’s making the biggest difference of all”: you. It called upon individuals to think of themselves as “unsung 
heroes” each time they dump their recyclables into the correct bin (Focus Earth, Earth Day episode, 2009). Even in coverage of mass 
mobilization, such as an article on the 2010 climate rally on the National Mall, the demonstration was recast inline with Planet 
Green’s affinity for “visionaries” and individual action: the “visionary responsible for the future is you” declared the headline 
(DeFranza 2010). 
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larger context of Planet Green, the “active viewer” was likewise invited to “do” various 
things, but she would do so not by disengaging from the brand, going out as a “citizen” to 
engage in purportedly “non-commercial” activities. Rather, she could “turn off the set 
and ‘do what has been suggested’” fully within the Planet Green branded universe, 
heading online to self-realize as a green consumer, philanthropist, volunteer, activist, 
and/or participant in civil discourse, in ways that added value to the Planet Green brand at 
the same time that it worked to realized the new environmentalism.  
For example, on PlanetGreen.com individuals could take part in branded 
volunteer and charitable activities, thanks to links on the Planet Green web site that 
brought them to partner organizations’ opportunities. They could “help save polar bears 
without leaving home,” or “Use Facebook to Plant Trees and Win Cash” by “liking” the 
iChapters Plant a Tree Drive’s Facebook page and taking one of its eco-quizzes. They 
could learn how to get involved in wetland restoration or find resources to “help your 
favorite restaurant conserve” with advice from the National Restaurant Association's 
Conserve Initiative and urged individuals to “Encourage your local school to change the 
world” by hooking it up with the Discovery Education-sponsored middle school eco-
competition, the Siemens We Can Change the World Challenge, in which promised to 
reward students working “to solve local environmental issues” (a partnership with the 
National Science Teachers Association and Siemens Foundation).  
Visitors to the Planet Green site could take part in a green consumer boycott as 
part of a Planet Green branded collectivity: “Don’t Buy Eco-Nightmare Collectible 
Plates!” the feature exclaimed, calling out by name those with Christian and “Precious 
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Moments” scenes. The site recommended protest and activist strategies like tree sitting 
and direct action. The site urged viewers to “Throw a seed bomb” and encouraged 
individuals to be “anonymous green nuisance[s]” by filling retailers’ comment boxes 
with their green opinions about corporate operations. One could even sign a “Petition to 
Fight Climate Change and Download Free Missy Higgins Song” (Root 2009) or one to 
“stop junk mail” through the consumer rights organization ForestEthics (Chua 2008c). 
Planet Green also encouraged individuals to participate in the political process in 
conventional ways for example, to read a “5-Minute Guide to the Senate Climate Bill” 
(Merchant 2009a), “write your congressman [sic]” or, on November 4, 2008 the website 
urged, “forget Democrat or Republican, Vote Green!” (Merchant 2008)44 On December 
2009, it reminded uses that “There’s Still Time to Speak Out Against Natural Gas 
Drilling in New York” informing users about the extended deadline for public comment 
(Cernansky 2009a).  
Planet Green even encouraged individuals to participate in mass mobilization. 
“What Are You Doing October 16? If You’re Not Standing Against Poverty and Climate 
Change, Maybe You Should Change Your Plans,” (Cernansky 2009b). Through Planet 
Green, we could join the organization Stand Up: Take Against Poverty and Climate 
Change, in events around the globe aiming “to get every individual, community, and 
government involved in the struggle against these pressing (and interconnected) crises.” 
A guest contribution from environmentalist and author Bill McKibbon (“How to Create 
Massive Change when it Comes to Climate Change”) reiterated this call to viewers to 
                                                
44 The author of the feature clarified this as a “bipartisan proposition for citizens across the country” not a vote for the Green Party, but 
a call to assess the environmental records and commitments of the candidates. 
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join in global demonstrations on Oct. 24, 2009 (McKibbon 2009). And the following 
year, we were invited to join in “1Sky’s National Call-in Day for a Clean Energy Future” 
(Team Planet Green 2010).45 But even when urging individuals to participate in these 
conventionally “political” activities, Planet Green always stitched such activism and 
volunteering back into lifestyle. Indeed, individuals were invited to customize and 
personalize their eco-engagement through the Planet Green brand by finding out their 
“volunteering personality.” Planet Green suggested partner orgs fit for “social 
entrepreneurs,” Rock ‘n Roll fans, those attracted to “Exotic travel,” outdoorsy types, or 
“lovers of the sea” (Get Involved n.d.).  
 This was a remarkably expansive array of possibilities for branded environmental 
action. Through these offerings, Planet Green worked to encompass all of the potentially 
threatening activities associated with environmentalism within the brand itself, 
transforming them in the process. If environmentalism was a threat to brands, Planet 
Green would subdue it by subsuming it entirely. It didn’t matter if the activities 
recommended were directly productive for brands in the sense of shopping or viewing 
and clicking on ads and branded video shorts. By offering the Planet Green brand as a 
site at which users could cultivate, realize, and enact consumer-volunteer-philanthropist-
activist-citizen selves, Planet Green positioned brands as an integral part of 
environmental action. 
 However, this third template for citizenship concerned not only providing the 
Planet Green community of viewers and web users with “news you can use” and a whole 
                                                
45 1Sky was conceived by establishment environmental organizations and supports policy measures to curb global warming and create 
a “green economy” but claims to be “grassroots.” 
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range of opportunities to put their informed citizenship into practice in branded 
volunteerism and activism. In addition, on TV and online Planet Green worked to instruct 
individuals in techniques of civil discourse and provide a platform on which they could 
do it. “Civil discourse,” in the Lockean sense, is hardly associated with commercial 
media on which viewers are far more likely to see pundits going “head-to-head” in heated 
arguments designed to drive ratings, than to see thoughtful debate informed by relevant 
research or lived experience. Yet Planet Green’s new environmentalism worked to 
cultivate just that kind of civil discourse—and make it useful to brands. 
 For example, on Supper Club with Tom Bergeron Planet Green offered viewers a 
chance to be a “fly on the wall” at a “Hollywood dinner party.” A celebrity chef would 
cook an eco-friendly meal, occasionally offering mini-lessons on ingredients, agriculture, 
and cooking, as a range of celebrities debated topics like sustainability, organic food, and 
green politics and also plugged their lifestyle books, websites, radio shows, and blogs. 
While certainly this was about showcasing green-hued luxury living and providing an 
opportunity for the celebrities involved to build their green brands, it was simultaneously 
about demonstrating the skills of facilitating and engaging in friendly debate around the 
supposedly contentious topic of climate change. 
Specifically, the show promised an evening of lively discussion and debate of the 
“full spectrum of green topics” and the “latest news and events in the green movement,” 
like green baby products, biodynamic wine, bamboo dresses, carbon offsets, “green 
fatigue” and global warming. (As we listen to the guests banter, popups tell us how we 
can become more engaged: “Looking for a great way to get going on your green life? Go 
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to planetgreen.com, register, and a dollar will be donated to help the green rebuilding of 
Greensburg, KS.”) (Supper Club episode "Junk Food, Organic Vineyards and Green 
Fatigue" 2008).  
 On Supper Club, skills of facilitating—and engaging in—civil discourse are 
cultivated as part of a lesson in upscale entertaining. Bergeron played the facilitator and 
party host, his job ostensibly to keep things from getting too heated and to keep the 
conversation going. Bergeron begins by introducing the guests, while text appears on the 
screen emphasizing the relevant details, always including one tidbit clearly positioned to 
be inflammatory—but in a “friendly” and humorous way—for example, that conservative 
radio host Doug McIntyre “says an Inconvenient Truth is full of lies” or that 
TreeHugger.com founder Graham Hill “doesn’t cook.” We also learn about the menu and 
Bergeron goes on to ask a series of “provocative” questions inviting guests to debate. 
When things got too contentious, he offers a lighter-hearted topic or beckons guests to 
retire to the sitting room for another glass of wine—and more prepared topics including a 
party game called “hypothetical biodegradable” in which guests must choose between, 
say, giving up your car for a 20 percent raise, or keep the car and forego the raise—while 
they wait for dessert (Supper Club episode "Junk Food, Organic Vineyards and Green 
Fatigue" 2008).  
 Supper Club worked to collapse public discourse with the domestic setting of 
upscale entertaining, all encompassed within and enabled by the branded universe of 
Planet Green. The show gave successful people a platform to debate topics with which 
they may or may not have been familiar. Guests’ authority to speak on environmental 
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issues was granted by the particular convergence of cultural capital, publicists, brand 
strategies and chance that landed them a spot on a televised dinner party guest list. And 
guests invariably enjoyed great distance from the felt effects of environmental 
degradation, thus the stakes of the debate were always ethical and philosophical, not 
personally felt. Never did a guest who lacked the cultural capital and educated middle 
class or upscale sensibilities appear on the show. It would have been absurd within the 
logic of Supper Club and highly disruptive of its sensibility, to invite one of the poor 
South Bronx residents suffering from asthma that we saw on Focus Earth’s 
“Environmental Injustice” episode (though Majora Carter was a featured guest on 
October 16, 2008). Such distance from the felt effects of environmental degradation and 
climate change was a central condition of the kind of “friendliness” and “civility” that 
Supper Club taught. As a lesson on friendly debate, “tasteful” self-promotion, and 
upscale green entertaining, Supper Club elaborated a whole branded mode of green 
sociality that could be enacted in one’s everyday life or in the Planet Green online 
community where one could find tips ad recipes for hosting green dinner parties, advice 
for talking to “climate skeptics,” and a whole privatized public-style sphere, called the 
“Forums” in which one could put these skills into practice. 
Specifically, when Planet Green launched, the website offered a platform called 
the Planet Green Community. The Community’s “Forums” were “a collection of 
community-created discussions based on a range of topics that members post to get 
answers to questions, share ideas and projects, and even have a spirited debate.” Aiming 
for a kind of privatized public sphere—complete with suggestions for civil discourse and 
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good community citizenship—the instructional page gently explained, “If you start or 
join a discussion, don’t expect that everyone will agree with you. We like to foster a good 
environment for discussion and tend to allow the community to police itself as much as 
possibl.” It offered a list of “best practices” like creating good titles, making “strong, 
salient points,” offer “background information,” “No Blatant Promotion or Advertising 
Please” and if “profanity, flaming, and insults” cause a thread to “get ugly” Planet Green 
may shut down the thread, though its decision-makers “hate doing that, so just be cool, 
okay?” Instead, they urge users to “Encourage Civility and Positive Discussion” and try 
not to “take anything personally.” Users could start a brand new discussion thread, they 
could create new posts in ongoing conversations, reply to existing posts, and report abuse 
(Team Planet Green 2008d). The “community” created all kinds of topics not generated 
by Planet Green.  
The open architecture of the forums was perhaps one of the most progressive and 
interesting parts of the Planet Green experiment—not directed through branded content, 
the forums had the feel of 90s-style comment boards. But in the context of a commercial 
enterprise, the limitations of this privately enabled public-style sphere are obvious—and 
would soon be borne out in Planet Green itself. As time went on, Planet Green struggled 
to generate advertiser support and as it began to alter its brand, the forums were one of 
the first things to disappear. As early as 2009, user Organic_Pet_Products reported 
difficulties in joining the forums, being redirected to inoperative links on the Planet 
Green site (Team Planet Green 2008d). When I revisited the forums in April 2010 the 
link brought me to TreeHugger.com, rather than a specific Planet Green forums page, as 
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it had been in 2008, though as far as I could tell, the content remained available. In March 
2012, user llamastalker was unable to find the user-generated topical forums and when I 
tried to access the forums again in October, I discovered that they had disappeared 
entirely, even from TreeHugger, which had always professed a commitment to this kind 
of quasi-democratic dialog: clicking on the “forums” link brought me to a “page not 
found” message, though Planet Green quizzes, program information, and other content all 
remained available.  
 Nevertheless, Planet Green’s effort to produce this space for civil discourse fully 
within its brand was as much a part of the brand project as anything else. It worked to 
incorporate all dimensions of individuals’ environmentalist sensibilities in this project of 
brand building. Planet Green worked to transform the brand itself into a privatized public 
sphere, a site at which good eco-citizenship could be enacted. This was absolutely crucial 
to the convergence of branding and environmental governmentality. In branding 
environmentalism, Planet Green worked to situate brands as sites at which conventional 
forms of citizenship and public engagement could be carried out within proprietary 
branded spaces.  
 
Conclusion  
 In this chapter I demonstrated the way in which, in Planet Green, governmentality 
and branding came together to elaborate a new kind of environmentalism. Planet Green 
worked to demonstrate, perform, and produce a whole branded context in which brands 
themselves would become environmental actors and authorities. By situating brands as 
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environmental authorities, Planet Green set the stage for its television programming and 
web content to operate as a cultural technology, in the Foucauldian sense, offering 
viewers tips and techniques to self-realize and self-govern as eco-consumer-citizens and 
members of the Planet Green community. 
Planet Green was carefully constructed to invite individuals to co-produce its 
brand in very specific, though multiple and contradictory, ways. It worked to incorporate 
all aspects of environmental action—from everyday life to volunteerism to activism to 
conventional public engagement—transforming activities often presumed to be non-
commercial into a new branded environmentalism. It did so by subtly guiding and 
shaping individuals’ environmentalist sensibilities and everyday activities toward the 
aims of brand value. But doing so aimed not only to bring individuals into the Planet 
Green community, it also aimed to operate as a cultural component to governance by 
calling on consumers to help manage the environmental externalities of a radically 
deregulated market. In the neoliberal imaginary, for corporations, “doing 
environmentalism” through voluntary “self-regulation” is contingent upon the construct 
of consumer “demand” codified in TV business as the “eyeballs” available for delivery to 
advertisers. As a governmental project, Planet Green aimed, on the one hand, to guide 
individuals’ environmentalisms toward this kind of “demand,” and, on the other hand, to 
guide their consumer and media activities toward a new environmentalism. 
In this chapter, I have focused mainly on how Planet Green’s branded 
governmental project came together. But it is also worth noting that Planet Green was 
contradictory from the get go in ways that are inextricable from the tensions between 
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branding and environmentalism. While the next chapter delves more deeply into how 
Planet Green worked to manage these contradictions, I want to conclude this chapter by 
noting a few moments when Planet Green’s contradictions ruptured the supposedly 
smooth meeting of commercialism and environmentalism—for these moments, I suggest, 
and will elaborate on in coming chapters, were as central to Planet Green’s pedagogy as 
anything else for if, as I suspect, Planet Green’s structuring contradictions were 
irresolvable, regardless of whether its decision makers were aware of this, the brand’s 
very existence would become contingent on cultivating a comfort with these 
contradictions themselves. 
 Sometimes, for example, commercialism baldly trumped environmentalism. On 
Emeril Green, for example, despite the fact that the show’s tagline claimed that the show 
“unleashes all the information you've ever wanted to know about green cooking” (On 
TV: Emeril Green 2008), in fact, the environmental politics of the show were all over the 
place (except to the extent that the ethical authority of the Whole Foods brand maintained 
a semblance of coherence). Topics ranged from heart-healthy cooking to wild game, anti-
aging foods to vegetarian cooking, “sushi on a budget” to tips for solving common GI 
issues through diet. While Lagasse did occasionally insert words like “local” and 
“organic,” or mentioned that he had been growing organic vegetables for twenty years, 
the vast majority of the lessons were tenuously, if at all, connected to environmentalism. 
The Whole Foods experts, for example, have very little to tell us about environmental 
consequences of food choices and typically inform us about cooking techniques, flavor 
profiles and beer and wine appropriate pairings, provenance, and nutrition of foodstuffs. 
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The fishmonger quite glaringly does not discuss questions of overfishing or contaminants 
like mercury and PCBs, nor does the butcher mention the environmental impact of 
various forms of cattle raising. Rather, they discuss cooking techniques, teach us fish 
identification, where on the cow common cuts of meat come from.46  
 And at times overcoming guests’ food fears on Emeril Green is unambiguously 
contrary to “eating green.” Elsewhere within the Planet Green universe, individuals can 
learn about the enormous environmental impact of meat production. On Battleground 
Earth, for example, factoids about the staggering resources required to produce a pound 
of beef. On the Planet Green website, an article headlined, “Meat and Climate Change: 
It's Even Worse Than We Imagined” points out that “Animal byproducts are responsible 
for 51 percent of annual worldwide human-caused greenhouse gas” (Z. 2010). Yet on 
Emeril Green, one young woman, Valerie, overcomes her fear and intimidation 
surrounding red meat. In the end, she feels “motivated and empowered to get creative and 
go into the kitchen myself.” Triumphant, she tells us, “Now I’m able to work with meat 
because I have the education to back it up. I’m thinking about trying to cook a steak on 
my own!” (Emeril Green episode "East Meets West" 2008). 
 Other times, however, environmentalisms were featured that seemed to fit poorly 
with the broader governmental brand project. Some segments were loosely consistent 
with market-oriented personal responsibility. For example, the website urged individuals 
to shop at thrift stores and salvage found furniture, to make “easy, no-sew cloth napkins 
in five minutes!” and to “Get Recession-Ready: Live on Less and Love It!” From G 
                                                
46 There was a small handful of off-brand experts who offered more explicitly “green” forms of expertise: the president of a farmers 
market talks about its environmental benefits, an “Eco-Arts and Crafts Expert” Jenn Savedge talks about toxin-free kid activities, John 
Page Williams of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation discusses the effects of overfishing. This typically occurs in the small collection of 
episodes in which Lagasse takes viewers on off-site field trips. 
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Word, one could learn how to make biodiesel from scratch, fashion a low-tech air 
conditioner, or set up a worm composting system. But, in overt tension with consumer 
culture, others spots advocated withdrawing from the consumer economy entirely. The 
website offered tips on how to “barter creatively.” G Word gave a lesson on freecycling, 
one on “slugging” (a free ride-sharing practice born during the 1970s fuel crisis and still 
used by DC commuters), and another very lengthy one devoted to profiling Dr. Milton 
Saier, Professor of Biology University of California, San Diego who, in his own words, 
has “been a freegan for 30 years.” In a 70s-style polo t-shirt and bare feet, he takes on a 
tour to teach us everything we need to know about dumpster diving while G Word popup 
bubbles offer authoritative factoids like, “Milton saves over $10,000 a year by being a 
Freegan” or “FREE-GAN (n): Person who believes in minimizing waste and individual 
impact on the environment.” Saier explains that “Freeganism in general is anti-
consumerism” meaning that “you are supposed to reduce consumption whenever 
possible…reuse anything that you do have…and finally recycle it if you can’t.” Text 
boxes reading “reduce consumption,” “reuse,” and “recycle” appear on the screen, 
affirming Saier’s advice. We hear from a number of students who have joined him on his 
dumpster dives, enthusing about the beer they once found. Finally, Saier gives us tips for 
determining whether dumpstered foods are safe. Fruits and vegetables are easy to assess 
by look, feel and smell, “if the meat is frozen then you know its good,” and stuff without 
labels is just fine, “we call them mystery cans,” he tells the assembled students. “Look at 
this!” he exclaims from a dumpster, “an absolutely magnificent mango. Sometimes I 
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wonder why they throw all this stuff away…” (G Word episode "Eco Drag Racing" 
2008). 
And there were not just anti-consumerist segments, but also features on anti-
corporate activism. Online, Planet Green promised to help users “find out who’s polluting 
in your neighborhood” and a Focus Earth feature on “eco-terrorism” offered an 
ambivalent lesson on what to do about it. While this Focus Earth feature emphasized 
eco-terrorism’s “extremism” in a highly ambivalent manner, drawing on tropes from 
coverage of other “dangerous societal elements,” the episode was unwilling to take a 
clear moral stance,47 leaving an opening for eco-terrorism itself to emerge as yet another 
lesson in the Planet Green environmental curriculum. This, of course, wasn’t remotely 
overt—and was almost certainly unintentional. But it is worth noting for it gestures to the 
ungovernability of the “green space” that Planet Green attempted to control.  
While surely these apparent outliers were part of Planet Green’s effort to subsume 
even anti-consumerist and anti-corporate sensibilities into the commercial project of 
brand building, it is also not difficult to see the problems that this might create. Calling 
out the consumer economy or corporate capitalism hardly makes for advertiser-friendly 
television to put viewers in what Joseph Turow calls a “buying mood” (1997). Nor does it 
advance Planet Green’s case that the solution to environmental problems lies in strategies 
of everyday work on the self and lifestyle in ways that are uniquely enabled by brands. 
The Planet Green project was rooted in the promise that environmental 
governance could be transformed into a “green space” of eco-friendly services, products 
                                                
47 But, as I discuss in Chapter 3, this ambivalence, filtered through an attachment to normative journalistic objectivity, was present in 
similar ways when the show featured climate deniers and big oil companies. The refusal to engage in investigation that would result in 
unambiguous reporting or news we could actually use was a prominent feature when the show tackled topics it presented as 
“controversial.” 
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and lifestyles that could be fully controlled through good branding. It was also rooted in 
the fantasy that good branding would successfully enable a new kind of planet saving—
one that would unfold seamlessly and require no intervention on the part of the state. 
Brands could do well by doing good thanks to consumers everyday lifestyle activities, 
and consumers could self-realize as green thanks to the resources and advice offered by 
brands. But while I have argued throughout this chapter that Planet Green’s project must 
be taken seriously as productive—that is, productive of a green consumer-citizenship and 
a new environmentalism—by productive I do not mean that Planet Green was successful 
in achieving its intended goals. As the contradictions noted here suggest, and the coming 
chapters elaborate, environmental branding was a far more unruly project than its 
proponents would care to admit. In Planet Green, as we will see, it did not always go as 
planned. 
  165 
Chapter 3: Anxieties, ambivalence and “posting” environmentalism  
 
Introduction 
In early June of 2008, Discovery Communications Inc. released a commercial 
entitled “Just Naked.” In it, a young and attractive strawberry blond woman turns to make 
small talk with a professionally dressed, balding white man who happens to be standing 
behind her in line. They appear to be at a bank. The floor is carpeted with lush green 
grass, but otherwise the scene is suitably corporate and unremarkable. “Vvvv,” she 
shivers. “It’s frickin’ freezing in here! It’s like a meat locker.” She smiles and returns to 
facing forward. “I guess so…” he mutters smirking, nervous, embarrassed. His eyes dart 
side to side. 
The woman turns to continue addressing him. As she does so, the customer ahead 
of her steps toward the teller, thus revealing her naked back. Unperturbed, she goes on 
cheerfully, logically, “Did you ever think that if everyone wore a little less clothing we 
wouldn’t waste so much energy crankin’ up the AC? Right?”  
“You might be alone on that one,” the man responds miserably. 
“Really? Look,” she observes, gesturing, “the security guard cares about the 
environment.”  
The commercial cuts to a portly Asian American man, nude but for his belt and 
gun. “Nope,” he says casually as he strolls by, “Just naked!” 
The ad leaves us with the cheeky “Get exposed to a whole new green” in text 
across a white screen. 
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“Just Naked” was part of a series of 30-second spots advertising Planet Green in 
the initial days of its existence. The ads were characterized by a hip sensibility, working 
to appeal to upscale consumers while refusing middleclass forms of propriety. They 
“sexed up” environmentalism through the display of women’s bodies and by appealing to 
heteromasculine “bad boy” sensibilities (Gajda quoted in Banet-Weiser, Authentic 2012). 
They were all committed to superficial forms of representational diversity, which seemed 
aimed at adding a layer of racialized urban cool or to a mode of address fundamentally 
structured by whiteness and affluence. If the joke was on anyone in the ads, it was on 
dorky middle-class white men, too out of touch or too square or too nerdy to invite even 
ambivalent identification.  
In “Do Time with Green,” for example, three enormous, heavily tattooed men in 
prison orange—one African American, two white—show off their shivs, made from eco-
friendly materials, of course. One is a recycled toothbrush joined to the lid of a tin can 
with organic glue. Another is “carved from reclaimed hardwood.” The last is fashioned 
from an old lunch tray—“locally sourced!” observes one of the inmates approvingly. 
“Beach” featured a nerdy white guy in a Speedo, the crotch of which is encrusted with a 
blinding array of miniature solar panels. He demonstrates his homemade “solar-powered 
swimsuit”—his “little gift to Mama Earth”—by grabbing an mp3 payer from a reluctant 
bikinied sunbather and plugging the device into his butt (doing so produces an awkward 
whimper of sensual satisfaction). “Feel the power of a whole new green,” concludes the 
ad. The final spot featured Mötley Crüe drummer Tommy Lee and 
rapper/actor/entrepreneur Ludacris aka Chris Bridges one-upping each other by showing 
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off to their recycled jewelry (Bridges) or soy ink tattoos (Lee), bragging that by filling a 
hot tub with “women instead of water” they “saved a hundred and fifty gallons!” 
(Bridges) or by not showering for seven days they “saved two hundred and seventy-six 
gallons, blam!” (Lee). With Lee’s week-old body odor in mind, viewers are urged to “Get 
a whiff of the whole new green.”  
While the ads are wholly lighthearted, poking fun at the earnest and often 
bourgeois sensibilities that have come to be associated with “ethical consumerism,” one 
can certainly critique their reliance on a number of gender- and race- and class-regressive 
representations. Their explicit humor relies on the viewers’ distance from the thinkability 
of the prison context (which, as many scholars, as well as news story after news story 
have shown, is a distance that is both racialized white as well as classed). It relies on the 
salience of excessive and jokey objectification of women’s bodies, as well as the 
naturalness of a white, heteronormative male viewer at the center of the imagined 
audience. Other viewers who can “take a joke” are, of course, also welcome to tune in. 
While the parodic and rehearsed awkwardness of professionalized white men in the ads 
might make the mockery appear to undermine dominant hierarchies, in the end, in fact, 
whiteness and hetero-masculinity are everywhere, albeit invisibly, and fully naturalized 
in the mode of address (see Dyer 1997). 
My purpose, however, is not so much to locate racist, classist or hetero/sexist 
imagery in Planet Green promotional materials—not least because the heavy use of irony 
and multiple points of identification in these ads make them resistant to easy critique. 
Rather, I argue that the ad campaign hints at more general anxiety and ambivalence 
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surrounding the whole Planet Green endeavor—anxiety and ambivalence on the part of 
Planet Green as well as within the branding of environmentalism more broadly. And 
further, that these seemingly regressive representations are part of Planet Green’s effort 
to solve an environmentalism that is approached as a problem. 
In this chapter, I situate Planet Green as an example of the “branding of politics” 
in the sense written about by Sarah Banet-Weiser (2012). Specifically, by working to 
brand environmental politics and produce a branded environmental movement (that is, a 
brand as a social movement), Planet Green participated in a broader tendency in brand 
culture in which politics itself is “harnessed, reshaped, and made legible in economic 
terms” (Banet-Weiser 2012, 127). But instead of positioning the branding of 
environmentalism in Planet Green as an achievement, I argue that Planet Green—along 
with green brands in general—is better understood as a site of struggle. While a brand 
like Planet Green is undeniably structured according to a commercial logic, this does not 
mean that it will materialize in ways that are “economically rational” in a pure and 
abstract sense.  
On the contrary, brands are produced by decision makers with their own 
assumptions about what is (and isn’t) commercially feasible. In the case of Planet Green, 
these assumptions were shaped by the fact that they were held by powerful actors 
operating within a firm that controls enormous amounts of money. As Planet Green 
attempted to bring environmental governance together with capturing the “right” kind of 
eyeballs to sell to advertisers, a whole slew of assumptions and anxieties—about 
  169 
consumers, about advertisers, about shareholders, and about environmentalism—came to 
shape the brand on every level.  
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I discussed the way in which media firms’ 
anxiety about the invisibility of the TV audience is central to the imperative to know the 
audience in finer and finer detail (through ratings, for example, and demographic and 
psychographic data). In scholarship on branding, this anxiety is acknowledge but rarely 
made central. Rather, successful brands are, more often than not, the ones that are 
highlighted—Nike, Sony, Dove, etc.—and analyzed for what they reveal about the logics 
of branding in contemporary culture. Yet, the success of branding is never guaranteed, as 
Celia Lury notes, “the brand is not a matter of certainty, but is rather an object of 
possibility” (Lury 2004, 2). The value of a brand is not simply given, Adam Arvidsson 
explains, but depends upon ongoing management of something that is “external to the 
brand-owning organization”: consumer “attention” and what individuals “think of or do 
with the brand” (Arvidsson 2006, 7). This means that branding is always about 
administering a process that can never entirely be brought under a firm’s control 
(Arvidsson 2006, 7). The brand’s very existence as such, what Lury calls its “object-
ivity,” is realized through ongoing discursive and communicative practices: the brand is 
“an effect of performativity” (Lury 2004, 7, following Butler 1990). This ongoing 
performativity (by a range of producers and consumers) that brands require for their 
realization, the huge investment in branding across organizations, and the whole field of 
brand management, suggest that branding, like ratings discourse, is better understood as 
ongoing struggle for control than an achievement.  
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It is in this sense that the branding of environmental politics in Planet Green must 
be understood as a struggle. Planet Green was fully structured by an ongoing effort to 
overcome profound fears of consumer unruliness as they came together with equally 
profound worries about the compatibility of environmentalism and good television. These 
worries, as I will demonstrate, were expressed in the trade press, the popular press, and, 
albeit indirectly, within Planet Green’s promotional discourse. And they came together to 
“problematize” environmentalism in a manner that disavowed these anxieties by 
refiguring them as something that, ostensibly, could be solved by branding. Planet Green 
problematized environmentalism as boring, unhip, “treehugging,” “granola,” 
anticonsumerist, “greenwash,” hypocritical, or unconvincing. The struggle of branding 
environmental politics for television took shape as an effort to “solve” this 
problematization of environmentalism in a manner guided by the aims, interests, and 
assumptions of decision makers.  
I follow Angela McRobbie (2004), Rosalind Gill (2007), and Sarah Banet-
Weiser’s (2007, 2012) work on postfeminism and post-racial culture to argue that, in a 
manner anticipated by the ad campaign described at the outset of this chapter, Planet 
Green as a whole would seek to solve environmentalism for television by bringing the 
governmental promises of “strong branding” together with an effort to “post” 
environmentalism. It would do so by strategically incorporating and repudiating aspects 
of environmental politics to remake environmentalism as a branded politics. Planet Green 
worked to post environmentalism with its ironic sensibility, its “aspirational” orientation, 
its ambivalent embrace of environmentalism as a cause, the way in which it favored an 
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entrepreneurial, can-do spirit over collective statements of environmental protest, 
preferred the purportedly neutral world of technoscientific expertise over the “biased” 
one of politics, and drew upon post-feminist and post-racial sensibilities to make the 
brand “hip” and “fun.” Planet Green’s branded environmentalism would be a “new and 
improved” response to a purportedly impotent, unhip, and “old” (and, implicitly, 
unprofitable) environmentalism. Posting worked to “move beyond” the “problems” 
environmentalism posed to branding by situating racialized, gendered and classed forms 
of entrepreneurialism, personal empowerment, and implicitly, ambivalence as key 
technologies of the post-environmentalist self. 
 
Problematization, green marketing, and Discovery’s anxieties 
Planet Green was launched into a market in which actors were both anxious and 
deeply ambivalent about environmentalism. At the time, the ubiquity of green 
consumerism and often-dubious “eco-friendly” product claims made green marketing 
look like nothing more than an environmentally suspect effort to capitalize on an existing 
consumer fad. This assessment, however, disregards how wholly problematic 
environmentalism is for branding, for media firms, and for consumer capitalism. It also 
disregards the work that firms like Discovery undertook to overcome environmentalism’s 
problematic character though ongoing efforts not only to actively construct a green 
market within this context, but also to fashion this market in line with their own 
objectives through strategies of branding and governance. In other words, reducing green 
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to a fad ignores the way matters of the environment are “problematized” in green 
branding discourse and the way solutions are proposed and enacted.  
Following Foucault, Jeremy Packer explains that defining something as “a 
problem” sets the stage to imagine that something “as governable.” When something 
becomes “problematized” in discourse, or “thought of in terms of a problem to be 
overcome,” its problematization can legitimate particular modes of “governance and self-
governance” (Packer 2003, 136). The way Planet Green as well as the broader green 
marketing discourse defines the “problem” of environmentalism has a “productive 
capacity,” in Jeremy Packer’s sense, in that it structures thinking around how it will be 
solved” (Packer 2009, 238). Planet Green’s problematization of environmentalism set the 
stage for how Planet Green’s launch would materialize as a particular kind of solution. It 
would “legitimate authority, and, by implication, authorize certain solutions while 
invalidating others” (Packer 2009, 237). Planet Green promised to solve capitalism’s 
environment problem for television. It is by examining the particular problematization of 
the environment (and the underlying ways in which it was not problematized through 
ongoing disavowal of a number of uncontrollable factors), both on Planet Green and in 
green marketing discourse more broadly, that one can gain insight into the ways in which 
Planet Green’s structuring anxieties shaped the forms of eco-governance it aimed to 
enable. I argue that Planet Green’s problematization of environmentalism worked to 
disavow the whole project’s structuring contradictions by reducing them to a range of 
abstractions that could be overcome by good branding. 
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As I discussed in Chapter 1, despite the surge in green marketing across product 
categories, when Planet Green was conceived in 2007 advertisers were far from 
enthusiastic when it came to casting their brands in a green light. Consumers were “not as 
devoted to the planet as you wish they were” one AdWeek reporter cautioned, citing 
consumers’ skepticism about corporate environmental efforts and reluctance to change 
their lifestyle practices (Dolliver 2008). Market researchers found that consumers were 
averse to the added labor and cost associated with green products and highly sensitive to 
greenwashing—all the more so if they were already environmentalists (Dolliver 2008). 
While corporate social responsibility campaigns remain a popular branding strategy, 
firms are extremely wary of attaching their brands to environmentalism for fear that 
consumers might cry foul—as one former Planet Green executive put it to me, if you 
make green claims consumers are going to “scrutinize your advertisers for sure” (Howell 
2013). 
Advertisers’ eco-reluctance could to be ruinous to Planet Green. Although 
Discovery’s enormous profits from its other channels would have enabled running the 
channel at a loss, since it became a publicly traded company in 2007 doing so would have 
violated its new responsibilities to shareholders. Turning a profit sufficient to Discovery’s 
growth imperatives would be impossible without significant sponsorship dollars. And 
advertisers not only were worried about inviting consumer scrutiny, but they were also, 
of course, preoccupied with whether Planet Green would deliver consumers “in a buying 
mood” (Turow 1997) to their advertisements and branded entertainment.  
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Far from being guaranteed or surely profitable, the “green market” lacks stable 
thing-ness. On the contrary, it exists to the extent that is constantly being produced 
through ongoing work by marketers and firms aiming to make profitable the eco-
sensibilities of the public by directing them toward the world of eco-friendly lifestyle 
goods and services. At the time of Planet Green’s launch, doing so appealed to firms to 
the extent that the payoff could be great (green-skewing consumers were believed to be 
relatively affluent and talkative—if you pulled off successful green pitches, they’d 
promote you in their social networks (Zerillo 2008)). The risks, however, often seemed 
even greater. While any market solution to problems related to (if not directly caused by) 
capitalism’s externalities is likely to be rife with contradiction, in the context of green 
marketing these contradictions seemed to be making marketers particularly nervous. 
Out of these worries emerged a whole body of green market research preoccupied 
with capturing and managing the green market—a pursuit always haunted by its 
uncertainty. This discourse worked to name the risks associated with green marketing and 
offer instructions to minimize these risks—instructions that Planet Green followed to the 
letter. The arguments went as follows: green consumers were only just “awakening” they 
were “confused” and even “bewildered”; thus marketers ought to communicate with them 
with “clarity, candor, hope” (Hough 2007). Since consumers’ commitments to green 
living were more “aspirational” than “actual,” behavioral changes should be encouraged 
in “baby steps”; and given consumer sensitivity to greenwashing, corporations ought to 
address them “authentically and transparently” (Dolliver 2008).  
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The discourse also worked to slice up potential green consumers into groups and 
offered specific advice for effective targeting of each one. The attention on the household 
demanded from moms, for example, and their wish to set a “good example for their 
children” made them a good target audience; however, they were only likely to take up 
green consumer lifestyle habits if messaging was brought “down to the personal”—how a 
given product affected her immediate household and concrete action steps she could take. 
Although green marketers tend to be preoccupied with young people, the studies 
indicated that “Matures” (older than boomers) are more likely to be homeowners, 
purchase locally grown food and energy-efficient appliances so should not be ignored. 
“Conscious consumers” are likely to look “behind the label” at your business and 
production practices and blab about it on the internet, but they are also a crucial audience 
for the same reasons, so give them evidence backing up any environmental claims 
(Dolliver 2008).  
In these ways, green marketing discourse struggled to tame consumers by 
disavowing their uncontrollability and refiguring it in terms of such seemingly 
remediable qualities as “awakening” and “confused” or situating them as an oft-ignored 
market: don’t be a downer, don’t overwhelm, don’t forget about older people, do promote 
your eco-friendly efforts, and do rely on gendered assumptions. What this discourse fails 
to disclose is the extent to which this “green” target audience is not so much already 
there, but rather is being actively produced by this whole cluster of market research and 
branding practices. Further, it is being produced in ways that are shaped by the 
assumptions and anxieties of actors within marketing and media firms. By suggesting that 
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this knowledge about green consumers was simply “discovered,” rather than actively 
produced (in the process of market research and trade reporting and using this knowledge 
in branding practices and so on), this discourse problematizes environmental marketing in 
terms of a cluster of “truths” about consumers, purportedly outside the world of branding 
and marketing. This is a performative process that works to allay industrial fears by 
disavowing consumers’ essential unknowability through a proliferation of knowledge and 
tips aimed at rendering them knowable, predictable, and profitable. 
And for Planet Green, these industrial worries about the potential for consumers 
to reject green TV were likely only heightened by skepticism in the popular press—
skepticism that constituted a second discourse contributing to Discovery’s 
problematization of environmentalism. Commentators predicted that environmental 
television would fail to entertain. For example, the New York Times’ Brian Stelter opined 
that Discovery’s attempt to make matters of the environment into “entertaining TV” 
placed the launch of Planet Green among the riskiest of the year (Stelter 2008). Karen 
Goldberg Goff of the Washington Times quipped “putting up solar panels, creating a 
compost bin or changing to cloth napkins” hardly sounded “naturally captivating” (Goff 
2008). They also questioned whether Planet Green would be credibly environmentalist, 
pointing out that the celebrities featured on the shows were often dubious environmental 
experts. Goff wondered if the programming wasn’t merely a platform for marketing, a 
chance for “companies to get out the message ‘See, we're not so bad after all’”; she 
derisively pointed out that the first such company in line would be Wal-Mart (Goff 
2008). Stelter likewise observed, “some of Planet Green's advertisers could raise 
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eyebrows,” specifically Hummer manufacturer General Motors which was the channel’s 
“exclusive automobile sponsor” (Stelter 2008).  
As Discovery rolled out Planet Green, it worked to offer itself as a solution to the 
particular problematization that materialized where industrial anxieties about 
environmental marketing met popular skepticism about eco TV. Here, industrial wisdom 
about “strong branding”—already concerned with overcoming unruly consumers—came 
together with more specific efforts to allay worries linked to environmentalism in an 
elaborate performative endeavor. Through branding, Discovery would work to transform 
environmentalism into something that was not only safe for advertisers but also would 
deliver to them what Eileen Meehan calls “bona fide consumers” (Meehan 2005). It 
would also overcome the popular skepticism about whether a commercial TV channel 
could be “credibly” environmentalist and whether environmental television could be 
genuinely “entertaining.” 
In Chapter 1, I suggested that, in this context, it is useful to understand the task 
before Discovery as a highly choreographed performance designed to persuade 
advertisers to invest in the new channel. I pointed out that Discovery publicized its own 
(internal and unpublished) research to suggest that the market was unambiguously 
“ready” for green TV (Discovery had found that 40 to 50 percent of US residents were 
“armchair environmentalists” (Stelter 2008)). The forthcoming “eco-tainment” channel 
would simply target (rather than produce) “bright greens” or “people who are motivated 
by the idea that they can help the planet” and would “activate” this already-available 
audience “in the green space” of eco-friendly consumer capitalism (O’Neill quoted in 
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Stelter 2008) and “take green to the mainstream” (Carr quoted in Stelter 2008). Discovery 
described its target audience as one particularly interesting to advertisers: Planet Green 
was not developed for environmentalists, but for “awakening light greens” who were 
conceived more as a kind of blank slate, ready to have their environmentalist sensibilities 
“activated” while being entertained. These consumers were “college students, baby 
boomers and new parents”—groups known to advertisers for their disposable income 
and/or propensity for buying new stuff—“who have demonstrated an interest in 
improving the planet by changing their ways of living” (Levin 2008)48—or, as a Wall 
Street Journal reporter cheekily summed up, “advertiser-friendly viewers willing to pay 
extra for hybrid cars and organic food” (Schechner 2008).  
I also pointed out that Planet Green promised to attract advertisers’ key target 
demographic of 18- to 49-year-olds, but more specifically, “media-savvy, social-
responsibility millennials… already engaged in the Internet as a resource” (O’Neill 
quoted in Kaufman 2007). Such viewers would not only consume advertisements on 
multiple platforms but would also provide advertisers free online labor as 
“greenfluencers” who eagerly promote their favorite green brands and products within 
their social networks (Zerillo 2008). In statements such as these, Planet Green 
spokespeople engage in performative declarations of knowledge aiming to demonstrate 
that launching environmental television was a good idea—a good idea for advertisers, for 
Discovery’s shareholders, and for consumers. What I want to point out in this chapter, 
however, is that these statements were also anxious, engaging in ongoing disavowal not 
                                                
48 He is likely referring to O’Neill’s statement that Planet Green targeted “boomers who look at longevity or legacy issues; first-time 
parents who want to do what is earth-friendly for their children; and college-age 20-somethings who have grown up in an 
environmentally conscious atmosphere” (Quoted in Blumenstock 2008). 
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only of Discovery’s own efforts to produce “bright greens” but also of the essential 
impossibility of knowing whether it is possible to do so. This was an effort to allay 
advertiser anxieties about the particular risks of green marketing—situating “green” as a 
site of capitalist possibility. 
As Planet Green began to materialize, Discovery addressed these anxieties 
through statements that were highly sensitized not only to advertiser worries that Planet 
Green would fail to deliver them bona fide consumers, but also to the popular skepticism 
that eco-TV could be entertaining and credible. As Discovery began to roll out Planet 
Green, it disseminated content and promotional language wholly organized around 
allaying these intersecting anxieties. Discovery spokespeople and press releases ritually 
repeated that Planet Green would indeed be “entertaining and credible,” and that making 
it so was within Discovery’s sphere of influence. “Planet Green proves that sustainable 
living is entertaining living,” declared an early press release (Planet Green Defines Eco-
Entertainment 2008). In a quote that was printed and re-printed across a range of 
promotional and news spots, O’Neill affirmed and reaffirmed, “This is a new genre… 
People don't have any set expectations of what green media is, and we're defining it—as 
really funny, engaging, entertaining and definitely credible” (quoted in Stelter 2008, for 
example). For Discovery, producing “entertaining” and “credible” content was crucial to 
“solving” an environmentalism that was itself approached as a problem. In Planet Green 
press, as in the broader green marketing discourse, the environmentalist and 
environmentalism both emerge as potentially unruly entities that required management to 
align them with Planet Green’s brand to add value and generate profits.  
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In addition, Discovery’s discourse betrayed anxieties about the tensions between 
environmentalism and capitalism, which were likewise codified in the constructs of 
entertainment and credibility. Compulsively announcing environmentalism’s potentially 
anti-capitalist associations, Discovery problematized green by citing a range of 
characteristics Planet Green would not have as it worked to contain “green” to maintain 
its alignment with the interests of brand value, lifestyle, and consumerism. Discovery 
CEO David Zaslav told the London Times that Planet Green would be “aspirational, not 
preachy” (Ashton 2008). Planet Green would not be about “perfection.” Rather, as 
O’Neill explains, “We're thinking about everyone being better—not necessarily perfect” 
(Stelter 2008). Zaslav adds, “If the standard is perfection, we'll all fail. The journey is to 
do a little bit better” (Stelter 2008). “Our messaging” a spokesperson promised TV Week, 
“is about being better, not perfect. If we’re all just a little bit better, we can make a big 
difference” (quoted in Kaufman 2007).  
Hedging against “perfectionism” was not only a way to maintain Planet Green’s 
appeal to a “can-do” spirit and avoid turning potential viewers off by setting the 
proverbial bar “too high” (thereby, perhaps, casting the consumer solutions offered on the 
channel in a dubious light and also making consumers feel powerless against depressing 
environmental realities), it was also a way of managing the criticism invited by 
sponsorship deals like that with Chevy/GM since cries of hypocrisy about, for example, 
GM’s environmental record could be reframed as unreasonable perfectionism that 
ignored (or worse, failed to celebrate) its “baby steps” in hybrid car manufacture.  
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Not wishing to be associated with an anti-consumerist ethos, political liberalism, 
or negative messaging, Zaslav distanced the channel from an “old” kind of 
environmentalism that “was granola and left” (Levin 2008). Zaslav explained, “We're not 
going to be ‘The ice is melting’… We want to engage people in a fun way and in the 
spirit of what we can all do together’” (Levin 2008). “Fun” is absolutely crucial, as 
Tommy Lee puts it, “[Environmentalism] is a serious sort of subject, but you got to make 
it fun or you freak people out” (quoted in Levin 2008) or as Adrian Grenier says of his 
Planet Green lifestyle show, Alter Eco (2008), “We're attempting to avoid the more 
boring parts of what this show could be” (quoted in Levin 2008). Yet this did not mean 
that the channel would be pure fun and commercialism, but would credibly “educate and 
inspire.” Zaslav explained that the channel would serve a “higher purpose,” operating on 
a plane above financial gain and commercialism (quoted in Siklos 2007). He promised 
programming that was “documentary” in orientation, not “reality,” hoping that viewers 
would "[come] back [to Planet Green] for a bit of nourishment, along with your 
entertainment” (quoted in Ashton 2008).  
In this performative discourse, Planet Green hedges against the potential to appear 
“granola” or “left,” political (i.e., “biased”), unfun, unhip, “extreme,” boring, “freaky,” or 
too serious. Passionate investment in urgent environmental issues (such as melting polar 
ice caps) is framed as a kind of crisis-obsessed fanaticism. Yet this is not simply a 
delegitimation of politics, it is an effort to allay the anxiety that environmentalism 
itself—its seriousness, its potential to discourage, its potential to be unfun—is a threat to 
business. Planet Green promised to solve the “problem” of environmentalism for TV. It 
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would rescue it from its associations with the preachy, political, depressing, and 
“granola.” It is worth noting that Zaslav assumed the term “granola” will speak for itself 
and does not elaborate, but it is difficult not to think of TV stereotypes in the 80s and 90s 
of New-Age, anti-consumerist, anti-materialistic, Birkenstock-wearing, TVP-eating, 
vegetable-juicing environmentalists. Almost always white, educated, middle class and 
middle aged, such characters were decidedly unhip. Though often heterosexually 
partnered, their non-normative gender performances—these gentle, feminized men, or 
women uninterested in the work of normative femininity—often rendered them non-
sexual, if not sexually suspect. Although these stereotypes are only barely evoked in the 
Planet Green promotional discourse, the specter of this unhip, anti-consumer stands as the 
foil—if not threat—to Planet Green’s edgy and fun brand of green. And as a foil it also 
stands alongside the outspoken political “lefty” and the environmental activist crying 
doom and gloom. Planet Green guards against these potential pitfalls by promising a fun, 
positive attitude and a can-do spirit. Yet Planet Green’s refusal to identify with more 
conventional images of environmentalism stands awkwardly alongside its anxiety about 
its own credibility.  
Of course, Planet Green did not invent these anxieties—nor did they dream up in 
a vacuum the strategies for overcoming them. Zaslav’s comments about “nourishing” and 
“documentary”-style programming sought to differentiate the new channel from “trash” 
TV in ways, as I discussed in Chapter 1, that tap into longstanding discourses that elevate 
“nutritious” educational television over mass-appeal broadcast programming and its 
feminized and working class associations (see Ouellette 2002, 33). Planet Green’s 
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anxieties also had much in common with worries set in motion during the Reagan 
administration. Reagan’s campaign rhetoric, for example, “successfully linked an overall 
decline in America’s international standing and the daily life of its citizens” to 
environmentalism, which, he argued would have Americans be hotter in the summer and 
colder in the winter; Reagan’s campaign attacked environmentalists as a “special 
interest” elite constituency (Gottlieb 2005, 185 & 208) insensitive to the everyday 
comfort of ordinary Americans and out of touch with their concerns (Ehrenreich 
1989/1990). Dismissals of environmentalists as a “liberal elite” stand alongside a long 
history of delegitimating them as fanatics and “longhairs” (Andrews 1999/2006, 190-
191). This has occurred in even within “establishment” environmentalist organizations, 
often, not surprisingly, in the context of efforts to align the interests of industry with 
certain environmental goals. For example the National Wildlife Federation’s Thomas 
Kimball called environmental activists, “extremists and kooks” and “screamers and 
yellers” when speaking to the electric power industry in 1971 (Gottlieb 2005, 214, 
Kimball quoted in Stansbury 1971).49 
Although terms like “credibility” and “entertainment” are often positioned as 
having obvious and noncontroversial meanings, upon closer inspection it becomes quite 
clear that in the case of Planet Green they each constellate around managing a range of 
anxieties about environmentalism in ways that are informed by highly reductive 
                                                
49 Planet Green’s promotional language also has precedent in things like the first Earth Day in 1970, which, as environmental policy 
scholar Robert Gottlieb explains, emphasized a “celebratory” dimension, rather than anything “adversarial” for the organizers didn’t 
want to “alienate the middle class” (Hayes quoted in Gottlieb 2005, 150). Like contemporary “green” strategies, Gottlieb argues that 
the organizers of the first Earth Day sought consensus among the press, government and the private sector precisely by shifting the 
focus of environmental intervention from radical activism and structural critiques of the “urban/industrial order” and its environmental 
consequences toward questions of individual lifestyle (Gottlieb 2005, 150). Indeed, as historian Donald Worster observes, most 
speakers on the first earth day in 1970 called upon “the public to drive less, conserve more, and to question the automobile—indeed, 
to question a way of life that was based on maximizing the consumption of oil and other natural resources, on promoting private 
wealth and national prestige as the highest social goals” (Worster 1977/1994, 357). This tension between the fear of alienating the 
middle class and fear of appearing bourgeois is a tension that continues to haunt green branding, including Planet Green. 
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industrial beliefs about audiences. Indeed, the Planet Green project was altogether 
preoccupied with realizing entertainment and credibility in the brand. It did this through 
the ritualized assertions of its own certainty that it could make green TV into good TV, as 
cited above, but also by attempting to enlist individuals labor in producing the brand as 
such. In this way, Planet Green’s strategy for overcoming anxieties about 
environmentalism must be understood at the place where the performativity of brands 
meets their governmental promises.  
 
Posting environmentalism 
I argue that Planet Green worked, on the one hand, to make environmentalism 
into good TV and, on the other hand, to make TV into good environmentalism, and that it 
did so through a process of “posting.” The “post-environmentalism” that Planet Green 
worked to enact had much in common with—and in many ways occupied then same 
cultural space—as postfeminism and other “post” discourses. While much has been 
written on the proliferation of such discourses in contemporary culture, in order to 
understand their particular role in Planet Green, I find Angela McRobbie’s and Rosalind 
Gill’s work on postfeminism and Sarah Banet-Weiser’s work on the meeting of 
postfeminism and postracial discourse especially helpful.  
I find their work useful in this case because it illuminates posting as a process 
and, I would add, a struggle, much as branding is a process and an ongoing struggle. This 
struggle aims to simultaneously incorporate and undermine, for example, feminism, or, in 
the case of Planet Green, environmentalism. Posting is done through ritual and repetition, 
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through a whole vocabulary of “choice” and “freedom,” and through technologies of 
distancing (such as “irony,” cultural savvy, the ability to “take a joke,” etc.). It celebrates 
the individual entrepreneur and personal empowerment; it centers the self as a site of 
work and it is intimately linked to neoliberalism. 
In order to see how Planet Green posted environmentalism, it is useful to briefly 
review this work on postfeminism. Postfeminism, writes, Angela McRobbie, is “an active 
process by which feminist gains of the 1970s and 80s come to be undermined”; it 
“positively draws on and invokes feminism as that which can be taken into account, to 
suggest that equality is achieved, in order to install a whole repertoire of new meanings 
which emphasise that it is no longer needed, it is a spent force” (McRobbie 2004, 255). 
Postfeminism situates feminism squarely in the past while celebrating young women as 
privileged bearers of freedom and choice wherein “feminism is decisively aged and made 
to seem redundant”; “Feminism is cast into the shadows” (255).  
Postfeminism also reacts against “political correctness” as an oppressive and 
humorless regime, tapping into an irony that relies upon generational difference and 
youthful cultural savvy—hipness and an ability to “take a joke” become an indication of 
one’s “sophistication and ‘cool’” (McRobbie 2004, 259) as well as one’s difference from 
ugly and fearful figures like the “feminist killjoy.” This kind of “irony and knowingness,” 
writes Rosalind Gill (2007), is central to the postfeminist sensibility. Irony hails 
audiences “as knowing and sophisticated consumers, flattering them with their awareness 
of intertextual references and the notion that they can ‘see through’ attempts to 
manipulate them” (Gill 2007, 159, following Goldman 1992). Further, “Irony is used also 
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as a way of establishing a safe distance between oneself and particular sentiments or 
beliefs, at a time when being passionate about anything or appearing to care too much 
seems to be ‘uncool’” (Gill 2007, 159).  
And in postfeminist media culture in particular, “irony has become a way of 
‘having it both ways’, of expressing sexist, homophobic or otherwise unpalatable 
sentiments in an ironized form, while claiming this was not actually ‘meant’” (Gill 2007, 
159), it is, borrowing David Gauntlett’s (2002) term, a “knowing ridiculousness” to overt 
sexist imagery (Gill 2007, 160). For Gill, irony has the effect of making critique more 
difficult, as it anticipates and dismisses it in one maneuver; for Banet-Weiser, 
postfeminism situates irony itself as a politics, a “much more personal kind of politics 
than a more activist, public politics” (Banet-Weiser 2007, 212). Likewise, throughout its 
short existence, Planet Green was relentless in its derision of “treehuggers,” yet was also 
continually working to position itself as credibly environmentalist in a repeated ironic 
maneuver that was similarly worked out through a personalized politics and what Banet-
Weiser calls “commodity-driven empowerment” (Banet-Weiser 2007, 202). 
 It is not difficult to see how posting is useful to power (e.g., white supremacist 
heteropatriarchal capitalism and its various manifestations in branding50 and consumer 
culture): it promises to contain threats (like feminism, for example) by simultaneously 
incorporating and repudiating them. In the case of brands, the containment of such threats 
promises to manage market uncertainties and consumer unruliness in the interests of 
profits and brand value as it struggles to transform political activism and social 
                                                
50 Sarah Banet-Weiser (2012) has demonstrated how post-feminism has become useful to branding more particularly in, for example, 
the Dove Real Beauty campaign. And as post-feminism comes together with post-racial discourse, she argues, “Popular discourses of 
race and images of nonwhites… become cultural capital in the contemporary marketing world” (Banet-Weiser 2007). 
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movements into a mode of individual empowerment achieved within and through the 
market. For this reason, “posting” can be understood as an ambivalent process that is 
laced with fear. This is much aligned with the way in which the process of branding 
environmentalism is shot through with anxiety, as I have been arguing throughout this 
chapter. McRobbie’s formulation of this is especially evocative: postfeminism’s repeated 
repudiation of feminism is indicative of anxiety about its “afterlife,” a signal that 
feminism itself continues to instill fear (McRobbie 2004). Feminism haunts the cultural 
space of postfeminism. And as I will show, environmentalism haunted Planet Green.  
Planet Green’s particular brand of environmentalism, with its simultaneous 
incorporation and repudiation of environmental politics and its heavy reliance on irony—
not to mention its insistence that the objectification of women’s bodies and celebrations 
of heteromasculine excess ought to make environmentalism “fun” and “for everyone”—
has much in common with postfeminism this sense. Planet Green was not simply 
“backlash” against conventional forms of environmental activism; it involved a process 
by which branding worked to undermine “treehugging” and “left” forms of 
environmentalism as “old,” “unhip,” and impotent—indeed, the feminist killjoy has a 
corollary in Planet Green’s other, the preachy, tree-hugging environmentalist, turning 
down the heat in winter and the A/C in the summer, making everyday life less 
comfortable and more laborious. But Planet Green’s repudiation of environmentalism 
was always ambivalent for it also celebrated environmentalism as a “mainstream” value 
and “common sense,” stressing the importance of saving the planet, albeit through “new” 
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and advertiser-friendly strategies—strategies that often relied on the transformative 
promises of postfeminism to make eco-TV profitable. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will analyze Planet Green’s effort to post 
environmentalism in its television programming and web content. In doing so, I will also 
attend to the contradictions that emerged in this process, the moments at which posting 
failed to contain industrial anxieties and failed to ease the tensions related to branding 
environmentalism for television. I examine the moments at which industrial anxieties 
about appealing to aging “affluents,” upscale consumers, or “middle America” trumped 
the will to make environmentalism “hip and cool,” as well as the moments when 
environmental politics refused to be corralled into a post-y narrative. I argue that Planet 
Green offers insight into an industrial “will to post” for commercial ends, as well as the 
limits of posting environmentalism in neoliberal brand culture. 
 
Posting as an industrial strategy 
I now shift from the industrial discourse issuing from Discovery spokespeople, 
toward the stuff of the Planet Green brand—the material with which individuals were 
invited to interact through the TV network, the websites, and the marketing events in the 
lead up to Planet Green’s launch. It is clear from the promotional discourse—including 
the Planet Green commercials—that Discovery aimed to align environmentalism with a 
post sensibility to remake it in line with commercial goals. More particularly, this 
strategy came together with the governmental aims of branding, for posting 
environmentalism promised to help Planet Green address a range of industrial anxieties 
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by guiding consumer behavior toward the ends of brand value across an array of 
interactive platforms. 
Specifically, Planet Green’s effort to post environmentalism was fully intertwined 
with its brand strategy, fully intertwined with its effort to enlist individual’s affective 
investments in the brand itself and invite them to incorporate the brand into their 
everyday lives. By making environmentalism “hip and fun” (among other things), Planet 
Green’s launch, its initial slate of programming, and its website worked in tandem to 
create an “[ambience] for ‘controlled forms of freedom’” (Arvidsson 2006, 16), to offer 
itself as a resource through which individuals could construct green “identit[ies], social 
relations and shared experiences” (3), and to insert itself as a valuable occupant “in the 
life-world (or to use marketing terminology, the ‘minds’) of consumers… to subsume and 
appropriate what consumers do with the [Planet Green] brand in mind as a source of 
surplus value and profits” (7). By doing so, Planet Green attempted to “work as a kind of 
ubiquitous managerial devices by means of which everyday life is managed, or perhaps 
better, programmed, so that it evolves in ways that can potentially generate the right kind 
of attention (and hence, brand value)” (7). 
Although brands always aim to structure consumers’ activities, Celia Lury 
explains that the brand also situates itself as a site of “indeterminacy, openness or 
potential” (Lury 2004, 47) to be completed by the interactive labor of consumers. Brands 
work by enabling rather than shutting down forms of action. Brands rely on consumers’ 
freedom and spontaneous activities for value (Arvidsson 2006). Planet Green worked to 
delineate an arena of freedom through a channel and websites that would have 
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“something for everyone” and “be like life, only greener” (O’Neill quoted in Goff 
2008)—its tips, games, quizzes, and news were customizable along interest and lifestyle 
lines, and into the minute details of everyday life. But—in ways that, on the face of it, 
seem to undermine the “openness” and “freedom” that branding relies upon for value—
Planet Green was also continually working to shut down, repackage, and distance itself 
from forms of environmentalism that were perceived to be bad for business. Planet Green 
was characterized by an irrepressible control impulse and was clearly not “for everyone” 
in a number of ways. 
I argue that Planet Green evidenced four anxieties. These were fears of being 
associated with (1) a “liberal elite,” (2) an earnest, feminized/emasculating and labor-
intensive environmental lifestyle, (3) anti-consumerism and asceticism, and (4) 
greenwash. The Planet Green brand worked to “post” each of these anxieties, or “move 
beyond” them, through a range of strategies that both incorporated and renounced a 
fearful other in order to make environmentalism advertiser friendly and respond to the 
skepticism in the green marketing and popular press discourse. This project was 
inextricable from Discovery’s struggle to structure individuals’ existing environmentalist 
commitments toward brand-building activities.  
This four-fear schema is, of course, reductive. These anxieties overlap 
significantly and the programs I use to illustrate each one could often just as easily 
exemplify another. It is useful, however, because it helps to demonstrate how anxieties 
about environmentalism came together with anxieties about branding. It also throws into 
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sharp relief the way in which the contemporary impulse to “post” is intimately tied to 
anxieties and ambivalences that emerge in fantasies of saving the world through brands. 
Planet Green worked to address each of these anxieties in ways that were both 
performative and governmental. They were performative in that Planet Green’s strategies 
to assuage these anxieties was part of a brand-story aimed at advertisers to persuade them 
that Planet Green was a good investment; they were governmental in that Planet Green 
actively worked to enlist individuals in making it so.  
However, neither advertiser nor individual compliance can ever be assured. This 
fact surely generated an additional layer of anxiety for Planet Green. And it also meant 
that no matter how much minute choreography and careful planning went into the brand, 
things might not go as planned. 
 
Post-tree hugger. Or, fear of (classed) politics. 
In the lead up to Planet Green’s launch, Associated Press television writer David 
Bauder wrote of a recent conversation with Planet Green’s Eileen O’Neill, “Planet Green 
doesn't want to be a network that appeals only to tree huggers and will always resist a 
heavy-handed approach… Instead of scolding people not to waste paper by using juice 
boxes, the network will profile a person who built a business upon recycling them” 
(Bauder 2008). In other words, Planet Green’s aim to make green “mainstream” was not 
only about making environmentalism fun, entertaining, and consumerist. It was also was 
rehabilitative project that situated branding itself (which encompassed a can-do 
entrepreneurial spirit) as rehabilitative. In the lead up to Planet Green’s launch, a 
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Washington Post reporter wrote, “It is a sign of the quickly changing ethos on the 
environment that until only recently, the term ‘tree-hugger’ was considered an insult in 
many quarters. Now, it is a valuable brand inside a global, mainstream television 
network” (Ahrens 2007a). Through branding, Discovery would rescue environmentalism 
from itself and, in the words of Discovery’s president of digital media, Bruce Campbell 
“continue doing what it does best: bringing green living to the masses” (Ahrens 2007a). 
And as the brand materialized, it became increasingly clear that Planet Green’s 
effort to move beyond (i.e., “post”) “tree hugging” and “heavy handed” environmental 
politics and make environmentalism “entertaining” for “the masses” meant something 
very specific. When Planet Green launched, for example, it worked to align the brand 
with purportedly “all-American” pastimes and “noncontroversial” fun. As I noted in 
Chapter 2, Planet Green reps attended the Indianapolis 500 and handed out T-shirts and 
beach balls, and sponsored a cleanup following the race (Stelter 2008). It staged “Get 
your Green On” events at Major League Baseball games in Washington, Milwaukee, San 
Diego, San Francisco and Oakland (Mark Award 2009). At the Washington Nationals 
game, Discovery CEO David Zaslav threw out the ceremonial first pitch and the 
National’s LEED-certified stadium’s JumboTron counted down to the 6 p.m. shift from 
Discovery Home content to the new slate of Planet Green programming (Stelter 2008). At 
a Milwaukee Brewers game, reps rewarded hybrid drivers with free parking, prizes for 
wearing “green clothing” and a “random act of green-ness” would earn one fan the 
privilege of throwing out the first pitch. Milwaukee’s Klement's Racing Sausages 
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employees—wearing Planet Green t-shirts—greeted fans who arrived on mass transit, 
giving them a free ticket to a future game among other things (Fultz 2008).  
In line with the wisdom on branding, these events and guerilla-marketing 
activities doubled as environmental activism and worked to position Planet Green as 
“fun” while enlisting individuals in a range of branded do-good activities (Maul 2008). In 
this way they sought to “incorporate not only (aspects of) the consumer, but also (aspects 
of) the context of use or wider environment, inserting itself into the activities and entities 
that exceed the individual consumer and are understood in terms of collectivities such as 
fans, lifestyles, or communities” (Lury 2004, 42).51  
In this way, Planet Green worked to rescue environmentalism from the depressing 
environmental realties and associations with a liberal elite. In this way, posting 
environmentalism’s associations with a liberal elite had little to do with casting a wide 
net to address the diverse environmental concerns of Americans positioned differently 
with respect to race, class, gender, geography, sexuality, ability, and lived experience. 
Rather, Planet Green aimed to refuse particularities of race, class, gender, sexuality, 
political commitment, and regional identity. Unsurprisingly, in the context of the hetero-
patriarchal white supremacist assumptions that govern industrial fantasies about “typical” 
and American-ness, this refusal of particularity manifested in the channel’s central 
programs, Greensburg (2008-2010). Produced by Leonardo DiCaprio’s production 
company Appian Way, Greensburg, a 13 episode docu-series, followed the green 
rebuilding of a Kansas town devastated by a 2007 tornado. Planet Green framed the 
                                                
51 “Or, to reverse the point of view,” Lury continues, “points of access to the brand have now come to include not simply the point of 
purchase and associated advertising and promotion, but also ‘special’ events” (Lury 42). 
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series as a story of the “rebirth of a rural town in Middle America into a model for the 
future” and a “story of a community coming together and facing the enormous task of 
greening a small city… an inspiring look into the human spirit” (Planet Green Defines 
Eco-Entertainment 2008). 
But while Greensburg worked to democratize “going green” by disarticulating it 
from a “liberal elite,” it did far more than this for it did so by positioning normative 
whiteness against “lefty” politics. For example, Greensburg is set up in terms of the 
town’s “conservative” American typicality, which in addition to an exclusive focus on 
residents with white bodies (except brief feature on a Latina recipient of a Habitat for 
Humanity home in late-season episode), draws on white-centric narratives of place 
(disavowing histories of displacement that cut through the narratives of most Americans 
who are racialized non-white). In Greensburg’s first installment, City Administrator 
Steve Hewitt tells us, “Greensburg, Kansas is very typical of the average, small town 
American—Midwest American [sic]. Built in the eighteen hundreds. Traditional Main 
Street. Not real big. Not too small. Focused on family. We go to church. We go to school. 
We know our neighbors. We root for the high school football team…” The voiceover is 
set against footage of high school cheerleaders, children playing on a playground, elderly 
residents hugging each other, a grain elevator pouring out wheat. The voiceovers and 
interviews rely upon, reproduce, and endorse an all-white nostalgia, in which the 
wholesome and “typical American” is a white, church-going Christian, belongs to a 
particular kind of family, and for whom “school” can be symbolized by a throng of white 
cheerleaders and football players and fans. Other residents express similar sentiments, 
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often emphasizing a history of geographical place-ness and close-knit community over 
countless generations. “It’s a great place to have kids. You could let your kids walk down 
the street, not have to worry about them,” says Mary Merhoff. Another resident tells the 
camera, “Greensburg has been home to us for generations. And we’ve lived together as a 
community for so long. We are so close-knitted [sic]. We are such a big family. This is 
just our home” (Greensburg episode 1 season 1 "The Tornado" 2008). The show hedges 
against associations with the “liberal elite” by showcasing the “typical,” largely working 
class, white, Christian, and patriotic. It features stories of those who profess to strongly 
identify with normative values of multigenerational family togetherness. Worried, 
perhaps, about alienating an imagined “middle American” viewer uncomfortable with 
racial diversity, non-normative gender performance, and environmentalism itself, 
Greensburg offers viewers a way of being green that distant from “lefty” politics and 
urban sensibilities associated with the “liberal elite.”  
By posting environmentalism in Greensburg, Planet Green did more than 
represent a post-environmentalism that repudiates liberal elitism in favor of white 
conservatism, it also produced this non-partisan middle ground precisely through 
enterprising individuals and brands: Greensburg’s green rebuild was made possible not 
through state intervention or collective action, but rather through the appeals of 
enterprising individuals to private corporations. Conventional political avenues were 
bypassed and a post-partisan solution to environmental problems was literally enacted in 
the show as SunChips sponsored the town’s new business incubator, Leonardo DiCaprio 
donated to overcome a “funding gap,” and the public school rebuild was enabled by 
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partnerships with the likes of Brita and General Motors. The town’s apparent 
normativity—that is, the purported absence of particularities in a white, conservative, 
agricultural, Christian, family-oriented town—and the ruin that resulted when the 2007 
tornado leveled the town came together to position Greensburg as an ideal site, a kind of 
tabula rasa, for this post-political intervention. 
If Planet Green wanted to make environmentalism “hip” and “fun” the painfully 
earnest and glaringly white Greensburg seemed like an odd choice—especially at a time 
when racial diversity had become a kind of cultural capital in dominant media culture 
(Banet-Weiser 2007, 202). But in the end, it hardly mattered if Greensburg was 
entertaining—or, for that matter, credibly environmentalist, for what it could offer to 
sponsoring brands was enormous. It promised to “move beyond” partisan politics by 
positioning enterprise and branded intervention as the route to reconciling 
environmentalism with conservatism. Greensburg engaged in no analysis of the structural 
causes of environmental destruction or political obstacles to achieving a less 
environmentally destructive future. On the contrary, it celebrated the possibilities of 
“going green” through brands. While it seems unlikely that Greensburg could have 
succeeded in inviting consumers into activities that would co-produce the Planet Green 
brand, it did offer sponsoring brands a platform ostensibly safe from politics on which to 
add green value to their brands and deliver the “Middle American” eyeballs that industry 
presumed were less prone to scrutinizing corporate environmental records. In 
Greensburg’s post-partisan politics, offering viewers entertaining content mattered little 
when sponsorship was assured. 
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Post-granola. Or, fear of feminized earnestness/labor-intensive lifestyle 
While Planet Green’s preoccupation with “Middle America” and the “mass” 
audience may seem odd given Planet Green’s status as an upper-tier cable channel and 
the more general belief among advertisers that educated, affluent, and politically liberal 
consumers are a safer audience for green messages, this preoccupation structured a great 
deal of the brand. And just as Planet Green would not be for “Tree Huggers,” neither 
would it be what Eileen O’Neill called “finger-wagging”; instead, she said on the eve of 
its launch, “it’s sexy, it’s interesting, it’s irreverent” (Bauder 2008). This may seem 
straightforward, but in the programming it becomes clear that Planet Green’s effort to 
move beyond finger-wagging environmentalists was structured by anxiety about the 
feminized and earnest associations of environmental nagging and eco-lifestyle, anxiety 
that dovetails with worries about their emasculating effects. Alienating men on this basis 
would be a problem for brands seeking the valuable and elusive 18-49 year-old male 
demographic. Planet Green moves beyond environmental lifestyle’s gender problem with 
celebrations of heteromasculine excess.  
Thus, Planet Green worked to post environmentalism’s gender problem. For 
example, in an online feature promoting a G Word (2008) segment, “Making Green 
Macho,” a Planet Green writer asked “the ladies out there”: “How many of you are 
getting the all-too-frequent eye-roll from your male mate?” presumably about their 
lifestyle environmentalism. G Word had the solution with a “manly meet and greet” with 
Jonathan Goodwin and his “biodiesel muscle car” (Billera 2008). While the feature was 
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almost laughably heteronormative, it was far from a one-off in the larger context of 
Planet Green. Rather its structuring logic characterized an enormous part of the brand. 
 Implicitly, this hypothetical eye-roll responds to such unbecoming feminized 
behaviors as nagging and being preachy or shrill (about, perhaps, turning off lights or 
leaving the water running or eating local, organic, or vegetarian cuisine). It also responds 
to the stereotype that green lifestyle itself is “girly,” or, if not explicitly feminized, then at 
the very least associated with a liberal professional middle class habitus often attacked 
from the right on the basis of effeminacy, helpfully illustrated by one conservative 
blogger who argues that the liberal professional middle class bastion National Public 
Radio is characterized by a “highly feminized, pantywaist perspective” and presumes to 
speak to an audience of “effete, soft, balding, granny glasses-wearing, oh-so-intellectual, 
cultured sophisticate[s]” (xPraetorius 2014). In a related manner, the anxiety about 
green’s girly-ness is wholly intertwined with the anxiety that “green living” is a matter of 
special concern for a “liberal elite” out of touch with “mainstream” American men. 
On Planet Green, entire series were devoted to fending off masculinized eye-rolls. 
In them, worries about associations with a “liberal elite” came together with worries 
about green’s feminized connotations. Although Planet Green aimed to appeal to the 
growing popular green sensibility characterized the mid-2000s—a sensibility that 
marketers agreed had special resonance with women and the liberal middle classes—in a 
way that seemed paradoxical it put what appears to have been a great deal of effort into 
refusing green’s feminized and liberal professional middle class associations.  
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Shows in this category were characterized by an assertive masculine ethos that 
flew in the face of professional middle class sensibilities and puritan forms of restraint. 
Careful not to make eco-lifestyle appear too labor intensive for male viewers or interfere 
with an imagined independent spirit, Planet Green’s male-targeted shows typically 
positioned the work of lifestyle as a kind of raucous play, often performed through 
irreverent humor, aggressive risk-taking, testing the limits of techno-scientific 
innovations, spectacular displays of laziness, and objectification of women’s bodies. 
These shows hedge against the elitist, feminized (or emasculating) aspects of “green 
lifestyle” by inviting viewers into a branded fantasy centered on raucous play and flexing 
technological muscles in extreme experiments in green technology.  
While on the one hand, this strategy reflected industrial assumptions about how to 
make environmentalism “entertaining” for a “middle American” mass assumed to be 
suspicious of “good for you” TV, on the other hand, it worked to situate branding itself as 
the rehabilitative technology for bringing green to the mainstream.  
The quiz show Go for the Green (2008), for example, was hosted by 
actor/comedian Tom Green (famous for adolescent bathroom humor such as his 1999 hit 
“The Bum Bum Song”). The show promised to bring Green’s “irreverent sense of 
humor” to a “fast, furious, fun and unpredictable half-hour” (Planet Green Defines Eco-
Entertainment 2008) with categories like “BEER!,” relentless teasing of contestants, and 
violently shoving ten-dollar bills at audience members who answered eco-questions 
correctly (winners were sent on eco-getaways to places like Costa Rica). 
 Mean Green Machines (2008) promised that green vehicles would be no less “fast 
  200 
and furious” than their eco-unfriendly counterparts, and pit them against one another in 
an “adrenaline-packed fight to the finish line” (Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 
2008). These “turbocharged thrill ride[s]” tested the limits of “rough rugged and mean” 
hybrid and solar-powered vehicles in an “all out drag race” or a “high stakes 
competition” or “no-holds barred battle” with conventional ones (On TV: Mean Green 
Machines 2009). With episodes ranging from a drag race pitting a canola-powered SUV 
against a conventional Hummer, a “Smart Cart Smack Down” to an “extreme motocross” 
(in which “the sleek and electric Zero Motorcycle” goes head to head against “the 
reigning champ of motocross - the Honda CR250V”) to a “Snowmobile Shakedown,” 
“Sun fueled Showdown,” to an “Airborne Extreme,” “Truck Stomp” (June 19, 2008), an 
“All Terrain Trample” (June 24, 2008) to a “Red Rock Rumble” (“When it comes to 
rough, rugged and mean, not much compares to the Land Rover. But even this vehicle is 
put to its limit” when it is raced against “a team of tough talking roadsters and their old 
electric Land Rover”) (Team Planet Green 2008e). The episodes did double duty by not 
only showcasing sponsors’ products, but also recasting green living as a form of raucous 
masculinized play. 
 Likewise, Battleground Earth (2008), a 10-episode, cross-country “eco face-off” 
between Mötley Crüe drummer Tommy Lee and rapper/actor/entrepreneur Chris Bridges 
aka Ludacris, also worked to guard against the specter of the “hippy” granola figure 
through hetero-masculinized forms of excess. Both celebrities offer a hip edginess thanks 
to their association with highly sexualized music videos and lavish lifestyles. Bridges’ 
performance as a famous rapper whose videos have been the object of controversy and 
  201 
censorship (notwithstanding his capitalist cred as an extremely successful businessman) 
is perhaps assumed to add racialized “hipness” to a slate of reality programming that is 
otherwise almost entirely white. On the show, Bridges and Lee, accompanied by their 
“ecorages,” compete in a range of challenges to “battle against the toxic forces destroying 
Mother Earth” (About Battleground Earth 2008), in such activities as planning “green 
funerals” for the “death of rock” and “death of rap” respectively, “eco-races” of solar 
powered vehicles, and rescuing recyclables from trash cans and dumpsters around 
Oakland, California. 
 The show is structured around ambivalently celebrating Lee and Bridges’ “hard-
charging, hard-partying, carbon-laden” superstar lifestyles (Planet Green Defines Eco-
Entertainment 2008)—on the one hand, the fun of the show invites viewers to be 
entertained by Lee and Bridges excessive objectification of women while on the other, 
viewers are invited to distance themselves from these celebrities and their cushy lifestyles 
and enormous carbon footprints. For example, while an online promotional article opens 
by asking, “Is it true? Have Tommy Lee and Luda traded in their bad boy ways and cute 
music video girls for a responsible, greener way of life where water conservation 
becomes sexier than lathered up babes?” (Root 2008), on the show it soon becomes quite 
clear giving up “babes” and “bad boy ways” was never on the table and, in fact, not doing 
so hardly precluded the forms of environment saving on Battlground Earth.  
The sole woman in the “ecorages” is Danish singer/actor/model Nina Bergman 
(consistent with the show’s commitment to racialized segregation, she is on Lee’s team). 
Much of the horsing around on Battleground Earth revolves around jokily harassing her. 
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At one point, Ludacris’ team kidnaps and mock-tortures her. At another, Lee theatrically 
drags her into his bunk on the tour bus. And at yet another, Lee’s ecorage member, 
Diggity Dave Aragon, clambers into a camping tent shouting, “I want to get on top of 
Nina!” Likewise, many of the eco-challenges center on objectifying women’s bodies—
albeit always incorporating an ironic distance as viewers are invited to be entertained by 
our understanding of celebrities as excessive. When persuading Lee and Bridges to 
“spread the word” about water conservation, pollution, and the plight of Las Vegas 
reservoir Lake Mead, for instance, Comedian Wayne Brady promises them “bikinis, 
drinks, beautiful ladies” and air conditioning. When Lee proposes his Guinness record-
breaking largest-ever group shower—a sexy water-conservation extravaganza—Bridges 
responds, “If it’s all women, I’m down.” The show also delights in the stars’ spectacular 
displays of laziness, as, after a night of partying, Aragon is too hung over to participate in 
a nature challenge or, after an hour-long hike, group members grumble, “I almost died 
out here!” and “We’ve been walking for like three days!” Throughout the series, the stars 
engage in a continual stream of derisive verbal abuse and one-upmanship: Lee is 
ridiculed for his infamous homemade sex tape, the teams hurl insults back and forth, 
Bridges’ ecorage pokes fun at their dorky nature guide, Ranger Matt, and Lee and 
Bridges place $1000 bets on the challenges to raise the stakes already in place on the 
show, dubbing each other “Toxic Tommy” and “Luda the Polluta” (Battleground Earth 
2008). 
 In both Mean Green Machines and Battleground Earth, going green is offered as a 
gendered form of play. Viewers are invited to be entertained by hetero-masculinized 
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forms of excess. On the former (and later Planet Green shows, like Coolfuel (2009), 
Future Food (2010), Planet Mechanics (National Geographic Channel UK 2008, Planet 
Green 2010), Ultimate Power Builders (2009)), men push the boundaries of the possible 
with “extreme” machines. While the show does offer green “lessons,” the lessons are not 
really for viewers to take up at home, for they involve greatly exceeding legal speed 
limits, access to high tech machinery, and risky, unapproved alterations to off-the-lot 
vehicles. Instead, for viewers, the act of watching television, going online, and adopting 
particular orientations toward the promise of technological innovation and brands are 
offered as practices of citizenship. Mean Green Machines is explicitly positioned as a 
male-targeted show and offers a template for a male-gendered eco-citizenship that is 
distanced from everyday work on the self or home. It offers male viewers a form of eco-
citizenship positioned against the Birkenstock-wearing “lefty” hippy in an ambivalent 
discourse of class that celebrates the excess of capitalist production while tapping into an 
anti-elite, populist masculinity.52 Like the NASCAR media analyzed by Mary Vavrus 
(2007), in Mean Green Machines, Planet Green worked to attach white, hetero-
patriarchal forms of masculine “cool” to a potentially “uncool” subject 
(environmentalism) in order to enlist the elusive and highly valuable 18-49 year old male 
demographic in the brand and at the same time persuade advertisers to buy their eyeballs. 
 Although half the cast of Battleground Earth is made up of Black men from the 
Southside of Chicago, this does little to undermine Planet Green’s structuring 
                                                
52 It thus draws upon on notions of “authentic” white masculinity that Mary Vavrus has written about in her work on NASCAR dads—
attempting to capitalize on the kind of “masculinist spectacle” (Burstyn in Vavrus 248) often used in commercial media to “[sell] 
sports and their fans to advertisers” (Vavrus 2007, 245-261). 
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whiteness.53 Rather, the show combines a post-racial logic with strategies for targeting a 
white male demographic by bringing racial difference to the audience as, in Sarah Banet-
Weiser’s (2007) words “a commodity” that is, “a street style, an individual characteristic, 
and a commercial product” (202) in a narrative that markets racial difference, particularly 
Blackness, “as cool, authentic, and urban”—a commercial strategy that has “proven to be 
incredibly lucrative economic tools for marketing to broad, especially white, audiences” 
(204).  
More particularly, Battleground Earth enlists postracial represenations to move 
beyond environmentalism’s association with uncool and implicitly white granola-type 
greenies and assure male viewers that eco-lifestyle can be cool. And it does so in ways 
that shore up a gendered division of eco-labor. That is, Battleground Earth does offer 
viewers tips on water conservation and changing incandescent light bulbs for compact 
fluorescents; it encourages the use of refillable water bottles, and teaches viewers how to 
recycle old electronics, purchase “greener” ones, make biodiesel, install solar panels, and 
promises “behind-the-scenes product info” on a “waterless” carwash/bike-wash spray to 
help “save mileage and money while keeping your hybrid sparkly and clean” (Root 
2008). However, it is clear that the work of changing light bulbs, washing cars, 
purchasing and reusing water bottles, cleaning homes is not really for celebrities like 
Tommy Lee and Ludacris or those who are called upon to identify with their 
                                                
53 However, the unpredictabilities inherent to the reality genre do create ruptures to the invisibility of Planet Green’s whiteness, as one 
of Ludacris’ ecorage members points out the whitened assumptions embedded in an eco-challenge involving riding a chairlift at a ski 
resort. As the groups head up on the chair lift, three of Ludacris’ ecorage members ham up their terror of heights on the lift. “Have you 
ever been on one of those? Have you ever been skiing? Nina Bergman asks, incredulous. “No!” shouts Big Willie Box. “You’re from 
the Caucasus Mountains! We’re from the west side of Chicago. There’s a big difference!” 
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masculinized excessive ethos—and likewise, the ways in which the stars enact eco-tips, 
such as the world’s largest group shower, are likewise not intended for us to do at home. 
 These shows hedge against worries that programming about “green lifestyle” 
might be elitist, feminized or “boring” by offering a version of eco-citizenship that 
frames masculinized work as raucous play. The show operates as platforms for 
advertising products at the same time that it worked to cultivate a specifically 
masculinized template for eco-citizenship that rejects the everyday labor of green 
lifestyles. 
The contradiction, of course, was that most of the programming on Planet Green 
and much of the web content was precisely aimed at feminized individuals, inviting them 
to do the work of lifestyle. Although the site insisted that this was “easy” and “anyone 
can do it” this was clearly not the case. Thus Planet Green’s worry about keeping 
masculinized viewers involved in the brand, assuring them that the work of green living 
was not really for them to do, beyond watching the shows and going online, was in fact a 
Janus-faced one; this anxiety’s other was a constant preoccupation with enlisting viewers 
into the (historically feminized) labor of green lifestyling and consumerism, a 
governmental project aiming to invite individuals to become green consumers and do the 
labor of brand building for which advertisers will pay.  
Much of Planet Green’s pedagogy for green consumer citizenship and self-
realization concerned everyday work on the self and home. It aimed to guide individuals 
toward “green” products and practices in order to transform various labors of lifestyle—
decorating and design, cooking, shopping, cleaning, entertaining, doing laundry, as well 
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as consuming related media—into brand value. But if, as green marking discourse 
cautioned, consumers were wary of green lifestyling on the basis of its presumed 
drudgery, Planet Green had to make it “easy.” If they were prone to getting derailed, 
“confused” and “overwhelmed,” by green information, Planet Green would provide a 
handful of experts to guide them toward appropriate conduct by “translating” green 
jargon into lay-speak and simple tasks. Although the programs maintained a resolutely 
gender-neutral mode of address—hosts exclaimed, “anyone can do it!” and shows 
featured male and female guests in nearly equal number—Planet Green worked hard to 
recast what was, for the most part, the historically feminized labor of lifestyle as 
“simple,” “easy” and “fun” things you can do at home. And it did so overwhelmingly 
through expertise that was professionalized, whitened, and gendered male. 
On Emeril Green (2008-2010), for example, celebrity chef Emeril Lagasse would 
help a guest pupil overcome “food fears” and “intimidating” ingredients (cooking fish or 
vegetarian cuisine, for example) in a Whole Foods Market-based cooking lesson. 
Donning his chef’s whites, Lagasse would take his guests on “shopping trips” introducing 
them to local, organic ingredients (as well as faddish health foods that raise complicated 
environmental questions, like quinoa) and techniques for preparing them. On Renovation 
Nation (2008-2010), Steve Thomas (former host of the PBS series This Old House) 
promised, “Whether your house is new or old, your project big or small, Steve shows just 
how easy it is to go green.” Thomas visited people “all over the country renovating 
green” and taught renovators and viewers mini-lessons about green building materials 
and reuse and recycling strategies. On Stuff Happens (2008), host Bill Nye (most famous 
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for the PBS children’s educational science program, Bill Nye the Science Guy) showed 
viewers “how simple, easy changes can reduce the environmental cost of things we love,” 
teaching them the “do’s and don’ts” of cleaning products, toothpaste selection, moth 
prevention, etc. (Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 2008). 
Planet Green was heavily reliant on enlisting these feminized forms of labor in the 
production of its brand value. But given that Planet Green was structured by anxiety 
about consumers’ aversion to labor, its efforts to achieve this aim became wholly 
intertwined with its efforts to alleviate this anxiety. And thanks to the larger context of 
industrial assumptions about feminized audiences, the “safest” solution, it seemed, was to 
disavow the laborious nature of these activities while simultaneously reinforcing a 
regressive sexual division of both labor and expertise. Viewers are addressed as 
“confused,” and are called upon to submit themselves to these forms of masculinized 
professional/credentialed knowledge. Drawing upon historically normative white- and 
male-centric signifiers of credibility and expertise,54 in these didactic how-to programs, 
eco-lessons were dispensed by professionalized white male hosts—Nye, for example, is 
described in Planet Green press as an award-winning scientist, engineer, comedian, 
author and inventor (Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 2008).55 These programs 
showcased the expert hosts engaged in voluntary, pleasurable or “helping” work. These 
performances of leisured labor—Lagasse sampling gelato at Whole Foods, Nye in 
humorously excessive protective gear examining a pest problem in his attic—disavow the 
                                                
54 Signifiers including the tropes of educational television—even enlisting these experts who got their starts on PBS shows—Bill Nye 
the Science Guy and This Old House. 
55 In this way, the channel plays on assumptions about “credibility” and avoiding the feminized associations with “preachiness” thanks 
to industrial assumptions about “objectivity” in hosts who inhabit normative white, professionalized masculinity—something I will 
return to later in this chapter.  
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laborious character of the tasks recommended. There seem to be no embodied or personal 
stakes for these hosts and the work they do is framed as a pleasurable kind of leisure. In 
fact, they don’t even seem to be working. Grinning at the camera, Thomas endlessly 
exclaims, “it’s easy” and “anyone can do it!” while Lagasse insists that making fresh 
local food at home is “very very simple” as he relished the sensory pleasures of Whole 
Foods Market. Nye is only shown working in humorous, scripted segments pouring 
coffee at a diner or carrying boxes out of his attic; his role is to instruct from above, not 
act as a site of identification for those responsible for everyday caring/cooking/cleaning 
routines. Indeed, emphasizing Nye’s distance from everyday forms of household labor, 
the show inexplicably brings in scantily clad women, who ask innocent questions to 
receive Nye’s expertise or demonstrate eco-don’ts by confessing that they had been 
secretly joyriding their polluting ATVs; scolding and deep remorse ensues. 
In these ways, labor is officially denied as the work of being green is presented as 
“not-work” by male hosts. Yet at the same time that viewers are urged to retrieve 
Lagasse’s recipes on the website or seek out the products and services on Thomas’s show 
or follow Nye’s tips to go through the items in their bathrooms, kitchens, and garages to 
root environmental contaminants out of their lives. While the expert hosts perform 
teaching or demonstrating labor, the ongoing labor of lifestyle not for them to do, but 
rather for viewers to take up at home in the context of existing household and caring 
routines. Given the preoccupation with masculinized leisure and fun in Planet Green’s 
brand story, the brand’s reliance on feminized forms of household labor haunts its 
insistence that the fun of post-environmentalism is for everyone. 
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Post-asceticism or fear of anti-consumerism 
At the same time that Planet Green was worrying about the elitist associations of 
green living, a great deal of its programming had everything to do with not only enlisting 
upscale consumers in the brand, but also cultivating consumers whose fantasies about 
class distinction would come together with a green good life—what Planet Green called 
“aspirational” green consumers. The strategy of course worked toward brand value in a 
direct sense, as these consumers were best positioned to buy pricy green products and 
renovate their homes. It also, however, worked to cultivate green sensibilities that would 
allay industrial anxieties by disarticulating green from “granola,” “tree-hugging” 
environmentalists and anti-consumerism and rearticulating it to consumer culture and 
class distinction. 
Simultaneous with its emphasis on masculinized, quasi-populist excess, Planet 
Green peddles an extremely expensive green good life in which pleasure—and pleasure 
in the knowledge that one is being green—takes precedence over all other concerns, 
especially financial ones. The promotional discourse ritually repeated how hip and 
wholly pleasurable the new lifestyle would be. The magazine show, G Word (2008), for 
example, promised to demonstrate that “Being green is no longer just for granola-loving 
hippies”; thanks to Planet Green it is now “a lifestyle, an attitude, a state-of-mind, and it’s 
shaking up the pop-culture landscape” (On TV: G Word 2009). On G Word, green living 
would be neither about sacrifice nor asceticism, for it promised to teach viewers “about 
preserving the environment and enjoying life at the same time” (Planet Green Defines 
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Eco-Entertainment 2008). On Alter Eco (2008), for example, Adrian Grenier and some 
famous, young and beautiful friends promised to demonstrate the practical, everyday 
details of how to live a green life “as they help both celebrities and ordinary people… 
transition their lives to green bliss” and “a hip green lifestyle” (Planet Green Defines 
Eco-Entertainment 2008). Emeril Green whose promotional material asks readers to lose 
themselves in a delicious fantasy as they imagine the show’s possibilities: “Picture an 
ultimate foodie fantasy store” (Whole Foods Market) and learn how to cook green with 
“a gourmet touch” and “hundreds of delicious recipes” (Emeril Green: Inside the Show 
2008). For viewers who “Think it's impossible to be green and glam” World’s Greenest 
Homes (2008-2010) will make them “think again!” (Planet Green's Fall Schedule 2009). 
By taking viewers on an “exclusive tour” (Planet Green's Fall Schedule 2009) of the 
inside and out of “high-concept, one-of-a-kind homes to die for” ranging from “high-tech 
superhomes fit for a Hollywood star” to “experimental eco-dwellings” boasting “mind-
blowing eco-innovations” (Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 2008) “on the 
cutting edge of sustainable building technology” (Planet Green's Fall Schedule 2009), 
World’s Greenest Homes would show viewers “how to coexist with the environment 
without leaving a great impact or sacrificing comfort” (Planet Green's Fall Schedule 
2009). Hollywood Green with Maria Menounos (2008) would “Always fun and 
informative” and with “VIP access to celebrities living the sustainable life” host Maria 
Menounos shows us what “celebrities do to help the environment, from trips to farmers' 
market to the hippest trends in eco-friendly fashions” (Planet Green Defines Eco-
Entertainment 2008).  
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Supper Club with Tom Bergeron (2008) promised viewers a peek into the lives of 
the rich and famous, inviting them to be “a fly on the wall at a Hollywood dinner party”; 
a guest “renowned chef” (Planet Green Defines Eco-Entertainment 2008) showcases 
haute green cuisine and fine organic beers and wines while Bergeron attempts to facilitate 
salon-style discourse among guests from a range of political and ideological persuasions. 
Viewers are offered tips for “sustainable” entertaining and taught how to “prepare 
memorable green recipes” and “select eco-friendly wines”; the tips and recipes featured 
on the show are available on PlanetGreen.com and include “cutting the waste from your 
next dinner party” including “ditch the disposable dishes” and use an Evite instead of 
paper; another page recommends purchasing recycled glassware from a few featured 
manufacturers. A buying guide for choosing eco-friendly fish, and a “100 mile 
Challenge” page with resources for eating locally; eco-friendly party favors like 
personalized cards containing seeds to plant, or local handmade soaps (avoid the “excess 
waste” associated with “unnatural wrapping paper” by just passing them out as is). Here’s 
an “easy” and whimsical DIY idea: “Pick one of your favorite simple recipes to pass on 
to your lucky guests. Write out the recipe on high quality recycled paper and then 
package all the dry ingredients in a fanciful reused jar. Tie with a rustic ribbon and you're 
done” (Team Planet Green 2008f). These shows work to enact the green good life, 
demonstrating the pleasurable possibilities of green living and offering viewers resources 
to cultivate their aspirational eco-capacities. 
The contradiction, however, was that anti-consumerism—the environmentalist 
who was not aspirational—was always lurking in the background, as anti-consumerism is 
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so tied to low-impact living and environmental sensibilities. The anti-consumer had to be 
incorporated and managed. Planet Green did so through strategies of ironic distancing 
and normative assumptions of gender. For example, one of G Word’s “eco-experts” was 
CEO-turned-cheap lifestylist, Jeff “the Ultimate Cheapskate” Yeager. Yeager would take 
us “Freecycing” and on trips to thrift stores, pick up curbside cast-offs in his 
neighborhood, and recommend using old rags instead of paper towels. These tips, 
however, are couched in a hammy persona: Yeager offers tips that individuals can take 
up in their everyday lives, but they are not invited to aspire to be like him. In one of 
Yeager’s Ultimate Cheapskate segments, for example, he visits a laundromat. Yeager, 
gangly, mustachioed and balding, explains, “there’s two things you should know [about 
me]: I’m a green guy, so I want it to be environmentally sensitive and I’m America’s 
cheapest man!” He gives us a few helpful tips about what to look for in a detergent—
usable with cold water, phosphate-free (no brands are named and he carries his in a 
nondescript Tupperware-type container)—and recommends washing only full loads. All 
the while he remains in character as “American’s cheapest man”: “This is the part that I 
hate worst!” he gripes as he walks over to the laundromat’s change machine, “the part 
when you have to get out the old wallet. I don’t get mine out very often—whoa, there’s 
my Woodstock ticket!” He dances a jig as the change clangs into the basin. “That was a 
good sound!” he exclaims. Through Yeager’s performance on G Word, the cheapskate is 
incorporated and contained through this parodic representation. His expertise is presented 
with ambivalence, cloaked in campy excess. 
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On Planet Green, the anti-consumer was positioned as one of a range of expert 
voices instructing viewers on green living, but the asceticism of some of its advice risked 
seeming “preachy” and could interfere with normative gendered performances. Thus, 
incorporation strategies involved not only parody, but also gentle discipline. For example, 
narrative drama on the reality sitcom, Living with Ed (acquired from HGTV in 2009), 
was structured around clashes between actor/environmentalist Ed Begley Jr.’s purported 
eco-extremism and his wife Rachelle’s commitments to aesthetics and consumer 
pleasures. Rachelle, for example, “puts her foot down” about Ed bringing home a 
“hideous” rain barrel. Ed’s unstylish, ancient khaki shorts, his 30-year-old desk chair, his 
plastic composter, and his solar oven all become the objects of feigned marital tension 
and gentle ridicule. These conflicts aim to simultaneously discipline Ed’s unfashionable, 
granola, vegan non-consumerism, while also allowing the show to be a platform for his 
eco-advice. When Ed’s items and habits emerge as “problems” within the narrative, they 
are remedied by acts of green consumerism. A special guest, for example, solves the 
issue of Ed’s “revolting” desk chair, presenting him with a replacement Herman Miller 
chair—not only stylish and ergonomically correct, but also made from recycled materials. 
On Ed’s birthday, Rachelle buys him a brand new “green” electric bicycle, despite the 
fact that Ed stressed that he needs nothing and that his preferred method of transportation 
is walking, followed by his bicycle.  
However, even in the show, this gift is not uncritically embraced, for the episode 
closes with a “family bike ride” on which Rachelle rides the new bike while Ed returns to 
his trusty ten-speed. This narrative is wholly reliant regressive gendered meanings. 
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Rachelle’s performative ethos cares only about fashion and aesthetics. She is a nag and a 
little lazy, the rationale for Ed’s lifestyle choices escapes her. Although in Living with Ed, 
Ed’s “extreme,” anti-consumerist, unfashionable, less “hot and fun”—perhaps even 
“granola”—brand of environmentalism is positioned as expert, it is simultaneously 
disciplined. While Ed is incorrigible and exasperating to Rachelle, he is also the source of 
information. It is under his tutelage, not that of Rachelle, that viewers may take up 
techniques for living a greener life. The disciplinary modes are never successful, thus can 
be enacted anew in each episode. And an ongoing gendered dichotomy of feminine 
consumerist triviality versus masculine expertise, that ironically operates to keep Ed in 
line, is repeated again and again. 
 
Post-greenwash/fear of greenwash 
The fourth and last anxiety concerns the fear of greenwash. Advertisers fretted 
that presence on an eco-channel would invite accusations of greenwash. As a corrective, 
part of Planet Green’s brand strategy was to situate itself as “credible.” It worked to 
create a post-greenwash sensibility. As I have already demonstrated, Planet Green 
worked to establish credibility by tapping into and reinforcing the white supremacist, 
hetero-patriarchal capitalist association of professionalism, whiteness, and masculinity 
with expertise and objectivity.  
Planet Green worked to cultivate “credibility” by tapping into a range of 
normative constructions of expertise, objectivity, and political neutrality. It promoted its 
own “seriousness” about environmentalism as a cause by partnering with 13 
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establishment environmentalist not-for-profits organizations and by promoting its 
historical brand positioning (nature and earth-focused) as well as its green headquarters 
renovations. It also assembled a “strategic Board of Advisors” which, it argued, 
“represent[ed] a broad spectrum of thought leaders in the fields of science, academia, 
technology, business, environmental advocacy, government and media” (World Class 
Board of Advisors 2008). When Discovery spoke of “preeminent scientists, researchers, 
innovators and environmental leaders” who would make up the board, its diversity was 
limited, not surprisingly, to establishment environmentalists, STEM researchers, media 
higher-ups, a few celebrity environmentalists, and otherwise conservative republicans 
who had broken rank to, for example, launch climate change legislation as did 
Minnesota’s then-governor Tim Pawlenty.  
 In Planet Green’s brand strategy, credibility thus was acted out not on the basis of 
expertise in environmental thought, policy, or science nor was it acted out on the basis of 
involvement in environmental movements nor was it granted by lived experience of 
environmental degradation; rather, it was performed in racialized, classed, and gendered 
ways by celebrating “value neutrality” and an “unbiased” perspective granted to a range 
of authoritative discourses in neoliberal culture. This strategy, not surprisingly, extended 
to the programming. Shows about “serious” (i.e., potentially divisive) environmental 
subjects like climate change, pollution, or habitat destruction were invariably hosted by 
figures who enjoyed the great distance from environmental problems that accompanies 
the social and economic power bestowed by wealth, professionalization, whiteness and 
male gendering—people like war correspondent Bob Woodruff, news anchor Tom 
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Brokow, and a host of guest experts. 
But even Planet Green’s seemingly thorough project to construct credibility in 
brand culture was unable to fully contain its contradictions. In what I call Planet Green’s 
“post-greenwash” programming, it is not difficult to see that Planet Green’s wide-ranging 
and elaborate struggle to achieve environmental credibility was structured by the same 
profound fears of politics that shaped the brand as a whole. In Planet Green’s effort to 
create post-greenwash television, anxieties about alienating conservative viewers came 
together with mandates to stay advertiser friendly.  
In coverage of climate change and industrial pollution, for example, news 
conventions of “balance” took precedence over sustained analysis in a manner that 
created confusing and ambiguous stories. It is generally quite clear that Planet Green is 
fully on board with the scientific consensus on climate change—always offering global 
warming near the top of the litany of reasons to “go green” in one’s everyday life, even 
dispensing advice on “What to Do if Your Date Says, ‘Climate Change is Fake’” 
(Peterson 2009), publishing features detailing global warming’s impact on coral reefs and 
melting tundra (DeFranza 2009) or asking, “How is Climate Change Affecting Your 
Region? Find Out with Terrifying Interactive Map” (Merchant 2009b). Nevertheless, 
when addressed head-on, programming on climate change centered on the “debate” over 
its existence.  
In a Focus Earth segment entitled “Climate Change and the Weather” (2010), for 
example, anchor Bob Woodruff gave equal air-time to the famous climate change-
denying MIT emeritus professor Richard Lindzen and Chris Field, professor of 
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Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies at Stanford who was award a Nobel Peace Prize 
in connection with his work on the intergovernmental panel on Climate Change. 
Although clues such as a well-lit, fancy atrium setting and cuts to footage of collapsing 
ice frame Field in a friendlier and more credible light (Lindzen on the other hand is 
filmed in his messy office, books and papers strewn everywhere, he himself looks rather 
disheveled, and he is shot in low-light, his shadowy face in extreme close-ups), the 
episode takes no explicit position and, significantly, makes no mention of Lindzen’s 
industry ties which were exposed in Harper’s Magazine in 1995 (Gelbspan 1995).56 
Focus Earth typically evaded taking a political position by setting up questions 
that, within a fully naturalized free market logic, were unanswerable (what introductory 
communication studies textbooks call “false dilemmas”): would, for example, a rural 
Perry Country, Alabama’s Arrowhead landfill would accept many tons of “arguably toxic 
coal ash” from a spill the previous year? The poor county would be compensated $3 
million, inviting the dilemma: “Is it a health risk? Or is it a financial boost that helps the 
town?” (Focus Earth episode "Environmental Injustice" 2009).57  
A particularly illuminating example is Woodruff’s investigation into Shell Oil’s 
sustainability claims, “Shell Oil: Are they Greenwashing?” (Focus Earth episode 
"Greenwash" 2009). The question in the episode is not so much whether Shell’s 
environmental record is bad, that is a given, taken as a natural fact of the industry (“the 
                                                
56 Author Ross Gelbspan pointed out that when Lindzen testified before Senate committee in 1991 on behalf of Western Fuel 
Association, “a $400 million consortium of coal suppliers and coal-fired utilities,” he had been hired as an expert witness and Western 
Fuels paid for his trip, that OPEC had underwritten his 1992 speech, “Global Warming: the Origin and Nature of Alleged Scientific 
Consensus,” and that Lindzen had worked as a consultant for the oil and coal industry, charging $2,500 per day (Gelbspan 1995). 
57 However, and unsurprisingly, the show feels no need to offer a counterpoint or opposing view when the market-based, voluntary 
incentive program is working, as in a segment on a program incentivizing recycling in Everett, MA with points redeemable at chain 
stores (those pictured are Bed Bath & Beyond, Target, Famous Footwear, Panera, but the program says it includes “local and national 
retailers”), and lots of testimonials about how well it is working and how much residents like it (“It’s MAH-velous,” says one Everett 
resident).  
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oil and gas business have what many environmental watchdog organizations consider to 
be the worst environmental record of all the big industries,” says Woodruff). Rather, the 
central question is whether the company is “greenwashing” or being “transparent” about 
its operations. The show sets up a two-sided debate with those Woodruff describes as 
“critics” and “environmentalists” on one side (as in, “critics say” or “environmentalists 
say”) and Shell’s president, Marvin Odum, on the other.  
Throughout the episode, the show cuts in footage of dirty extraction and 
refinement operations, Greenpeace’s Claudette Papathanasopoulos talks to the camera 
about Shell’s investments in oil sands in Canada, “it’s a very dirty process. We’re talking 
some estimates would say 3 to 10 percent more dirty emissions than traditional oil 
refinery, and so if they care about climate emissions, it seems unusual for them to be 
investing in dirtier technologies with bigger carbon footprints.” Woodruff adds, “yet for 
all of the talk about investing in cleaner technologies, Shell commits about 1 percent of 
its overall budget to developing them.” The author of Greenwash (and NYU adjunct 
professor) Kenny Bruno calls Shell is “a master of greenwash” with “very clever 
rhetoric.” 
In the face of all this apparently unambiguous evidence damning Shell’s 
operations, the interview between Woodruff and Odum is chummy. They are perched, 
side-by-side, on the front edge of an enormous boardroom table surrounded by chairs, 
turned slightly to face one other. While the “critics” who appear in the show are alone in 
the frame, either in a book-lined office, as in the case of Bruno, or in close-up against a 
black background, as in the case of Papathanasopoulos, Odum is in this social situation. 
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He says very little of substance, but goes on about his personal commitment to “integrity” 
and Shell’s to “transparency” (evidence for this “transparency” combines promotions of 
Shell’s “sustainability initiatives” combined with solemn admissions of Shell’s own 
environmental shortcomings and pledges to do better).  
As the segment draws to a close, Woodruff notes, “And [Odum] reminds critics 
who say Shell is not doing enough, that their primary business is providing the oil that 
powers our lifestyles.” Odum gets the last word: “as an energy company, that purpose is 
to provide the energy the world needs today, to have vision about where that energy mix 
needs to change over the future, and to work on both of those ends. And that’s what 
we’re doing.” 
 This highly ambiguous conclusion speaks volumes about Planet Green’s 
ambivalence about environmentalism. While from the clip, viewers learn that Shell’s 
operations are clearly terrible for the environment. But since the question driving the 
segment was less whether Shell’s operations were harmful than whether the company 
was being “transparent,” viewers are invited to be satisfied, comfortable, even, with this 
ambiguity since we need oil companies to “power our lifestyles.” 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Planet Green emerged as a solution to a 
particular problematization of the environment. This problematization was a meeting of, 
on the one hand, profound anxieties about unruly consumers among marketers and media 
firms and, on the other hand, popular skepticism about whether eco-TV could be 
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entertaining and credibly environmentalist. For Planet Green a process of posting 
environmentalism in a multiplatform media brand promised to overcome unruly 
consumers and, in the same maneuver, to resolve the contradictions between commerce 
and conservation, activism and consumerism, and profits and planet saving by making 
environmentalism “fun.”  
As I discussed in Chapter 1, Planet Green emerged at the intersection of a crisis in 
cable business—the sense that consumers had become especially uncontrollable in the 
multi-platform, multi-channel era—and public worries and outrage at environmental 
destruction, the intensifying effects of global climate change in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, and 8 years of Bush administration policies further dismantling the 
already weakened environmental policy apparatus. By posting environmentalism, Planet 
Green worked to “solve” capitalism’s environment problem by enlisting TV viewers in a 
highly gendered, racialized, and classed project of eco-citizenship aimed at managing the 
contradictions that emerged as the imperatives of brand value came into conflict with 
environmental activism. This was a highly structured project seemingly at odds with the 
openness58 that branding relies upon for value (and the “freedom” that governmentality 
relies on for civic management). 
Planet Green’s programming was a constant dance, continually moving between 
advancing and undermining environmentalism. As it acted out its ambivalence about 
environmentalism, Planet Green relied upon and reproduced anxieties and assumptions 
                                                
58 As Celia Lury puts it, the brand-object “does not tend towards full determination or closure; rather, it exists in a state of 
indetermination, a situation of (un)control. This is what makes it an increasingly important object of contemporary capitalism. But to 
describe it as an object into which possibility has been introduced is not to imply that the brand is, or even may be, any-thing. The 
indeterminacy of the objectivity of the brand is not absolute; uncontrol is not the same as lack of control. There is instead limited 
possibility designed into the brand… The brand is not an unfortunately deteriorated objectification of perfect flexibility, but rather the 
objectification of a manageable flexibility, of indeterminacy within limits” (Lury 151). 
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about gender, race and class, through which the channel defined both “credibility” and 
“entertainment.” This resulted in programming that attempted to tightly control every 
aspect of how this “green” brand got produced. Planet Green’s ambivalence about 
environmentalism resulted in a top-down brand-building strategy, which is at odds with 
much of the wisdom on branding, which states that brand value is reliant on consumer co-
creation, what consumers spontaneously do with the brand in their everyday lives 
(Arvidsson 2006). Conversely, Planet Green worked to constrain the possibilities of what 
consumers might do or think with the green brand at every turn. 
Planet Green materialized around efforts to contain “green”—as well as the 
conduct of “green consumers”—to maintain their alignment with the interests of brand 
value and profits. In these ways, Planet Green’s was an environmentalism transformed 
through branding in ways that were shaped in fundamental ways by the anxieties and 
ambivalences of Planet Green decision makers. In Planet Green and other green brands, 
the labor of resolving these contradictions is offloaded onto consumers. 
From the get-go, Planet Green was structured by anxieties generated by the 
contradictions and tensions that emerged in the process of branding environmentalism—
tensions, for example, between citizenship and consumerism, politics and profits, 
activism and commerce, conservation and consumption, and education and entertainment. 
Planet Green took shape in ways designed to manage these tensions through a process 
that disavowed their irresolvablility by reducing and refiguring them in problematizations 
that could be solved by television. Posting was an industrial strategy that attempted to re-
define environmentalism as good TV while simultaneously working to manage both 
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industrial anxieties and the potential for consumer unruliness in such minute detail that 
the contradictions between branding and environmentalism could be held in check. The 
project centered on the belief was that overcoming unruly consumers was absolutely 
crucial to resolving these tensions (despite the fact that an at least as convincing 
problematization of green TV’s viability was advertiser reluctance and profit 
imperatives). By refiguring the external problem of consumer uncontrollability as an 
internal problem of content, Planet Green’s preoccupation with “post”-resonant forms of 
“entertainment” and “credibility” was part of an ongoing process seeking to contain the 
incredible threat unruly consumers posed to green TV’s viability within a radically 
deregulated media environment. 
  223 
Chapter 4: Planet Green’s demise 
 
Introduction 
On Memorial Day of 2012,59 a brand-new mid-level cable channel launched with 
an all-day marathon of reruns. The new channel was Discovery Communications’ 
Destination America, and the reruns were from the series, BBQ Pitmasters (2009-), a 
reality competition show originally produced for and aired on TLC (also a Discovery 
network). The program showcases the “high-stakes world of competitive barbecuing” (Ito 
2012), travelling to barbequing competitions around the country and letting the cameras 
roll. In true reality-competition form, editing favors moments when “nerves and patience 
get tested” and “tempers flare” but it is also what a friend of mine calls “meat porn”: the 
show lovingly films enormous quantities, fine cuts, and unusual varieties of meat while 
celebrating the “legendary” talents of the (overwhelmingly) men who cook it. The new 
channel would soon add shows like United States of Food (2012), also featuring copious 
amounts of meat, Fast Food Mania (2012), which celebrates America’s fast food chains, 
new episodes of BBQ Pitmasters, Epic (2012-2013) featuring “epic,” i.e., superdeluxe 
and enormous RVs or epic log cabins, Super-Duper Thrill Rides (2012) on “extreme 
roller coasters” (Ito 2012, Levin 2012), as well as Buying Alaska (2012-), Cheating Las 
Vegas (a 2000 documentary) and Ghostown Gold (2012-). 
Destination America’s launch is noteworthy for several reasons, two of which are 
especially glaring. First, it replaced cable television’s one-and-only foray into a fully 
                                                
59 That year, Memorial Day was May 28, but several sources report that Destination America launched on the 26th. While this may be 
just sloppy reporting, it also speaks to the extent to which the launch was a non-event. 
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environmentalist channel: the eco-lifestyle network, Planet Green. As I have discussed 
throughout this dissertation, Planet Green offered DIY projects, news on global warming, 
and tips for a “less is more” lifestyle and home energy saving. Its content coaxed viewers 
to bike to work, shop at thrift stores, change their light bulbs, curb their online shopping, 
eliminate toxin-containing products from their homes, cook and garden, visit farmers 
markets, and even dumpster dive. It offered a range of resources for individuals to self-
shape as good environmental consumer-citizens, calling upon them to reflect continually 
on the environmental impact of the mundane details of their everyday lives and 
establishing a quasi-public sphere in its privatized online universe for civil discourse and 
debate. In an apparent 180-degree flip, Destination America would be “dedicated to the 
bigness of America in all its forms” and “[offer] up a vision of a land where everybody 
barbecues, no one eats greens, and there's a 36-foot-long Winnebago in front of every 
home” (Ito 2012). Destination America’s macho celebration of patriotism—one which 
seemed to applaud the very kinds of excess that Planet Green cautioned viewers 
against—couldn’t have been more different from the quirky, gently disciplinary, and 
feminized lifestyle programming on Planet Green. This contrast was not lost on the press: 
the “unabashedly patriotic” Destination America (Levin 2012), with its “red, white and 
blue” (de Moraes 2012) celebration of carnivory, was “anathema to… the tree huggery” 
(Owen 2012), “pinko-liberal” (de Moraes 2012) Planet Green, reporters wrote. 
The second striking thing about Destination America’s premiere is that an all-day 
rerun marathon is hardly consistent with industry mandates for “big and loud” launches 
to “break through the clutter” of the hundreds of TV channels and the proliferating online 
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content-delivery platforms that characterize the contemporary media landscape. Many 
media industry insiders concur that one can no longer expect viewers to just happen upon 
a new network or show simply by “surfing.” On the contrary, media firms often assemble 
special marketing teams to figure out how to get viewers to actively seek out a new 
channel. As one former Planet Green executive explained, 
there’s hundreds and hundreds of channels…you’re competing for the same, what 
we call eyeballs… same people to watch your programming and it’s harder and 
harder to get attention for channels today than it was fifteen/twenty years ago. So, 
the louder you are, the more exciting you feel, the more relevant you feel, the 
more likely you are to attract that group coming in at the start… People get very 
comfortable in their channel set… 10-15 on their personal, internal channel list… 
And you tend to go to those channels first before you’ll go anywhere else. So, 
also when your launching a new channel, you tend to be higher up on the dial and 
that means, so instead of channel 4, 8, 7, even 25, 30, 50, you’re, like, 472… you 
can’t just count on people surfing through all those channels to find you. And that 
means the louder you are in the launch, the more likely you are to get someone to 
look for you, instead of find you. (Howell 2013) 
As I have already discussed, Planet Green, premiered with an enormous launch. It 
advertised in magazines, on television, and on billboards in New York’s Times Square. 
Its stars made appearances on daytime broadcast television to promote the channel. It 
held brand events like a “green carpet” launch party filled with environmentalist 
celebrities and a rock/rap concert headlined by Tommy Lee and Ludacris and featuring a 
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good number of other big-name acts. Planet Green representatives carried out guerilla 
marketing tactics at professional baseball games and the Indianapolis 500, passing out 
eco-friendly prizes like public transportation passes along with Planet Green t-shirts. 
Discovery played the brand changeover from Discovery Home (the channel’s previous 
brand) to Planet Green on the JumboTron at the ball games and staged a bicycle give-
away with News Corporation’s New York Daily News (the Daily News also raised a green 
flag during the week of Planet Green’s launch and published an adver-tainment section 
promoting the new channel’s shows and brand events). Destination America’s 
comparatively monotonous and lackluster launch is, if this wisdom is to be believed, 
astonishing.60 
This chapter seeks to understand how this happened. Why, after such an 
expensive and successful launch (one which won several advertising awards), did 
Discovery decide to cancel Planet Green and replace it with what in many ways appears 
to be its polar opposite? And why did it determine that Destination America needed so 
little in the way of promotion when Planet Green needed so much?  
When Planet Green was rebranded as Destination America, Discovery and press 
voices explained that eco-programming failed to draw viewers, pointing to a lack of 
“entertaining content,” “poor ratings,” and the decline of the “green [consumer] 
movement.” This chapter refuses to take these explanations for granted, despite the tone 
                                                
60 On the 4th of July, the new channel did sponsor an “apple pie dive” (it is what it sounds like—contestants dive into an oversized 
apple pie for prizes up to $5,000) as part of the festivities in the lead up to the Coney Island Nathan’s Famous annual hot dog eating 
competition, but this quiet launch with a single, month-and-a-half delayed brand event was still miniscule by comparison to launches 
like Planet Green’s. But, as I will discuss later, in the multi-channel, multi-platform era, big, loud, and expensive launches are only 
one strategy for maximizing profits and minimizing risk. As I will address later in this chapter, it is crucial to note that Destination 
America’s launch was also very cheap. Cheap rerun-heavy launches are also common—some because many new networks lack the 
huge sums of money of a firm like Discovery, and others because even large media firms regularly engage in practices to minimize 
costs, often to recoup the costs of mergers and acquisitions. 
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of obviousness with which they are made. Rather, I argue that these explanations, far 
from being straightforward, involve messy and contradictory constructs (e.g., ratings, 
entertainment, what is “trending”) that are made and remade by industrial actors in an 
ongoing struggle to bring the essential unruliness of consumers within their sphere of 
influence. 
First, I examine the changes in Planet Green’s television and web content over its 
four-year run. In general, Planet Green’s programming moved away from the explicitly 
pedagogical and environmentalist “how-to” shows toward what its president/general 
manager called “green adjacent” and “storytelling” programs—docu-series on 
experiments in living, spending a month living as someone else (the 2005-2008 FX series 
30 Days, aired on Planet Green 2010) or trying out homelessness (the 2009 BBC1 
Famous, Rich & Homeless BBC aired on Planet Green in 2010)—that were often 
unconnected to environmental themes (though this shift did not always unfold in a linear 
or consistent fashion). However, I argue that the channel remained both pedagogical and 
governmental in ways that are intimately connected to anxieties and contradictions that 
had dogged Planet Green from the get go. Second, I delve more deeply into Discovery’s 
explanations for Planet Green’s cancellation, situating them within larger discourses of 
entertainment, ratings, and trends that aim to predict consumer behavior. I complicate the 
certainty that characterizes Discovery’s argument that “green” was a passing consumer 
fad by situating it within a larger green marketing conversation that retained the same 
outsized optimism, coupled with profound anxieties, that characterized it when Planet 
Green was conceived in 2007. Finally, I insist that Discovery’s assessment that Planet 
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Green was simply “not entertaining” be understood against the backdrop of Discovery’s 
astronomical success on Wall Street. If Planet Green represented Discovery’s foray into 
“the new public service” wherein private firms step in to fill the gaps left by deregulatory 
policies and a shrinking social safety net, I argue that placing Discovery’s financial gains 
alongside Planet Green’s cancellation casts the contradiction between profits and public 
service in a deregulated market into sharp relief—and does so in ways that are made even 
more apparent when the question of advertiser dollars is considered. I close by reflecting 
briefly on the question of “failure” in brand culture, asking what it can tell us about the 
limits of branding environmentalism in neoliberal times.  
 
Branding environmentalism for the “crisis” in cable 
Planet Green’s unraveling over its four-year run must be understood in the context 
of commercial television and brand culture. More particularly, it requires that I return to 
my discussion of the contemporary “crisis” in US cable business, which I laid out in 
Chapter 1, and the way in which branding has come to appeal to cable TV’s decision 
makers as a strategy for managing this crisis. This crisis, as I mentioned, concerns 
industrial anxieties about attracting consumer eyeballs to sell to advertisers in the context 
of enormous numbers of content delivery options—from the hundreds of television 
channels to the proliferating online video services—and a tapped out (and now shrinking) 
US cable market. Since audiences are television’s core commodity, the sense that their 
eyeballs are increasingly scarce has generated a great deal of anxiety. This is not to say 
that feelings of crisis for the TV industry are new; industry has long been plagued by 
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worries about audience unpredictability and has worked endlessly to bring audiences 
under control by rendering them visible through things like ratings data and other 
audience measurement techniques (see Ang 1991). As feelings of crisis within cable 
business have intensified over recent years, the practice of branding has become a darling 
of audience management culture. Planet Green’s initial design reflected this. In 2007, 
Planet Green promised to help Discovery manage the crisis in US cable; through “strong 
branding” it would not only overcome the uncertainties of the market, but also overcome 
the particular challenges of making environmentalism profitable. In Planet Green’s 
realization, however, this process proved enormously difficult. 
The promises of branding for a US cable industry in crisis are expansive. On a 
basic level, branding promises to differentiate channels in this cluttered media 
environment and to involve consumers more deeply in the objects of commercial culture 
by offering them a sense of belonging (in a “brand community,” for example). Planet 
Green hoped to break through the media clutter by differentiating its brand on the basis of 
green living and inviting individuals to act out their eco-commitments in and through 
Planet Green, becoming part of its brand community. But branding is also more than this, 
as I have argued, for brands only come into being through an ongoing performative 
process (Lury 2004, Moor 2007). In the case of television brands like Planet Green, this 
performativity involves a discourse about consumers and markets characterized by what 
Ien Ang calls “rhetorical certainty” (Ang 1991); in this discourse, TV firms still use 
things like ratings data, stereotypes, and market research to make unequivocal statements 
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of “fact” about consumers to persuade advertisers that the brand will render them 
predictable and profitable.  
The performativity of branding is not just rhetorical, however. It is made material 
in branded content that similarly seeks to overcome consumer uncontrollability. 
Specifically, branding seeks to use these same forms of knowledge about audiences and 
fold them into projects aiming to “govern at a distance.” To make sense of the way 
brands work to do this, branding scholars have turned to the Foucauldian concept of 
governmentality: the dispersion of governmental functions across the population and 
societal institutions that aims to aid individuals in governing themselves, guiding them 
toward certain objectives without intervention from the state; this is the sense in which I 
will use the terminology of governance through this chapter. Likewise, branding seeks to 
guide and shape what consumers do with brands—not through coercive means, but by 
inviting consumers to become active members of a brand community in their freedom 
(see Arvidsson 2006, Lury 2004, Moor 2007). Branding thus works to overcome unruly 
consumers through an elaborate performative and governmental endeavor to garner 
advertiser dollars and increase brand value; this ongoing project works to position both 
ratings and “strong branding” as practices that can both manage and predict viewers’ 
behavior and the value of their eyeballs.  
However, as Liz Moor points out, brand management always contends with a 
central problem: that brand value depends on “the successful appropriation of 
externalities” (Arvidsson 2006 and Slater 2002 referenced in Moor 2007, 72). In the case 
of Planet Green, “the qualities assumed to reside ‘in’ [potential green consumers had to] 
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somehow be extricated and isolated and made to be compatible with other qualities 
assumed to be qualities ‘of’ the brand.” This process, not surprisingly, is “fraught with 
problems” and by no means guaranteed and “for this reason brand managers must rely on 
estimates and indicators [e.g., ratings, market research, etc.] whose use is secured by their 
legitimacy – that is, their acceptance by other actors – rather than their accuracy” (Moor 
2007, 72). To set the stage for Planet Green, as I have already discussed, Discovery 
announced to advertisers the existence of what it called “armchair environmentalists”—
nearly half of the US population ready to be “activated” and “awakened” as “bright 
green” consumers. The Planet Green brand would do just that by inviting these 
consumers to involve the Planet Green brand in the details of their everyday lives, from 
cooking, cleaning and shopping to activism and volunteering.  
But, as I will show, despite the careful planning, the detailed market research, and 
the elaborate and interactive brand content, Discovery could never fully contain the ways 
in which individuals took up (resisted or refused) the Planet Green brand. Thus, what I 
wish to center in this discussion of Planet Green’s demise is that, no matter how 
sophisticated techniques of audience governance become, they can never bring audiences 
fully under control: media firms will always contend with viewers’ essential 
uncontrollability and thus will always be characterized by anxiety about this ritually 
disavowed reality (see Ang 1991). 
Ang’s observation that the late twentieth century’s “relentless search for 
technological sophistication” in the production of more and more precise ratings data can 
be likened to the contemporary industrial pursuit of sophistication in brand management 
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(which does not abandon the search for “accurate” ratings, but elaborates how this data is 
put into practice). For Ang, this pursuit of precision has less to do with the possibility of 
achieving control over the unruly entity that is “the audience” than it “betrays a sense of 
desperation over the very possibility of designing a proper map of the streamlined 
audience in the crowded and chaotic television landscape” (Ang 1991, 89). Likewise, 
Planet Green’s sophisticated brand management and statements about market readiness 
were as much about disavowing consumers’ unmanageability as it was about managing 
them. 
The question of unruly consumers—and all the work devoted to bringing them 
under control while simultaneously disavowing their unmanageability—is crucial to 
understanding Planet Green’s demise in the larger context of the crisis in US cable. The 
problem of consumer unruliness was where governance met performativity in 
Discovery’s pursuit of ad dollars. And when it came to branding environmentalism for 
television, the always-already unruly character of audiences was met by a number of 
anxieties and contradictions specific to environmentalism. As I have argued in previous 
chapters, Planet Green had been bedeviled by worries about its eco-brand identity from 
the start. Discovery was worried about the politically charged character of green TV, 
about the feminized connotations of ethical lifestyling, about being associated with 
“treehuggers,” “granola”-type environmentalists, or a “liberal elite.” Many of these 
anxieties constellated around the tensions between, on the on hand, enlisting consumers 
in an eco-governmental project, urging them to self-shape as green consumer citizens, 
and on the other hand, persuading sponsors that this was fully compatible with a project 
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that would deliver “bona fide consumers” (Meehan 2005) in a “buying mood” (Turow 
1997) to their advertisements and branded entertainment. The contradictions in this 
project are in many ways obvious: conservation and consumption, public service and 
profits, activism and advertising are difficult pairs to reconcile, especially in the context 
of a radically deregulated market.  
When Discovery rolled out Planet Green in 2008, it took aim at these 
contradictions by doing everything “right” according to industrial branding wisdom. 
Planet Green’s marketing team offered consumers branded resources and activities to 
take up in their everyday lives, it multiplied the opportunities for what marketers call 
“attention and engagement” with Planet Green and its sponsors’ brands by encouraging 
individuals to move between Planet Green’s branded media platforms, and it folded 
sponsor’s brands into television and web content in a way producers viewed as “tasteful” 
rather than annoying, since it also promised not only to “educate” by showing how these 
brands were “doing well by doing good,” but also participate in and enable environmental 
action (Thomas 2013). And Planet Green was as attuned to advertisers’ anxieties about 
green marketing as it was to these beliefs about “strong branding.” Nearly all of Planet 
Green’s content choices were part of an elaborate effort to assuage industrial worries—
endlessly reiterated and specified in trade journals—about aligning corporate profits with 
environmentalism (in ways that were often reliant on regressive racialized, classed, and 
gendered assumptions about audiences, “entertainment” and environmentalism). It 
worked to distance its “new,” “hip,” and “fun” kind of environmentalism from granola 
and tree-hugging hippies, from girliness and earnestness, and from preachiness, partisan 
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politics, and pessimism. In this way, industrial fantasies about the kind of media content 
that could deliver “valuable” eyeballs to advertisers—packaged in industrial 
constructions of entertainment—were enlisted in an attempt to resolve tensions were in 
many ways fundamental to the branding of environmentalism itself. 
In these ways, Planet Green’s project was two-fold: first, it was about overcoming 
the essential uncontrollability of consumers by governmentalizing them toward the aims 
of brand value and green(ing) brand culture; and second, it was about persuading 
advertisers that doing so (that is, getting consumers themselves to resolve these 
contradictions by becoming members of the green brand’s community) was within Planet 
Green’s purview—even in a realm as fraught with contradiction as environmental 
consumer capitalism. despite the detailed, calculative approach that Discovery took to 
environmental media, before Planet Green completed its first year, it was clear that 
something was amiss. Shows that had structured Planet Green’s brand identity at the time 
of its launch were not renewed (though a number of them continued to be played in 
reruns throughout Planet Green’s existence). According to the Futon Critic website, of 
the original lineup, Greenovate, Hollywood Green, and Mean Green Machines were 
canceled after their very first season (2007-2008). Alter Eco, Battleground Earth, G 
Word, Go for the Green, Stuff Happens, Supper Club, and Total Wrecklamation were also 
not renewed, ending after the 2008-2009 season. And Planet Green’s remaining initial 
shows, Renovation Nation, Wa$ted!, Emeril Green, World’s Greenest Homes, 
Greensburg, Focus Earth and Living with Ed (not original, but brought on just after the 
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launch) were renewed one or two times, but were all canceled by the 2009-2010 season 
(Showatch: Planet Green 2008-2011). 
 Although, as I discussed in the third chapter of this dissertation, Planet Green’s 
early programming went to great lengths to avoid being “preachy” or “political,” from the 
perspective of Discovery decision makers, the way it had done so had not, in fact, solved 
environmentalism for television. As early as 2009, the channel was already making 
moves to shift away from green instructional content toward what Planet Green’s new 
President/General Manager Laura Michalchyshyn61 called “green adjacent” programming 
that emphasized “storytelling” rather than explicit lifestyle advice. Planet Green’s 
problem, Michalchyshyn explained, was that it was still airing “lecturing series” that 
were “hitting people over the head about green” (Michalchyshyn 2013). (However, it is 
worth remembering that Planet Green’s initial programming strategy was also completely 
preoccupied with making green living fun and hip, promising Planet Green would contain 
“absolutely no lecturing” and would “resist a heavy-handed approach”; Planet Green’s 
Eileen O’Neill told NBC in 2008 that the channel would be “not only not finger-
wagging” but “sexy… interesting [and]…irreverent” (Bauder 2008).) While Planet 
Green’s initial lineup had all been commissioned in line with a more or less consistent 
vision for the overall green brand, the new programming strategy was largely one of 
acquisition. Increasingly cobbling together a brand identity from existing content 
purchased from a range of other networks and at documentary film festivals, Planet 
Green’s environmentalism—and its governmental project—became less and less 
                                                
61 Former President/General Manager of Planet Green, Eileen O’Neill had moved to TLC not two months after Planet Green’s launch 
and the channel was without a permanent president/general manager until Michalshychyn arrived in February 2009; prior to her stint 
at Discovery, Michalshychyn had been an executive VP at Sundance Channel, where she oversaw environmental programming, and 
returned there after Planet Green was canceled. 
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coherent.  
 
A brand makeover 
 But Planet Green’s changing brand did not completely lack coherence. There 
were two broad tendencies that characterized its changes over time. On the one hand 
were unabashedly advertiser-friendly shows that contained no environmental critique but 
rather celebrated “visionaries” who seamlessly melded entrepreneurialism with pro-social 
goals. These shows explicitly targeted gendered niches to cultivate and sort eyeballs for 
advertisers. On the other hand were independent documentaries acquired at film festivals 
around the world—documentaries that were often quite critical of corporate and 
consumer capitalism as well as the political apparatus that enables them. Certainly, this 
new programming departed sharply from the how-to consumer and lifestyle advice in 
Planet Green’s initial slate of shows. And the juxtaposition of the two apparently 
contradictory strands of programming may seem at odds with the mandates of “strong 
branding.” Still, though, I argue that the new shows offered a pedagogy for green 
consumer citizenship that, however sketchy and (most likely) unintentional, can be 
viewed as a rarefied and even more ambivalent version of that which Planet Green had 
offered at its start. Planet Green’s evolving pedagogy can be understood as a kind of 
result—or perhaps even byproduct—of a reactive process wherein Planet Green decision 
makers changed its programming in the face of a struggle to garner both ad dollars and 
viewers for branded environmentalism. 
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Advertiser-friendly television 
 In the former category were what Laura Michalchyshyn called “storytelling” 
shows—mostly docu-sitcoms and docu-dramas—that were structured by a gendered 
mode of address. Sometimes these shows had environmental themes and sometimes they 
didn’t. Many of the “female-targeted” shows “conceptually incorporated multiple 
philosophies of environmentalism and community and back to the land, and farm-to 
table, and eating organic…” said Michalchyshyn (2013) while backing off of the advice 
and highlighting “compelling characters.” For example, The Fabulous Beekman Boys 
(6/16/10 - 5/17/11) chronicled the misadventures of city slickers-turned-farmers, couple 
Josh Kilmer-Purcell and Brent Ridge, who purchase and attempt to run an organic farm 
in upstate New York (plus undertake a handful of value-added cottage industry activities 
like making goat milk soaps under the now-valuable “artisan brand” Beekman 1802 
carried by retailers like William Sonoma and Target, and writing a cookbook celebrating 
“heirloom” recipes and produce). Kilmer-Purcell and Ridge dramatize the financial toll 
that starting a farm can take—not to mention the strain it can put on a relationship—
while viewers learn about entrepreneurializing small town, hobby-farm living and are 
invited to cultivate skills for becoming upscale “conscious” consumers: knowledge about 
foodie buzz words (“heirloom,” “heritage breed” etc.) and the Beekman brand itself.62  
 Later, Dresscue Me (4/19/11-6/9/11), a docu-series in which self-taught designer 
and owner of several vintage clothing stores, Shareen Mitchell, a helps “ordinary” 
women (though on the show her customers are often celebrities) realize themselves 
                                                
62 There was also The 100 Mile Challenge (10/12/09-11/16/09), originally aired on Food Network Canada, followed six families from 
Mission, British Columbia who “have accepted a challenge” to limit themselves to food and drink grown and processed within a 100-
mile radius of their homes for a full 100 days. Billed as “a food revolution” the show documented “the ups and downs, and downright 
creativity” of the challenge participants (Planet Green Heads Into 2010 with New Series 2009). 
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through recycled fashion. Viewers watch her business and personal ups and downs (they 
learn about the challenges of opening a new store across the country and watch as she 
learns strategies for self-care and work-life balance). Viewers also get to hear her “[dish] 
out her styling secrets” (On TV: Dresscue Me 2009) and can thus take up her tips for eco-
chic in their everyday lives. Dresscue Me was far more centered on cultivating upscale 
“ethical consumer” sensibilities than environmental activism, though it was ostensibly 
about recycling (and also a platform for Planet Green’s partnership with Goodwill 
Industries). Reacting to this, one reporter wondered, “what the heck is this doing on 
Planet Green?” balking at the “upscaling” of thrift store finds into pricey designer duds 
for celebrities like Katie Holms, Cat Deeley, and Katy Perry (McDonough 2011). 
 This programming had its counterpart in a range of new “male-targeted” eco-
themed shows. These were largely concerned with pushing the boundaries of techno-
scientific (and in one case, financial) innovation and celebrating the (almost exclusively) 
men who are doing it. Unlike Planet Green’s original lifestyle advice, these programs 
showcased experiments specifically not to be tried at home. Ultimate Power Builders 
(12/11/09-3/14/10), for instance, launched with the bombastic promise to “def[y] all four 
basic elements (earth, air, heat, and water) to engineer big, ambitious and 
environmentally-friendly projects that will shape the Earth's landscape for future 
generations, while providing unlimited sources of energy.” On Coolfuel (9/8/09-
10/20/09), Australian eco-adventure seeker, Shaun Murphy set out on a 16,000-mile road 
trip—a man-and-his-dog-on-the-open-road-type journey—driving “across America in 
vehicles run on anything but gasoline.” On Planet Mechanics British engineers, Dick 
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Strawbridge and Jem Stansfield took “viewers on a wild journey of cutting edge 
technology and elbow grease” creating things like “Britain's first street legal, air driven 
motorbike,” a truck powered by wood and a fully cow manure-fueled farm (9/8/09-
11/3/09). Nature, Inc. (10/14/09-11/18/09), a 6-episode BBC docu-series asks, “How 
much is nature really worth to the world economy?” assigning economic value things like 
honey bees, coral reefs, biodiversity, etc., to enact a new kind of environment-saving 
through the financialization of everything and the scientists, economists, and “biosphere 
bankers” who can make this possible (Planet Green's Fall Schedule 2009).63 
 The female-targeted programs showcased practices that could certainly be tried at 
home in personal projects of eco-lifestyle entrepreneurialism—gardening, crafting, 
thrifting, cooking, etc. However, the male-targeted shows constellated around the much 
more anxious project of capturing male viewers addressed more as couch potatoes than as 
latent eco-entrepreneurs. This cluster of shows speaks to the gendering of the concept of 
advertiser-friendly television, for while male viewers are invited to just plop on the 
couch, tune in, and fantasize about planet saving through dangerous or high stakes 
innovation, female viewers were invited not only to watch, but to retrieve recipes online, 
make them, engage in vintage self-fashioning, and self-realize through upscale shopping 
practices. 
 But the advertiser-friendly programming did more than divvy up consumers into 
gendered niches and step back from environmental critique. In addition, this 
                                                
63 There were also Cops-style series. Operation Wild (1/8/10 - 12/17/10) followed the day-to-day operations of the Florida Fish and 
Wildlife Commission. Coastwatch (7/2/10 - 12/10/10) chronicled the work of New Zealand’s Ministry of Fisheries and the Maritime 
Police protecting New Zealand’s waterways from (largely small-scale, recreational) poaching. (Both of these series, however, lacked 
the high-impact drama of the genre they sought to imitate—on Operation Wild, officers are often shown arresting inebriated boaters 
and collecting alligators from Florida residents’ yards; on Coastwatch, poachers caught red-handed usually sheepishly accept the 
penalty, pack up and go home). 
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programming became increasingly insistent that planet saving ought to be conceived as a 
personal project that was less about everyday work on the home and self than it was 
about self-realizing as a “visionary.” In the press release announcing the programs, Planet 
Green’s Senior Vice President of Production and Development Jeff Hasler explained that 
this programming would be about “passionate people engaged in forward thinking 
activity,” Planet Green wanted to “help people start thinking of ‘the’ environment as ‘my’ 
environment” (Planet Green Heads Into 2010 with New Series 2009). This “visionary”-
led “storytelling” lent itself nicely to a retooled and highly gendered pedagogy. Instead of 
encouraging individuals to do their bit for the environment by recycling, installing 
energy-efficient light bulbs or driving less, the new programming worked to cultivate a 
new sensibility in which individuals would come to view themselves as big-thinking 
change-makers: “The visionary responsible for the future is you” proclaimed 2010 Earth 
Month feature (DeFranza 2010). In this way, Planet Green recast green living away from 
lifestyle and toward the equally individualized constructs of “visionaries” and 
entrepreneurs—proposing technical and profitable “innovation” as forward-thinking 
environmentalism.  
 The “visionary” theme that governed Planet Green’s new programming strategy 
gave a strange coherence to new shows that had no connection to environmentalism. 
Michalchyshyn explained to the New York Times that the programming changes reflected 
her view that Planet Green was “actually a channel for conscious living, a channel… 
about moving forward” (Stelter 2010a). On Dean of Invention (10/22/10-12/3/10) 
billionaire-inventor Dean Kamen travels in his helicopter to sites of “cutting edge” 
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innovation in robotics with military applications and medical technology (particularly 
prosthetics, which often promised to rehabilitate injured troops for redeployment). On 
Future Food (3/30/10-5/18/10), celebrity chefs/restaurateurs Homaro Cantu and Ben 
Roche, billed as “molecular gastronomists,” complete spectacular feats of food 
preparation. The narrative is largely unconcerned with social responsibility, but episodes 
often conclude with untenable ideations about “feeding the world” by transforming non-
foods into edible substances.64 On Morgan Spurlock’s FX series 30 Days (premiered on 
Planet Green 3/29/10), narratives are structured around self-reflection and personal 
growth, each episode of 30 Days chronicled a kind of walk-a-mile-in-their-shoes, 30-day 
experiment: a mom worried about her college-aged daughter’s alcohol consumption 
binge-drinks for 30 days—ostensibly to scare her daughter into responsible decision 
making; Spurlock and his fiancée live on minimum wage for a month; Spurlock spends a 
month in jail; middle-class professionals learn what it is like to live off the grid.65  
But even “conscious” television (that is, these not explicitly environmentalist 
shows) ran into problems as their pro-social goals came into conflict with their 
advertiser-friendly ambitions. This was most apparent in a cluster of BBC shows in 
which, thematically continuous with 30 Days, privileged people were confronted with 
adversity. These shows repeatedly invited viewers to watch as spoiled brats get their 
comeuppance (or, depending on how you look at it, experienced profound ethical and 
personal growth). Blood, Sweat and Takeaways (premiered 1/4/10), billed as “shock 
                                                
64 For example, when Cantu and Roche make a peanut butter substitute out of peanut shells or remove intolerable flavors by fooling 
the taste buds with a “miracle fruit” that makes bitter taste sweet, the nutrition of the final products is usually not mentioned in the 
episodes and the concluding hopes often come off sounding like a reflection on how to feed “first world” garbage to starving people. 
65 On 30 Days, experiments aimed at challenging religious prejudice were a staple: a “God-fearing 24-year-old conservative 
homophobe from red state America” lives, works, and plays (he joins an all-gay sports team) in San Francisco’s Castro District for a 
month in an episode entitled “straight man in a gay world.” In another, a Christian man does a cultural immersion stay in a Michigan 
Muslim community. And in yet another, a “freethinking” atheist does a home-stay with a family of evangelical Christians. 
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therapy,” brought six young “fast food junkies” face to face with the poor pay and 
working conditions as they “live and work” alongside fast food workers. Blood, Sweat 
and T-Shirts (premiered 2/1/10), followed much the same structure, sending six young 
“fashion victims” to learn “first hand” what it is like to work in the garment sweatshops 
in India and live on their meager earnings. On Famous, Rich and Homeless, five of 
Britain’s “rich and famous” (ranging from a retired tennis star to a disgraced royal) sign 
up for an experiment to sleep on the street as if they were homeless. Each is paired with a 
homeless “buddy” to learn, not only the ropes of “sleeping rough,” but also to cultivate 
compassion for their buddy’s circumstances.  
In all of these shows, the narrative is driven by the testimonials of the privileged 
participants narrating their ethical growth and up-close experiences. The shows offer 
minimal commentary. Instead, over the course of the series, the participants’ assessments 
come to take on explanatory weight and they opine authoritatively on “root causes” and 
offer solutions. Paradoxically, however, the shows also set up the participants as 
hopelessly out of touch with reality. Viewers are alternately invited to laugh at and 
identify with the participants, dismiss them and submit to their (often-dubious) authority. 
But are viewers really to find authoritative, for example, the hopelessly privileged 
celebrities’ conclusions that social services are merely a “band-aid” that fails to address 
the “real” problems of community breakdown, fractured families, and drug addiction 
when they are simultaneously brought face-to-face with the humanity and complex 
histories of individuals struggling with homelessness who would quite clearly be helped 
by assistance? Are they to take seriously that “sleeping rough” for a few nights is a 
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tenable form of activism to fight homelessness? Or that “first hand” experience in a 
sweatshop—and “raising awareness” of its working conditions through television—will 
reshape the garment economy?66 In many ways, attempting to answer these questions 
misses the point. On the contrary, the shows themselves make a spectacle of the 
irresolvability of a number of contradictions that emerge when self-reflection and ethical 
growth are proposed as solutions to forms of suffering that arise from the intensification 
of deregulated global capitalism.  
In other words, these shows flirt with structural critique by bring viewers into 
intimate contact with inhuman living and working conditions and connecting these 
conditions with forms of privilege that coexist with and enable them. They thus are 
different from shows that actively participate in social service delivery by inserting 
volunteerism and branded intervention as solutions to a wide range social and 
environmental problems—the Planet Green docu-series, Greensburg, which I discussed 
in Chapters 1 and 2 is a useful example of this kind of programming. On the contrary, 
these new shows were not aimed at “solving” these problems, but rather the more 
ambivalent goal of awareness-raising—a solution that becomes obviously insufficient 
                                                
66 However, a number of shows offered “solutions” to these problems as well as big-thinking “innovators” enacted profitable and 
technical programs on television. Conviction Kitchen (1/6/10 - 2/15/11) offered itself as a televised form of privatized public service. 
Originally aired on Canada’s Citytv, the 8-episode docu-series was a rehabilitative drama in which recovering addicts and ex-
convicts—none of whom have prior culinary training—work as the kitchen crew with a “world renowned chef” in an “emotionally 
charged” and “risk it all” attempt to open a high-end restaurant in a mere three weeks (Entertainment Business Newsweekly 2011). 
Likewise, Big Chef Takes on Little Chef (premiered 1/6/10), in which “world-renowned” and “Michelin-starred” chef Heston 
Blumenthal revamped Britain’s fast food chain, Little Chef, into healthier, higher quality menu, to rescue it form financial ruin and 
return it to its “former glory” appealing to nostalgia for the British breakfast joint. There is also a lesson in it for Blumenthal. The 
show seems to want to take him down a notch: he “must forget fine dining and get a grip on the real cuisine ordinary people want to 
eat” at affordable prices, explains the Discovery press release. And The Woman who Stopped Traffic (2/3/10 - 2/17/10) (aired on PG 
as the Woman Who Stops Traffic) “Kris Murrin takes on the traffic problems of England's three most congested towns and attempts to 
stop the madness for one day. The obstacles are tremendous, but if she can succeed, she shows us all that anything is possible with 
motivation and innovation” (DeFranza 2009). “Professional trouble-shooter and creative problem solver Kris Murrin is on a mission to 
stop traffic for just one day in three of England's most congested locations: Marlow, Boston, and Durham. Each city poses challenges 
ranging from resident objections to concerns from the city councils to bitter businesses worried about their bottom line” (Discovery 
Corporate 2010) 
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and unsatisfying during the course of the shows. On Blood, Sweat & T-Shirts, for 
example, as the show drew to a close, the participants increasingly came to conclusions 
that situated the status quo as inevitable, as one “fashion victim” explains: “we’re being a 
massive help to [sweatshop workers] because if it wasn’t for us buying their clothes, 
these guys wouldn’t have a job.” in the interest of narrative coherence (i.e., what Planet 
Green leadership called “compelling storytelling”), the show then abandons the critique 
of the garment industry and its concern for adult sweatshop workers and moves on the 
purportedly more unambiguous question of child labor (abstracted from its larger context 
and solved through English classes to facilitate upward mobility in global capitalism). 
But the humanity of the adult sweatshop workers who cease to matter in the narrative 
continues to haunt the show. The show has given us a glimpse of the enormity of the 
problem of sweatshop labor and its deplorable conditions; and the insufficiency of the 
solutions proposed on the show is all too clear.  
 In this way, Planet Green’s television shows became less and less environment-
themed over time and the tension between profits and planet saving (as well as the 
tension between profits and the less ambitious and less commercially risky “conscious 
television”) became more and more apparent. This was not an rigidly linear process, as 
evidenced by the air dates above, but a general tendency that describes both the 
programming specifically launched on and for the Planet Green brand as well as what 
was actually aired in each 24-hour cycle: Planet Green’s lineup became increasingly 
rerun-focused with shows borrowed from other Discovery-owned networks on topics 
ranging from human sexuality to space aliens and the supernatural. In its last 9 months, 
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Planet Green aired such shows almost exclusively (Levin 2012).  
 I am interested in this programming trajectory not because it exposes Planet 
Green’s hypocrisy, but rather because it gestures to the way in which Planet Green’s 
structuring tension—that between advertiser-friendly television and environmentalism—
intensified over time. This tension is thrown into sharp relief when the shows de-
emphasizing environmentalism are placed alongside Planet Green’s concurrent 
acquisition and airing of a range of independent environmental documentaries that were 
often highly critical of corporate power and capitalist business-as-usual. Far from an 
outlying trend in Planet Green’s overall trajectory, I argue that these documentaries were 
just as central to its brand identity as the “green adjacent” shows. Further, I argue that the 
juxtaposition of these documentaries with the celebrations of profitable technological 
innovation and the mish-mash of “conscious” offerings was crucial to Planet Green’s 
effort to resolve its central paradox through pedagogical means.  
 Specifically, in her effort to improve Planet Green’s ratings, Michalchyshyn 
introduced a primetime block of documentaries called Reel Impact. Most of these had 
been acquired from film festivals and would make their cable television “world 
premieres” on Planet Green. A handful of them even offered sustained analysis and 
structural critiques of issues with enormous human and environmental consequences. The 
Reel Impact block included calls to action on global warming, such as the Leonardo 
DiCaprio-narrated The 11th Hour (2007) and Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth (2006). It 
aired Barbara Ettinger’s A Sea Change (2009), which looks at the threats ocean 
acidification poses to fish populations globally. The Last Beekeeper (2009) and The 
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Colony (2009) both focused on the havoc wrought on bees and beekeepers by colony 
collapse disorder (Levine 2009). King Corn (2007) and Big River (2009) looked at the 
environmental impacts of industrial corn farming. Split Estate (2009) was on the 
environmental impact of natural gas extraction. The movie Coal Country (2009), a 
rallying cry against mountain top removal, was even identified as a “security threat” by 
the Pennsylvania Department of Homeland Security after its airing on Planet Green 
(McDermott 2010). 
Who Killed the Electric Car (2006) is a devastating exposé of the way in which 
the auto industry sabotaged the viability consumer electric vehicles, taking Planet Green 
“premiere sponsor” General Motors to task for shutting down its electric vehicle (EV) 
program, laying off workers associated with it, and taking back all the cars; it also 
exposes the “revolving door” between the auto and petroleum industries and government 
regulatory agencies and the way in which oil industry front groups pose as grassroots 
opposition to policies designed to enable consumer electric vehicles. Black Wave: The 
Legacy of Exxon Valdez (2008), about the 1989 oil spill, is a damning indictment of 
corporate lies and greed, and the complicity of the government and legal system in 
enabling them. It pointed out Exxon’s willingness to put people and ecosystems at risk to 
maximize profits. Viewers learn about Exxon’s old, sub-par equipment, poor oversight of 
personnel, and government failure to regulate the operation in the lead up to the spill. 
Viewers hear from fisherwomen and men who lost their livelihoods, cleanup workers 
who developed debilitating illnesses from toxin exposure, scientists who explain the 
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effect of the spill on ocean life, and those engaged in 18-year struggle to get Exxon to pay 
damages awarded to those whose health and livelihoods were harmed. 
 Reel Impact worked to establish itself as a mediated film club and privatized 
public discussion forum. With the tagline, “Watch at eight, talk at ten,” Planet Green 
invited viewers into its online universe to participate in discussion forums with fellow 
documentary enthusiasts. Through the site, users could also access additional video clips 
related to the movies, read blogs of filmmakers, play “educational” online games specific 
to each film. In this way, the Reel Impact block sought to “engage and provoke” 
individuals to move between media platforms in ways that simultaneously added brand 
value and cultivated engaged eco-citizenship (Michalchyshyn quoted in Golding 2009). 
Not surprisingly, many of the documentaries ended on a hopeful note, offering 
consumers suggestions for making change “one person at a time” with additional 
resources on the Planet Green website to help them do so (for example, a online feature 
invited individuals to “take part in 8 days of no impact” (Heimbuch 2009) after the airing 
of No Impact Man (2009) chronicles a New York City family’s yearlong experiment to 
try to eliminate its carbon footprint). Given this emphasis on individual action, it is easy 
to critique the documentaries for reinforcing troubling neoliberal discourses of personal 
responsibility. And certainly such a critique would not be unwarranted. However, it 
would be a mistake to reduce the significance of these critical and progressive 
documentaries to this concluding narrative device that has so much purchase in 
contemporary documentary filmmaking. On the contrary, I argue that these 
documentaries exemplify one of the central contradictions of Planet Green, one that is 
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often resolved through appeals to viewers to cultivate a comfort with this contradiction 
itself: the documentaries are part of a broad project in which viewers are called upon to 
reconcile the enormity of environmental destruction—especially with respect to the 
devastating consequences of corporate power and deregulated capitalism—with the 
limitations of consumer citizenship.  
This is not to say that this was deliberate project on the part of Planet Green 
decision makers. Rather, I want to stress that, however unintentional, a distinct pedagogy 
was embedded in struggle to make environmental TV advertiser friendly. Indeed, I argue 
that the new shows and the Reel Impact block remained both pedagogical and 
governmental in ways that are continuous with the “how-to” shows aired at the time of 
Planet Green’s debut. Initially, Planet Green worked to enact an environmentalist brand 
that would provide a platform and disseminate resources, lessons, and tips through which 
advertisers, celebrities, eco-entrepreneurs and individuals at home could self-realize as 
neoliberal eco-citizens and members of a green brand community. When the content 
shifted, the pedagogy was less overt. Nevertheless, it was still aimed in crucial ways at 
the same broader governmental project. Planet Green’s very existence had always hinged 
on a paradox: the channel needed viewers who not only would watch environmental 
television and click on links to help them go “no-impact” (fundamentally incompatible 
with “high-impact” electronic media) but it also needed viewers for whom advertisers 
were willing to pay big money on the off chance that they would be brand loyal and 
purchase products. Planet Green’s evolution from environmental “how to” to “green 
adjacent storytelling” then can be viewed as less a break from Planet Green’s initial 
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project than as an intensification if it: Planet Green’s programming changes were an 
outcome of an ongoing effort to make environmental television advertiser friendly and 
the governmental project that would make this possible involved a struggle to cultivate 
viewers who are comfortable with the ambivalent character of green consumer 
citizenship in neoliberal times. While this was almost certainly never a conscious agenda, 
I argue that it is quite legible in the shows—particularly in their ambivalence about social 
and environmental change—and that it emerged from Planet Green’s structuring tension. 
 
Discovery explains Planet Green’s demise 
 As I have discussed throughout this dissertation, at the time of its launch, Planet 
Green worked to make its entire slate of programming both environmentalist and 
advertiser friendly: each program represented different line of attack to bring these 
apparently contradictory projects together. As Planet Green evolved, however, it 
abandoned its effort to reconcile the two and instead increasingly split environmental 
activism off from the overtly commercial in two separate categories of programming. 
Nevertheless, if the programming move I discuss in the next paragraphs is any indication, 
even this failed to resolve the tensions internal to branding environmentalism for 
television. In 2011 Planet Green premiered two new shows that unambiguously sounded 
its death knell. In December, it introduced Suzilla: the Mouth that Roars and Midnight 
Snack. Both were LA-based reality shows. In Suzilla professional competitive eater 
Suzanne French (who also happened to have the decidedly non-green occupation of 
“contract lawyer for oilfield services company” (Grinberg 2011)), visits various greasy 
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spoons and BBQ joints challenging regulars to eating contests. Midnight Snack follows 
“night owl with a killer appetite,” former VH-1 VJ Steven Smith, as he prowls around the 
city in search of the best spots to indulge in “a fourth meal of the day” (Planet Green Pigs 
Out 2011). Explaining the shift, a Planet Green’s Marc Etkind called the new shows “the 
first step in Planet Green's evolution, bridging its eco-centric roots into a destination for 
lifestyle and entertainment seekers” (Etkind quoted in Planet Green Pigs Out 2011). 
 Aiming to target “entertainment seekers” rather than “armchair 
environmentalists,” in Discovery’s estimation, meant something very particular. This 
audience didn’t include Planet Green’s progressive or feminized viewers, nor its DIY, 
off-the-grid eco-living contingent, nor its Christian survivalist following (a number of 
whom vehemently objected on Planet Green’s comment boards to the celebrations of 
gluttony in the new shows). Etkind’s comments anticipated Discovery’s rationale for 
Planet Green’s rebrand as Destination America that would follow a few months later. 
And what remained unstated in the discourse surrounding the changes, of course, was 
that entertainment seekers promised to be far less commercially risky than armchair 
environmentalists.  
 In the section that follows, I lay out Discovery’s explanations for Planet Green’s 
cancellation, highlighting the certainty with which these explanations are made by a 
range of Discovery actors to audiences ranging from the industry, to popular press 
readers, to Planet Green fans, and to me in interviews. I point out the way in which these 
explanations are part of a performative project—that drew upon abstractions like ratings, 
entertainment, and trends—aiming to control a segment of the cable market by promising 
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to offer up predictable and valuable consumers to advertisers. I also point out that 
Discovery’s explanations were in fact never based in certainty, which becomes obvious 
when its constructions of “entertainment” are unpacked and its arguments about 
trendiness are placed against a larger green marketing discourse that remained as wildly 
hopeful and deeply anxious as it had been in 2008—in fact, I could find no radical breaks 
in the general green marketing wisdom over in the four years that had elapsed; on the 
contrary, the tendencies already in motion intensified as new research produced 
increasingly specific and detailed knowledge about slices of the green consumer market 
and “discovered” new green niches. 
 I argue that Discovery’s process of explaining the cancellation of Planet Green 
and the debut of Destination America reveals less about the “reality” of, for example, 
“what consumers want” or what makes for “entertaining” content, and more about 
Discovery’s ongoing effort to produce knowledge and transform markets and consumers 
into manageable entities. In this discourse, Discovery worked hard to produce and 
reproduce the fantasy that the failure of environmental television was, on the one hand, 
due to the “fact” that environmentalism just wasn’t entertaining and, on the other hand, 
the fault of viewers too capricious and too entertainment driven to sit still through boring 
and educational eco-television (an explanation that relies on highly classed 
understandings of “taste” as well as the collapse of consumer choice and democracy, a 
construct crucial to both neoliberal rationalities of rule and media culture). While I situate 
these explanations as both performative and productive, having tangible effects for 
media, brand culture, and environmentalism, I also argue that part of their productivity 
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involves a disavowal of the structural impossibility that environmental television could 
be commercially successful in a deregulated market where advertiser dollars make or 
break a media brand. The initial promise of Planet Green was rooted in a control impulse, 
that a brand could overcome this structural impossibility through governmental means, 
working to shape and guide consumers’ everyday activities (as well as the behavior of 
advertisers) in order to do so. In the end, I argue, this pursuit proved too challenging and 
advertiser-friendly television won out. 
 
Ratings 
 When Discovery announced Planet Green’s impending demise on April 4, 2012 
(Levin 2012), explanations for the decision constellated around ratings, entertainment, 
and trends—all positioned as unambiguously revealing of TV market truths. The popular 
narrative of Planet Green’s failure was dominated by the question of poor ratings. 
Although, as Annie Howell (2013) told me, Planet Green’s the launch, “We got lots of 
awards we got big buzz, we had excellent ratings on [Planet Green’s] first shows.” Laura 
Michalchyshyn (2013) later explained, “The reality of it was, when you looked at the 
internal ratings—we didn't have external—its like it started at a top—like a bar graph—it 
starts high, and then boom, within a week [of Planet Green’s launch] it was, like, right 
down.” By March of 2010, according to the New York Times, Planet Green had still 
“hardly made a dent in the ratings” (Stelter 2010a)—information the Times must have 
gotten from Discovery itself since the channel wouldn’t become Nielsen rated until the 
following month (Planet Green Unveils Bold Programming 2010). By the time of its 
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cancellation, the LA Times reported that Planet Green “failed to find an audience over its 
[four-year] run” (Ito 2012); it had “floundered with low ratings,” said the New York 
Times (Stelter 2012). 
Discovery executives cited these low ratings in its explanations for Planet Green’s 
cancellation. Michalchyshyn explained: 
the ratings just weren’t [high] enough—not enough people were watching. And in 
a democratic society where our entertainment—its like with the box office, you 
know, in the first three days an opening film, we can take whether its going to be 
a successful film of not. It doesn't necessarily mean it's a bad film, it just means 
that it doesn't have commercial success and, you know, someone has to pay for 
this programming. It’s very expensive. So if people aren’t watching, no one’s 
paying for it. (Michalchyshyn 2013) 
The notion that cable programming is a democracy in which viewers are equally valued 
by cable companies and their advertisers has been debunked by media studies scholars 
again and again. Television ratings are less revealing of “truths” about audiences than 
they are a discourse that transforms an audience into what Ien Ang (1991) calls “a unified 
totality… that can be known in terms of size, profile, and demographic composition.” 
Through ratings discourse, the audience becomes “a target, a commodity that can be 
bought and sold… delivered” to advertisers. As Ang explains, although ratings discourse 
has a productive capacity—it has the “ability to define a certain field of empirical 
truth”—the audience-as-commodity “is a fictive entity,” a construction of ratings 
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discourse that “smooth[es] out of problematic subjectivity and translat[es] it into ordered 
and regular instances of viewing behaviour” (Ang 1991).  
 In this way, ratings are highly reductive of audiences and crucial to an ongoing 
project aiming to render messy and unpredictable subjectivities predictable and 
manageable: ratings aim to bring unruly consumers under control. When media firms use 
ratings to bring audiences under control to sell them to advertisers, they are interested not 
simply the number of viewers tuning into a program, as Eileen Meehan points out, but the 
viewers’ “quality” with respect to their ability and propensity to consume. In this way, 
what media ratings systems aim to measure is not a show’s popularity or success at 
producing a pleasurable viewing experience for a general audience (perhaps what 
Discovery spokespeople are calling “entertainment”). On the contrary, they aim to 
measure a show’s success at delivering advertising content to “bona fide consumers—
people with disposable income, desire, and access to the retail system [who would]… buy 
brands loyally as well as impulsively” (Meehan 2005, 33). 
Discourses about TV brands’ success draw upon ratings in a performative 
endeavor that plays a productive role in media markets. Through ratings, a firm like 
Discovery can perform its certainty about audiences—certainty about audiences’ 
behavior, their likes and dislikes, and their value—for advertisers, shareholders, and 
multi-system operators in a broader project aiming to maximize profits and minimize 
risk. While ratings are also often enlisted in explanations to fans when a show or network 
is canceled—people just weren’t watching, Planet Green executives told me—in reality, 
the success or failure of a network hinges far less on viewers “voting” with their eyeballs 
  255 
than on media firms’ success or failure to sell these eyeballs to advertisers. Nevertheless, 
Discovery’s narrative of failure positioned ratings as a stable truth discourse. And, if 
Discovery was to perform its brand as a profitable place for sponsors to advertise, it 
would have to reassert mastery over these numbers and this market.  
 
Trends 
It did so first, through appeals to trendiness. In a message to disappointed fans, for 
example, the Planet Green website explained, “Planet Green was launched in the midst of 
an exciting environmental trend in the U.S.” (Team Planet Green 2012). It was “the 
height of the green movement… everybody, everything was going green” a former Planet 
Green executive reiterated (Howell 2013). But that trend declined. (She added with real 
regret: “Green was a trend. Environmentalism and love and care for the environment, 
should be a lifestyle forever. So giving it a name, ‘Planet Green,’ I think, was a mistake” 
(Howell 2013)). Discovery CEO David Zaslav confirmed that Planet Green seemed like 
“a great idea” at the time, but “it turns out that it wasn’t” (Levin 2012).  
 This self-referential argument—that the Planet Green experiment proved that a 
fading green fad caused its demise—ignores the fact that the larger trade discourse 
remained characterized by profound uncertainty about green marketing in a manner that 
continued to be struggled over through market research and analysis seeking to get this 
market under control.  
 During Planet Green’s run, for example, rather than turning away from the 
promise of green consumerism, industry journals reported on the ongoing promise of 
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green marketing for companies wanting to “do well by doing good.” Although in 2008, 
Advertising Age’s John Neff (and others) worried that the end of green and ethical 
marketing was nigh given the economic downturn, in 2009 he heralded “green” as 
“recession proof” (Neff 2009). Authors of a 2009 green marketing handbook affirmed 
this, noting their “surprise” that green marketing was “likely not a fad,” that its “time in 
the sun” might be “closer to the start than to the end” (Environmental Leader LLC and 
MediaBuyerPlanner LLC. 2009, 6). By 2011, as Planet Green’s cancellation was already 
in the works, trade journalists still perceived advertisers as single-mindedly focused on 
mobile devices and green lifestyle (Bulik 2010). Rather than recommending that 
advertisers give up on green consumerism, market research continued to specify narrower 
and narrower slices of the green market with more and more specific advice for effective 
targeting (Four Tips for Green Marketers 2009, Dolliver 2010, Banikarim 2010, RedKite 
Advisors 2011, Holland n.d.). By 2010, trade journalists were reporting on a whole 
“spectrum of green [consumers] -- stretching from the darkest who are willing to pay a 
premium for eco-friendly products in order to help stem global warming to the lightest 
who are primarily interested in saving money on their energy bill, as opposed to saving 
the planet” (Banikarim 2010). Marketers could find special instructions for speaking to 
dark-green “Alpha-Ecos,” self-interested “Eco-Centrics,” hip, young, and networked 
“Eco-Chics,” pragmatic “Economically Ecos,” and family-oriented and cost/health-
conscious “Eco-Moms” (Banikarim 2010).  
On the one hand, this larger trade press discourse on green marketing suggests 
that Discovery’s conclusion that the “green” trend had passed was far from industry 
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consensus. On the other hand, however, the increasingly narrow lifestyle clusters that 
green market research continued to specify, along with the detailed instructions for 
effective targeting of each cluster is also a performative discourse that worked to make 
green marketing commercially viable while managing profound anxieties that cropped up 
near-continually. For example, marketers worried that the explosion of green marketing 
in 2007 had resulted in “green fatigue” among consumers67 (Kenyon quoted in Neff 
2010b) as well as heightened consumer sensitivity to “greenwashing” (corporate 
exploitation of consumers’ interest in eco-friendliness with bogus green claims) (Heimert 
quoted in Shah 2010). There was worry that the US population didn’t care about 
environmental issues and recent green marketing campaigns had gone awry, such as 
major Planet Green sponsor SunChips’ compostable chip bags—consumers didn't like 
how noisy they were (Can Green Marketing Work? 2010). And consumers weren’t the 
only source of anxiety for green marketers. In 2010, the Federal Trade Commission 
began revising its “Green Guides”—which specify how existing laws are enforced—
making them more stringent and doing so a year ahead of schedule. “Agencies beware,” 
warned Advertising Age (Parekh 2011): The guides “could radically reshape how far 
marketers can go in painting their products, packaging or even corporate images green” 
(Neff 2010c). The revisions would mean closer scrutiny to root out false advertising 
claims (regulatory action against such claims had become rare since 70s and 80s), the 
guides would render both the client (advertiser) and the agency accountable for false 
                                                
67 Green fatigue refers to growing skepticism among consumers about whether “green” products were better for the environment and 
objections to their cost. 
  258 
green claims, and communications between client and agency would now be subject to 
scrutiny (Parekh 2011).68 
Against the backdrop of the larger green marketing discourse, Discovery’s 
decision to cancel Planet Green ought not be understood as a one based on the passing of 
green’s “time in the sun.” On the contrary, the green marketing discourse shows not that 
individuals were ceasing to care about the environment, but that the seams holding green 
marketing together (tractable consumers and a market-friendly state, for example) were—
and are—always under stress. No matter how detailed, specific, and sophisticated green 
market research became over this time period, it never overcame consumer 
uncontrollability (though it also never ceased to try). Planet Green’s cancellation is thus 
better understood as a decision, made by Discovery, to withdraw from a space that it was 
unable to control; as a governmental project, Planet Green failed to guide either 
advertisers or consumers toward conducting themselves in a manner that would make 
Planet Green profitable. 
 
Entertainment 
 Planet Green was unable to guide and shape consumers’ everyday conduct toward 
brand-building activities, assist them in conducting their conduct in a manner that would 
                                                
68 Parekh cites the American Association of Advertising Agencies Washington Office head Dick O'Brien, was defensive: “We believe 
that our own self-regulatory efforts and the existing regulations meet most of the concerns expressed by the commission in their new 
proposals. Green marketing is fragile and can be harshly affected by too many rules that make it almost impossible to discuss the 
environment benefits of products and services” (Parekh 2011). For O’Brien, regulations hurt industry’s ability to do 
environmentalism. Other agencies worried that the guidelines would cause court battles that would in turn “hamper creativity.” What 
is new and alarming to Parekh is that agencies, not just advertisers, are being held accountable for the advertising content they 
produce. The author advised agencies to “be cautious” because “a little paranoia could go a long way in terms of helping an agency 
avoid an unnecessary headache” and closes with an insider quote from a Mr. Cole, who is more pointed in his warning: ”be really 
careful what you say in electronic communications, whether in an email or a text message… "It can be retrieved after the fact, and it 
could come back to haunt you” (Parekh 2011). What is incredible about these concluding remarks is the extent to which they indicate 
that breaking the law is not only common, but entirely normative and normalized. There is no suggestion that there might be an ethical 
problem with these modes of operating. 
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help them self-shape and self-govern as the kind of green consumer citizens that 
advertisers would be willing to purchase. This “ungovernability” of the green market and 
green consumers undermined Planet Green’s performative project that aimed to realize 
brand value by persuading advertisers that it could deliver predictable and valuable green 
consumers. Although such “ungovernability” can be linked quite clearly to Planet 
Green’s demise, this fearful fact, along with Discovery’s own power to make decisions 
about programming, was always disavowed in Discovery’s explanations for Planet 
Green’s cancellation. Instead, Discovery used the ratings as an objective measure of 
consumer choice: viewers did not want environmental television. Through ratings, the 
people had spoken clearly and unambiguously that green TV was “just not entertaining.” 
Discovery was only following suit, giving the people what they wanted. In this way, 
Discovery represented Planet Green’s failure as a problem of demand, not a decision 
made by industrial actors (see Ouellette 2002), and it posited “entertainment” as an 
objective fact rather than something subjective and unstable. As Laurie Ouellette has 
observed, the equation discussed above of “ratings with people’s democratic 
participation” that characterized Discovery’s messaging on Planet Green’s cancellation 
has a long history in discourses of television’s quality; and this equation has long allowed 
industrial actors to “[obscure] their own powerful role as the commercial shapers of 
television culture” (Ouellette 2002, 37) while attributing decisions about content to “mass 
tastes.” Discovery explained Planet Green’s demise in terms of these two tropes—
ratings-equals-democracy and entertainment-as-objective fact—enlisting them in its 
performative efforts to maintain control of a market. 
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 Despite the fact ratings data has little to do with democratic representation of 
what people “want,” for Discovery, the equivalence of these two things was nevertheless 
ritually performed through appeals to entertainment. For Laura Michalchyshyn, Planet 
Green’s early ratings drop-off “just said to me, and everyone, this programming is just 
not entertaining enough. The channel was failing. Period. Simple. No one was 
watching… there’s a lot of places where the green message and environmental activism 
has been a lot more successful. It’s not in long-form television programming. It’s just 
boring, I’m sorry. It’s dull and does appeal” (Michalchyshyn 2013, my emphasis). David 
Zaslav told USA Today, “The feedback from viewers was that programming about the 
environment was not entertaining enough” (Levin 2012) and Discovery executives told 
the New York Times that Planet Green floundered due to “a lack of entertaining eco-
themed shows” (Stelter 2012).  
 Although of course the obviousness that characterized Discovery’s conclusions 
about entertainment was performative—as was the discursive collapse of “objective 
entertainment” with ratings and consumer choice—it nonetheless gained purchase across 
press sites and seemed to have real resonance with the executives with whom I spoke 
(though some qualified their opinions about entertainment by listing shows that they had 
in fact enjoyed—and even found “fun” in the case of Battleground Earth and “hilarious” 
in the case of the 100 Mile Challenge and the Fabulous Beekman Boys69). Richard Dyer 
                                                
69 Annie Howell, for example, spoke directly to the wholly subjective and confounding nature of “entertainment” in a comment about 
her own viewing preferences: “[Green TV] sounds boring and unless you tuned in and watched some of the stuff—I mean, some of 
the stuff that they had was really interesting and really cool, but I’m interested in that topic. If you’re not, even to get someone to sit 
down for even half an hour is almost impossible… And they had a bunch of acquisitions from Canada that I thought were just 
fantastic. Really interesting, fun, clever shows. But you had to be into it. My husband was like, “eugch, who watches this?” I’m 
serious! I hate to say it, but it’s true. You know. I mean, you had the 100 Mile Challenge, which I thought was a hoot, which was a 
town in British Columbia decided that for an entire month they could only eat or drink products that could be found within a hundred 
miles… And it was hilarious watching the ones who could do it and the ones who were just buckling under the pressure because 
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has pointed out that what is “entertaining” is often taken for granted and dismissed. One 
need not answer “why” something is entertaining, or what makes it so, because it “just 
is.” To say that something is “entertaining,” then, is often understood as “an end point” or 
“obvious” (something is “just entertaining”) (Dyer 1992). Dyer, however, insists that 
entertainment be “made strange” (7). What is “entertaining” is not natural, but produced 
in particular contexts at particular times in ways that have implications more significant 
than a throwaway chuckle: “entertainment offers certain pleasures not others, proposes 
that we find such and such delightful, teaches us enjoyment – including the enjoyment of 
unruly delight. It works with desires that circulate in a given society at a given time, 
neither wholly constructing those desires nor merely reflecting desires produced 
elsewhere” (7). Planet Green’s shift to Destination America constructed “entertaining” 
content by tapping into the anti-elitism/populism of a carnivalesque aesthetic that did less 
to subvert dominant hierarchies than it did to shore up hetero-patriarchal white 
supremacist capitalism while flying in the face of middle class propriety. (Interestingly, 
Destination America ambivalently claims and reshapes class struggle in line with status 
quo economic arrangements in a way that mirrors what Planet Green attempted with 
environmentalism.) 
 Discovery’s construction of “entertaining content” was wholly bound up in its 
desire to capture white, “Middle American,” male viewers and deliver them to 
advertisers—a desire that was absolutely central to the anxieties that structured Planet 
Green throughout its existence. Given this, the appeal of a network like Destination 
                                                                                                                                            
there’s no coffee grown in British Colombia. You know, so these men without their coffee. And, it was a really clever idea. It didn't do 
well” (Howell 2013). 
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America is obvious. Seeming to speak directly to Discovery’s ambivalence about the 
politically charged character of “green” television, Destination America’s Henry Scheiff 
explained, “Americans may be divided by politics, but we are united by our love of 
country… As a network inclusive to all, Destination America will celebrate this 
connective spirit by curating the common ground among us: the pluck of the worn saddle, 
the promise of exploring new territory and the diversity that has made this nation great” 
(Scheiff quoted in Planet Green Rebrands 2012). Unlike scary stories about global 
warming and the gentle scolding of American mega-consumers that viewers saw on 
Planet Green, Destination America’s content would be “quintessential 
counterprogramming to many of the negative stories” and “a one-stop destination for all 
of these stories from an American perspective,” ostensibly recuperating the negative 
image of “Middle America” by giving it positive spin (Levin 2012). Zaslav explained that 
Destination America aimed to target “a manly version of TLC's audience…with shows 
about food, travel, adventure and natural history aimed squarely at a between-the-coasts 
crowd”; Discovery had “became convinced,” perhaps thanks to its experience with Planet 
Green, that “there was an opening there to build a channel based on Middle America, 
strong values, behavior and customs” (Zaslav quoted in Levin 2012).  
Poking a hole in Etkind’s argument that Destination America would be “inclusive 
to all,” an LA Times reporter asked him “whether there would be anything for vegetarians 
to watch” (Ito 2012). Missing the point, Etkind responds, “If we can find something that's 
going to appeal to everybody that's vegetable-based… by all means, we'll do it” (Ito 
2012). But “How many actual, everyday blue-collar Americans can go home and do that 
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crap they do over there at Food Network?” asks one of the judges from BBQ Pitmasters, 
“None of ’em! Who is gonna make foam and gel, and then string that crap across the 
plate to make it look pretty? But everyone can go out and grill a burger, they can go do 
pork chops, they can do ribs. And they do it” (Mixon quoted in Ito 2012). Here, 
guaranteed appeal is bound up in a reclamation of “ordinary” American sensibilities laced 
with racialized, classed, and gendered assumptions in ways that are extraordinarily 
exclusive, not inclusive. Exclusivity, of course, is neither unusual nor surprising for niche 
media, on the contrary it is central to the business model, but here it is wholly disavowed 
by Discovery’s discourse; unacknowledged is that Destination America seeks to appeal 
not to “everyone” but to a specific target audience of 18-49 year-old males who can be 
sold to advertisers skeptical about the future of cable TV. 
 Thus, in the discourse of the Planet Green’s demise, the commercial logic 
governing the changes was inextricable from industrial assumptions about Middle 
America. Further, there is a not-so-subtle suggestion that this “Middle America” is 
somehow to blame for the failure of environmentalist television. The Planet Green team 
did everything they could, one former executive told me, “they tried to give it [their 
all]—they had a significant programming budget…they were given everything that was 
necessary to try and launch and run a channel, but it was just hard to attract an audience 
to 24/7 environmental content. It just was. It sounds boring and unless you tuned in and 
watched some of the stuff… I think that’s why the channel did well on the coastline 
where people are a little bit more environmentally conscious or in big cities” (Howell 
2013). “If you had green spinach fed to you everyday on a platter and its boiled with no 
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accoutrements, salt or pepper, are you going to eat it? And enjoy it?” another former 
executive asked me. “I don’t think so,” she concluded. “That’s what this had done” 
(Michalchyshyn 2013). She added, “There’s this endless list of—Honey Boo Boo on 
TLC—I mean, successful programming draws in audiences. It doesn't always mean it’s 
the same quality-wise, but it’s just what appeals” (Michalchyshyn 2013).  
In this way, the dominant narrative describing Planet Green’s replacement by 
Destination America rehearses the same 60s-era anxiety about “childlike” mass audiences 
choosing “candy over spinach” in their television viewing that, as I have already 
demonstrated, haunted Planet Green (Gould quoted in Ouellette 2002, 33). By doing so, 
this discourse “[blames] issues pertaining to cultural production and control on viewer 
self-discipline” (Ouellette 2002, 33). Instead of the reform impulse that governed such 
critiques in the 60s, Discovery decision makers resigned themselves to this “reality” and 
gave the people what they (supposedly) wanted. While Discovery’s emphasis on pleasure 
was potentially progressive, in the end, the question of viewing pleasure was hardly 
relevant as it was governed entirely by a commercial logic and highly reductive and 
exclusive assumptions about mass tastes.  
Destination America’s exaltation of excess may seem strange for a media firm 
that was so recently professing its investment in greener futures; and its unextraordinary 
launch might appear surprising in the multi-channel, multi-platform era. These choices, 
however, were almost certainly based on three factors. The first factor is that this new 
“entertaining” television was far cheaper than Planet Green’s initial slate of all-original 
shows. Destination America’s launch surely made sense to Discovery because it was also 
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very very cheap. With a slate of reality reruns, Destination America’s launch drew upon 
very common strategies US television firms use to minimize risk, as Ted Magder (and 
others) have pointed: “First, to deliver audiences in a ‘buying mood’ to advertisers. 
Second, stick to established program genres and avoid challenging the genre’s 
expectations of viewers. Third, recycle and copy successful shows” (Magder 2009, 148). 
The second factor is that Destination America’s content was surely chosen in part based 
on industrial stereotypes that appeals to “ordinary” and “blue collar” American 
masculinities would resonate naturally among viewers. However, since TV—and more 
particularly, reality TV—does not give us what we want, but rather reflects the needs and 
desires of advertisers, the third and most decisive factor is that first and foremost for 
Discovery was the belief that Destination America’s unambiguous celebration of 
American capitalism would inspire little anxiety among potential sponsors. Discovery did 
not worry that Destination America needed a boost to “break through the clutter” nor did 
it need to demonstrate to advertisers that it could. 
  
Profits trump planet saving 
 Although the relative absence of anxiety in Destination America’s launch 
represents a sharp departure from Discovery’s approach to Planet Green, I argue that 
Destination America is best viewed, in fact, as continuous with a struggle that was 
already in motion when Planet Green launched not four years prior. While much of the 
press coverage of Planet Green’s switch to Destination America represented it as a total 
reversal, as I discussed above, to anyone who had been watching Planet Green’s 
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evolution over its short time on air, its cancellation cannot have come as a great 
surprise—by the time of the 2012 re-branding, Planet Green hadn’t aired eco-content for 
about nine months (Levin 2012). Online commenters had been complaining at least since 
2010 about Planet Green’s airing of non-environmentalist shows from other Discovery-
owned channels: What Not to Wear, Miami Ink, Tuna Wranglers, and programs on 
ghosts, aliens, and mummies, to name a few. Discovery’s de-emphasis on 
environmentalism on Planet Green and the transformation of the channel into Destination 
America was part of a larger industrial process seeking to manage a crisis of ad dollars on 
the one hand, and, on the other hand, deprioritizing a risky brand in the context of 
enormous commercial success elsewhere within the Discovery universe. 
 
Ad dollars 
 Given the centrality of pleasing advertisers to media business, it may seem 
surprising that the question of ad dollars was almost entirely absent from the popular and 
industrial conversation on Planet Green’s failure. This is not to say that the industry 
insiders are lying to the press. Rather, within performance of TV brands, ratings bring in 
ad dollars in a straightforward sense. The legibility of “failure” within branding and 
media discourse relies on a collapse of ratings and advertiser support, despite the well-
known fact that media firms engage in an ongoing struggle to transform ratings into ad 
dollars through the hard work of, in the case of Discovery, ad teams paid on commission 
who are charged with convincing advertisers of the value of the “eyeballs” they may be 
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able to deliver. Yet, the public discourse focuses single-mindedly on the problem of 
ratings and viewers (coded as “entertainment”).  
 The few published accounts of Planet Green’s success with advertisers sounded 
quite positive. A 2007 Washington Post story described the initial advertiser interest in 
purchasing time on Planet Green as “intense” (Ahrens 2007a) and Planet Green’s launch 
was deemed a success according to measures such as “engagement” and “attentiveness,” 
as the marketing team reported in their Mark Awards application: 
PG ranked as the #2 network for viewer engagement and #4 for viewer attentive 
to ads. Conversion rate of those aware to those intending to view was very high. 
Conversion rate of awareness to intent-to-view was the highest of all Discovery 
Communications Networks at 67% based on DCIC / OTX Marketing Evolution 
Study, May and July 2008. (Planet Green Launch Marketing Team 2009) 
Planet Green’s ad team also reported that ad sale commitments had increased two fold 
over the ad sales when the channel was still Discovery Home (Planet Green Launch 
Marketing Team 2009) and Planet Green’s launch campaign won several awards: it was 
not only designated the “Consumer Launch Campaign of the Year” by PR Week (Launch 
of the Year 2009) but also recipient of a 2009 Gold Mark Award in the “Brand Image and 
Positioning: Campaign” division. 
But a few days before Planet Green’s June 2008 launch, one media buyer “on 
condition of anonymity” revealed to Media Week’s Anthony Crupi that ad time on Planet 
Green was “not selling like they hoped… Clients have some misgivings about aligning 
with a concept that might leave them open to all sorts of unwanted scrutiny,” the buyer 
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explained (quoted in Crupi 2008). Indeed, as I later learned in interviews, Planet Green’s 
cancellation was less about viewers than it was about the difficulty in generating enough 
ad dollars to run the channel at all. Throughout its short life, as one former executive 
remarked, “for the most part, [the response to the channel from viewers] was very 
positive. But you know, people who are in that environmental space and know it, they 
will scrutinize your advertisers for sure. And that’s why getting the right advertisers with 
the right records was extremely important but very hard” (Howell 2013). And indeed, “ad 
sales was a challenge,” she went on. “Companies were very leery of how much they 
wanted to put their brand against something that was so completely tied to the 
environment… I think there was concern that that would call into question their own 
practices… there were many many advertisers that were mainstream advertisers on TLC, 
Animal Planet, Discovery that didn't want anything to do with Planet Green. It was too 
scary for them” (Howell 2013).70 In hindsight, despite the initial excitement, “within a 
year, it was clear that [Planet Green] was going to be a much harder thing to pull off long 
term. People didn't want to give that up, but I think when you realize that you’re not 
going to be able to generate the revenue that you need to sustain a business, you’ve got to 
cut, you’ve got to cut deep, you just do” (Howell 2013). 
Despite Planet Green’s marketing awards and an ad team that one executive 
called the “best in the business,” its ad revenue was dwarfed by that of other similar 
networks because, despite new “green advertising budgets” in fact, corporations were 
                                                
70 “You know, you have, for instance, Dow, okay, well great, they have all this, they have a whole line of environmentally friendly 
products, you know, windows and whatnot, but we all know that Dow also has a horrendous track record for pollution. So that was 
really tricky. Automotive, I mean, Ford was very involved, you know, a great company, but there were many many advertisers that 
were mainstream advertisers on TLC, Animal Planet, Discovery that didn't want anything to do with Planet Green. It was too scary for 
them” (Howell 2013). 
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unwilling to risk the heightened scrutiny of their business and manufacturing practices 
invited by green claims. And when the housing sector crashed in 2009, things only got 
worse, as Renovation Nation host, Steve Thomas explained: 
By the time they got into the belly of the recession, virtually all of our 
advertisers—I mean, our principle advertiser was Saturn, the car company, and 
they folded. And I’ve been through a number of recessions in my adult life and 
this was by far the worst, by an order of magnitude… the advertiser base simply 
disappeared. Windows and doors, home products of various sorts, big box 
stores—Home Depot, Lowes and so on—their day-to-day sales dropped 
precipitously. Basically, the whole housing category was down by more than 50 
percent, windows, doors, appliances… everybody from Whirlpool to Subzero, 
they’re not advertising… banking services, mortgage services, real estate 
services—none of those people are advertising. Ford trucks, Chevy trucks… 
advertising to contractors: not advertising. 
Thomas explained to me that Planet Green sold the bulk of its advertising around Emeril 
Green and Renovation Nation, so when the housing market plummeted and the 
advertisers withdrew their sponsorship, this represented a significant portion of the 
channel’s overall revenues: 
I think what happened at Discovery was they looked at the numbers and looked at 
the hemorrhaging and just said, we’re going to pull the plug… and they pulled the 
plug on the whole network… [Renovation Nation] was a great show. It had a 
growing viewer base, a loyal advertising base… they had to cut their advertising 
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when their businesses evaporated… I think that [Planet Green’s cancellation] was 
purely fiscal… look, you know, they’re [Discovery’s] in the business to make 
money and Planet Green was doing well and my show was doing great. You 
know the VP, the senior VP of ad sales for planet green said there’s two shows 
that I need, I need you and I need Emeril [Emeril Green], because he sold most of 
the advertising around those two shows, but that all changed when the economy 
just—you know, I think they just didn't want to sustain the network through a 
series of losses. (Thomas 2013) 
Ad sales are not only crucial revenue for a channel, but they are also key to justifying 
carriage of a network to multi-system operators (like Comcast, for example). Without 
sufficient advertiser interest, channels risk being dropped from their “dial position” (a 
term that bears the legacy of analog TV and refers to the channel number a network 
occupies) by service providers. Planet Green’s dial position was designated “lifestyle,” 
which meant it was contractually obligated to have a certain distribution of food, travel, 
home shows, etc (Howell 2013). Destination America’s programming promised to 
rework these lifestyle categories—away from everyday feminized work on the self, 
home, and family and away from environmentalism—for a demographic more desirable 
to advertisers (Howell 2013).  
 
Wall Street and other priorities 
 While it may be tempting to see Planet Green’s struggle with ad sales as a 
definitive explanation for its cancellation, doing so fails to situate Planet Green’s demise 
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in the context of the operations of commercial media in a radically deregulated market. 
The direct relationship between ad sales and the viability of television networks is not a 
natural fact but rather the product of a very particular media environment in which 
maximizing profits trump all other concerns. When placed against the backdrop of 
Discovery’s business decisions behind the scenes and enormous commercial and 
financial success, Planet Green’s rise and fall unambiguously demonstrates the limits of 
branding as a mode of environment saving in contemporary culture. 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, Planet Green was launched simultaneous with 
Discovery becoming a publicly traded company under new CEO David Zaslav. 
Although, as I noted, there is some evidence to suggest that Planet Green had initially 
been part of Discovery’s efforts to demonstrate “responsibility” to Wall Street, as time 
went on, in the discourse surrounding Discovery’s growth efforts, the Planet Green brand 
was seldom mentioned. On the contrary, both the trade press and Wall Street celebrated 
Zaslav less for “responsibility” than for aggressive and risk-taking business moves. In 
September 2009, USA Today’s David Lieberman called him to a “tenacious corporate 
animal poised to challenge the kings of television”; Discovery’s re-branding and 
expansion projects over the preceding years had caught the attention of both Wall Street 
and industry for transforming itself from what Lieberman called “an also-ran television 
service into a vigorous worldwide rival to giants including Disney, NBC Universal, News 
Corp., Time Warner and Viacom” (Lieberman 2009). The value of Discovery shares had 
gone up dramatically over the year, less because of Discovery’s environmental 
commitments than because it was a pure-play cable company, which, as Lieberman 
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explains “look good in a recession because about half of their revenue is guaranteed 
[since] it comes from payments by cable and satellite operators.”71 Bernstein Research 
(self-described as “Wall Street’s premier sell-side research firm”) was predicting that 
Discovery’s net income would reach $559 million on revenues of $3.48 billion by the end 
of the year (Lieberman 2009). Discovery’s reputation on Wall Street was improving—
without, it seems, any discussion of Planet Green. 
In July, 2008, not two months into Plant Green’s run, Zaslav removed Planet 
Green’s President/General Manager, Eileen O’Neill from Planet Green’s helm so she 
could devote her talents to more urgent projects at sister network The Learning Channel 
(TLC).72 O’Neill would be charged with returning TLC to cable TV’s top 20, 
Discovery’s “priority No. 1,” according to Zaslav (Schneider 2008). Zaslav explained, 
“The recent strategy for TLC did not meet our ratings or operational goals. I am 
committed to improving upon these processes and lessons learned and restoring TLC to 
its full creative and business potential” (quoted in Schneider 2008). (The “commitment” 
to TLC’s survival is notable in the context of a lack of such commitment to Planet 
Green’s. What are the criteria that make for a brand that a company is willing to take a 
loss on, sometimes for several years?) When O’Neill left Planet Green, according to 
Renovation Nation host Steve Thomas, the channel lost one of its most passionate 
supporters, “a real powerhouse” with a clear “vision” for the channel, she was 
                                                
71 Further, Discovery’s ownership of its programming and content (unusual in TV business) and its internationalization efforts were 
bolstering its reputation among investors (Lieberman 2009) 
72 O’Neill replaced TLC head Angela Shapiro-Mathes (who had been hired the year previous in Zaslav’s initial “restructuring”). While 
Discovery searched for a Planet Green replacement, Clark Bunting, a Discovery higher-up who’d been with the company for over 20 
years, would be acting prexy-GM. 
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“instrumental” in making the programming successful, he said (Thomas 2013).73 Another 
Planet Green star agreed that O’Neill had “a vision for [Planet Green], and then she left… 
everybody was kind of floating”; as an aside, she added her sense that O’Neill’s 
departure “coupled with… the economy and the green advertising dollars” created a 
“perfect storm” for Planet Green’s cancellation (Murphy 2013). 
 The backdrop to O’Neill’s move and Discovery’s diminished focus on Planet 
Green was Discovery’s single-minded focus on aggressive growth—both on Wall Street 
and in terms of international market share. The company continued to rebrand channels—
for example a 2009 partnership with Hasbro toys to rebrand Discovery Kids as the Hub 
and one with Oprah Winfrey to launch OWN (Yourse 2009). In addition, Discovery was 
ramping up its internationalization efforts.74 As Discovery became what New York Times’ 
Brian Stelter called a Wall Street “favorite” and “the subject of envy” among TV 
companies in 2010, Planet Green was increasingly absent from Discovery discourse, 
including promotional releases, annual reports, and statements to the press (Stelter 
2010b).  
Analysts were less interested in environmental responsibility than in the fact that 
Discovery owned most of its content—something quite unusual in TV business—
Discovery could thus replay this content in its international markets and monetize it in 
                                                
73 Renovation Nation’s Steve Thomas explained in an interview that, with O’Neill’s departure, Planet Green lost its most powerful 
champion. Renovation Nation’s Steve Thomas called O’Neill “a real powerhouse” and “instrumental” in making the programming 
successful. He called her “the genesis of Planet Green” and said that “she understood exactly what she wanted to develop in terms of 
Planet Green… what we did conformed to her vision… She was great to work with” (Thomas 2013). 
74 On July 28, 2009, the New York Times reported that Discovery had just signed with Baidu, what is sometimes referred to as “the 
Google of China,” to partner in the production of a “science and adventure” website. Zaslav explained that Discovery’s content spoke 
a “universal language of satisfying curiosity,” which the Brian Stelter speculates “may not run the same censorship risks as Western 
culture or news programming” (Stelter 2009) Zaslav’s statement, here, is revealing about the business assumptions attached to 
“quality” and “educational” television: they are central to producing ostensibly “non-offensive” programming, defined according to a 
set of assumptions about normative moralities. One might extrapolate from this statement that Planet Green’s do-good “edu-tainment” 
had originally promised to serve a discursive function for the expansionist projects, but was now taking a backseat. 
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any number of other ways (Howell 2013). Stelter attributed Discovery’s success (in the 
US and internationally) to this and to the fact that Discovery relies heavily on cheap-to-
produce reality formats. Over the year prior, the price of Discovery stock had doubled, 
doing better than shares of most other cable companies and Zaslav continued to be 
intently focused on increasing Discovery’s international market share: international 
revenue had gone up significantly and in Latin America in particular, distribution of 
Discovery content had increased some 70 percent over the preceding three years. In the 
context of this commercial success, Discovery decided to “ease up” on Planet Green’s 
environmental theme (Stelter 2010b). 
 Although the trade press offered little explanation, it is worth noting that at the 
same time that Discovery was de-greening the network, Planet Green higher-ups were 
leaving Discovery. On January 3, 2011, Annie Howell, a senior VP of communications 
and public affairs at Discovery and a member of Planet Green’s launch team, left 
Discovery to join Crown Media Holdings (which owns and operates Hallmark Channel 
and Hallmark Movie Channel) (People on the Move 2011). On January 4, Daily Variety 
reported that another Planet Green higher-up, Rachel Smith, would also be leaving, this 
time to join the BBC as VP of original programming (BBC America 2011). Were they 
leaving a dead-end brand? Or abandoning a project that Discovery had ceased to support? 
Disillusioned? Or encouraged to seek employment elsewhere on the eve of Planet 
Green’s demise? Or was it just coincidence that they both landed top positions at other 
media firms at the same time? The best we can do is to speculate about the internal 
conditions that precipitated these moves. But what is certain is that all the while, 
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Discovery was waffling about whether to maintain the Planet Green channel. In January 
2011, the New York Times reported that “Discovery [had] been trying to figure out 
whether to rebrand” Planet Green (Stelter 2011). On February 14, Zaslav told Variety that 
Planet Green was slated for a “re-think,” explaining, “We feel like we could something 
else more meaningful” with the channel (More OWN Coin 2011).75  
 Planet Green’s “re-think” was not a completely linear or straightforward process 
at Discovery Communications Inc. In March, the company hired two new executives to 
manage Planet Green and Discovery Fit & Health (now managed as a “dual network”). 
Michalchyshyn commented that the new hires would “further [strengthen] what is already 
a top-notch senior team for Discovery Fit & Health and Planet Green… as we continue to 
build these two young, emerging networks” (Powers 2011). At the same time, thanks to 
Planet Green’s investment in original programming, the 2011 Harris Poll EquiTrend 
study—a study that evaluates and ranks brands—named Planet Green among the most 
improved “Topical Interest” TV brands (Harris Interactive 2011) and by the summer, 
industry news was reporting that Discovery planned to continue to invest in “further 
growth” of the channel.76 
                                                
 
75 This announcement came at the same time that Discovery announced its plans to invest another 50 million dollars in Winfrey’s 
OWN, Daily Variety, “MORE OWN COIN AHEAD; Discovery to invest another $50 mil,” Daily Variety (Reed Elsevier Inc.), 
February 2011: 5., and FiTV had been rebranded as Discovery Fit and Health. 
76 Despite the planned makeover, Planet Green embarked on a partnership with Goodwill Industries International to support the 
charity’s “Donate Movement” a branded platform for activism that “encourages consumers to consider the positive impact their 
donations have on both people and the planet.” The “donate movement” also partners with “iconic brands” like Hanes, Family Circle 
Magazine, Levi’s). Goodwill calls it “a global movement inspiring consumers and businesses to join Goodwill in promoting the 
positive impact donating has on people and the planet,” refashioning the notion of a social movement in line with the demands of 
branding. Such a movement offers “education” on what kinds of socially responsible activities are appropriate as well as an 
opportunity for individuals to “do good” through the brands themselves: “Planet Green and Goodwill are working together to educate 
the public on ways they can actually make the world a better place,” writes the author. Michalchyshyn offered: “It's the idea of 
conscious living… As partners of the Donate Movement, we are asking viewers to consider the small ways they can help their 
community and the environment by giving to reputable organizations like Goodwill that turn donations into jobs” (Wireless News). 
Planet Green stood to promote its new programming though the announcement and add “socially responsible” value to its brand. A 
new docu-series, Dresscue Me (a show in which “self-taught designer” and owner of several vintage clothing stores, Shareen Mitchell, 
a helps “ordinary” women realize themselves through recycled fashion) would be involved in the partnership. For Goodwill, the 
  276 
 Despite this continued investment in Planet Green and some success by industry 
measures of brand value, by September Laura Michalchyshyn, too, had resigned from her 
Planet Green post (Benzine 2011). It was evident to anyone watching the channel that 
around this time Planet Green ceased to be in all but name. At some point Discovery 
decided that it was not worthwhile to run Planet Green at a loss. Unsuccessful brands are 
viewed as a liability and now that Discovery was a publicly traded company, it was 
mandated to maximize profits for its shareholders. As noted in Chapter 1, cable 
companies are now operating under the belief that the US cable market is “saturated”—
most households who are likely to subscribe to cable already do, so little expansion of 
this market is possible. On top of this, the market is expected to shrink as people—and 
young people in particular—get more and more of their content online, some never 
subscribing to cable in the first place and others, “cord cutters,” cancelling their 
subscriptions. This is the context in which Discovery’s internationalization efforts (driven 
by the promise of untapped cable markets) and its emphasis on cheap-to-produce, 
advertiser-friendly brands makes sense. It is also the context in which risky projects like 
Planet Green are less and less appealing. Initially, Planet Green, with its mantle of 
“responsibility” and its copious online and interactive content promised to solve to this 
set of industrial problems for a cable company on the brink of going public. And in some 
ways, Planet Green’s failure can be understood as a failure in these terms: it didn’t 
                                                                                                                                            
partnership contained the promises of media generally and lifestyle television more specifically for extending its brand and offering 
viewers tips on how to incorporate Goodwill into their everyday lives. According to a Goodwill spokesperson, "Planet Green will 
enable us to channel our ‘repurpose’ message to millions of viewers who understand what it means to give a new purpose to existing 
material” (Wireless News 2011).  
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manage to solve these industrial problems sufficiently. Growth, it turned out, did not 
require green TV.  
 
Conclusion 
While Planet Green “failed” in market terms, for Discovery this failure was far 
more ambivalent. Foucault has pointed out that the productivity of a governmental 
project may have an ambivalent relationship to its ostensible aims. This is most clear in 
his discussion of the prison in his 1977 Discipline & Punish. I am not here comparing the 
governmental project of Planet Green to that of the prison in Foucault’s work; however 
the instrumentalization of failure for broader aims is relevant, here. Specifically, Foucault 
points out that “If the law is supposed to define offences, if the function of the penal 
apparatus is to reduce them and if the prison is the instrument of this repression, then 
failure has to be admitted” (271) but if one asks “what is served by the failure of the 
prison” which “is not intended to eliminate offences, but rather to distinguish them, to 
distribute them, to use them” (272) in a process that is exceedingly successful at 
producing and instrumentalizing delinquency (Foucault 1977, 277). Similarly, when it 
comes to brands, As Liz Moor argues, “the effects of branding should perhaps be 
construed less in terms of the ‘effectiveness’ of particular branding campaigns (which, as 
we have seen, are prone to considerable error), and more in terms of the impact of 
branding upon a wider environment” (Moor 2007, 64). Although Planet Green “failed” in 
the sense that Discovery decided to discontinue the brand, it nonetheless participated in 
broader tendencies in ways that have a number of implications. Moor reminds us that 
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“Brands may not always work in practice in the ways intended by those who create them, 
but the effort to cultivate brand identities, and to use these as a means to organize 
production, exchange and management, structures a growing range of social and political 
as well as economic activities” (153).  
Discovery spokespeople performed Planet Green’s failure as market research—
offering up unambiguous and objective knowledge about consumers—in ways that added 
value to Discovery’s other TV brands, particularly Destination America, and shaped 
industrial beliefs about television and the branding of environmentalism. The failure of 
Planet Green was remarkably successful in garnering profits for Discovery and confirmed 
and bolstered a range of existing hierarchies. In its first year of existence, according to 
Nielsen ratings, Destination America “experienced 11 consecutive months of year-over-
year gains in Prime delivery among P25-54” and “Since its launch on 5/28/12, 
Destination America ranks #1 in Prime for M25-54 delivery among ad-supported cable 
networks with 65M subscribers or less” (Bibel 2013). At the time of Destination 
America’s launch, all of Planet Green’s advertisers stayed with the channel, and 12 
additional advertisers signed on “including marketers of food and beverages, auto 
makers, insurance companies, and makers of home-improvement products such as 
Mitsubishi Electric, which will advertise a new cooling and heating system,” Advertising 
Age reported (Steinberg 2012). 
 And just as “failure” as a concept does little to get at what is produced by a failed 
governmental project, brands included, Miller and Rose remind us that “Government is a 
congenitally failing operation” anyway: “Things, persons, or events always appear to 
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escape… the programmatic logic that seeks to govern them” (Miller and Rose quoted in 
McCarthy 2010, 7). In the case of Planet Green, people at Discovery attempted to enact a 
context in which advertisers and viewers would align their conduct with the invitations of 
the green brand community. In both cases, they refused. But, Anna McCarthy adds, “if 
the world in which we live is not [as Miller and Rose write,] ‘a governed world so much 
as a world traversed by the “will to govern,” fueled by the constant registration of 
“failure,” the discrepancy between ambition and outcome, and the constant injunction to 
do better next time,’ this does not mean that the will to govern is impotent or ineffectual, 
particularly when it comes to the distribution of resources and access to power” 
(McCarthy 2010, 7, quoting Miller and Rose where noted). 
 Perhaps Planet Green’s failure should be understood less in terms of whether it 
successfully governmentalized consumers toward good green consumer citizenship and 
more in terms of the particular way that television’s usefulness as technology of 
governance under US neoliberalism maintains a seductive pull on media decision makers. 
When television took hold as such a technology in the postwar era, and sponsored 
programming attempted to guide individuals toward the emerging ideals of neoliberal 
citizenship, Anna McCarthy argues that significance of this programming was not that it 
had any hope of achieving “the Orwellian goals of total propaganda” (7). Rather, and 
much in line with critiques of Planet Green’s “boring” green vegetable programming, she 
adds “it is hard to believe, given the often soporific nature of [the postwar sponsored TV 
shows] produced with the goals of governance in mind, that such endeavors had much 
direct effect” (7). Nevertheless, she writes,  
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If television helped to implant the neoliberal program in U.S. political culture, it 
was not via its influence upon the so-called masses, but rather in its capacity to 
galvanize elites. From its inception, television assembled and connected members 
of distinct sectors of the governing classes who were seduced by, or at least 
curious about, its potential as an instrument for inculcating the values of liberal 
capitalist democracy. (McCarthy 2010, 8) 
Of course, we cannot equate the postwar context with contemporary forms of 
governmentality. Planet Green had different aims and objectives from postwar television, 
less concerned with ushering in liberal capitalist democracy than with working to create a 
template for eco-self-governance amenable to the contemporary form of US 
neoliberalism as it comes together with brand culture. Planet Green’s aims were much 
more overtly and purely commercial—cable, unlike broadcast television, has never been 
beholden to serving the public interest. But McCarthy’s insight about the seductive 
appeal of governing through television remains relevant.  
Although Discovery abandoned the Planet Green project when it didn’t prove 
profitable, there is a good deal of evidence that the promise of eco-governing through do-
good media continued to exert pull among industry insiders. For example, Planet Green 
won several awards throughout its existence. I mentioned the launch awards above. 
Additionally, at the 2010 News and Documentary Emmy Awards, Planet Green received 
awards for the Reel Impact series, and the documentaries The Last Beekeeper and Split 
Estate (Weiswasser 2010). Ed Begley Jr.’s Living with Ed won an Environmental Media 
Association award (Lacher 2010). The reality series, Wa$ted! won a bronze at the 2011 
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Telly Awards, and the Planet Green website won an outstanding achievement award in 
entertainment from the Interactive Media Council (Winners 2009). Further, although 
Planet Green failed, green and ‘ethical’ marketing and media show no sign of abating. 
Celebrity chefs emphasize local and organic ingredients, “green” product lines 
proliferate, “fast fashion” retail chain H&M recently introduced its “Don’t Let Fashion 
Go to Waste” recycling program, Wal-Mart publicizes its sustainability initiatives, and 
the EPA even has downloadable eco-apps for mobile devices. 
 Additionally, even as it was taking Planet Green off the air, Discovery continued 
to assure Planet Green fans that it “still cared about the environment.” When Discovery 
announced the 2012 rebranding, there was a groundswell of outrage. The Planet Green 
website tried to ease the transition with a FAQ page: “7 Common Questions about 
Changes at Planet Green.” The questions ranged from, “So, what's happening? Is Planet 
Green going away?” “Will I still get PG on my TV?” “Why is this happening? Why not 
keep Planet Green on TV?” “Does Discovery not care about the environment? Where can 
we find environmental news and information moving forward?” The answers promised 
that Discovery-owned media would “continue to be a great source for news and 
information about important environmental issues”: sites like TreeHugger.com and 
Discovery News would publish information on “environmentalism and sustainability” 
and Planet Green video content would remain available on PlanetGreen.com, Planet 
Green’s YouTube channel, and on iTunes. Discovery also took the opportunity to 
publicize its “plans to continue to invest in environmental programming and initiatives, 
such as the epic series, Frozen Planet” (Team Planet Green 2012). 
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 But even this modest promise had limits. When Planet Green was canceled, all of 
its partnerships with environmental organizations “just kind of [went] to the wayside” 
unless they had a partnership with another Discovery brand (like Animal Planet) (Howell 
2013). For a number of years after the TV network’s cancellation, Discovery did in fact 
maintain the PlanetGreen.com and the TreeHugger.com websites. However, 
PlanetGreen.com was soon subsumed into the still Discovery-owned TreeHugger.com 
site (at the address PG.TreeHugger.com) and eventually, all Planet Green web addresses 
were redirected to the Mother Nature Network77 homepage where there wasn’t a trace of 
Planet Green’s content (something I first observed on February 16, 2013). Some of the 
Planet Green website was transferred to other Discovery-controlled websites: bits of its 
science and technology content moved to the website HowStuffWorks while pieces of its 
lifestyle advice began appearing on the TLC site. But this content is far less interactive 
than the original and all of the critical content—the environmental news and open-ended 
comment forums—are gone.  
Further, Discovery’s promise to invest in “environmental programming” like 
Frozen Planet (2011) generated its own environmental controversy. The David 
Attenborough-narrated BBC series was produced as a 7-episode nature documentary, the 
last episode of which explicitly addressed the impact of climate change on the ice caps. 
When Discovery announced its plans to air the documentary, there was public outcry 
over its decision to air only the first 6 episodes (Climate change episode of Frozen Planet 
2011). In the face of this outcry, Discovery back-peddled and decided that it would air 
                                                
77 The process by which Planet Green became Mother Nature Network is pretty opaque, as far as I can tell; when I spoke with them in 
2013, former Discovery executives still thought Discovery Communications owned the web address. 
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the last episode (Associated Press 2011), but after the documentary ran, commentators 
noted that there was no mention of the causes of climate change and the discussion of the 
effects of climate change was accompanied with the morally ambiguous commentary, 
“Whether or not [the melting of the arctic ice sheet is] a good or bad thing, of course, 
depends on your point of view”; activists mounted a campaign urging Discovery 
acknowledge anthropogenic climate change (Kuipers 2012). 
 It is easy to be cynical about this kind of “self-regulated,” volunteer, privatized 
environmentalism—and Planet Green’s replacement with Destination America 
spectacularly demonstrates its limitations. On the one hand, it is only lasts as long as it 
remains profitable. On the other hand, it is an environmentalism that is shaped at every 
turn by efforts to contain it within existing the requirements of neoliberal citizenship and 
white supremacist, hetero-patriarchal capitalist assumptions about what “works” on 
television. 
 But one would be remiss to ignore the ambivalence about abandoning the green 
project among the higher-ups with whom I spoke. A will to “bring green to the masses” 
launched Planet Green in 2008. And while Planet Green itself fizzled, threads of this 
governing impulse continue to be shot through the discourse of Planet Green alums. 
Eileen O’Neill, for example, insisted on the value of Frozen Planet because viewers are 
faced with seeing “an environment that's changing, if not disappearing, in our generation” 
(Associated Press 2011). Although Discovery executives told the New York Time’s Brian 
Stelter privately that the ambiguous portrayal of climate change in Frozen Planet 
stemmed from anxiety about alienating skeptics in Discovery’s audience, O’Neill said the 
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airing Frozen Planet was about an environmental and governmental imperative: “You've 
got to get them to care,” she told Stelter (Stelter 2012).  
 Likewise, Laura Michalchyshyn who assured me, “by the way, I consider myself 
an environmentalist, an advocate for all things green,” but environmental goals, she 
explained, were always at odds with the imperatives of television business. “I’ve… been 
a programmer for 17 years on cable channels and producing content for over 17 years and 
now I’m on the independent producing side” she told be, and despite her personal 
environmentalist commitments,  
I was actually one of the biggest advocates when they transformed that channel 
[into Destination America]… It does the movement no good to have a green 
channel, a cable channel, that is not drawing advertisers or viewers, it just says 
failure failure failure, and you don’t want that in the movement… I’m a total 
supporter of what Discovery did, you know, it was a very noble and, you know, 
and incredibly brave gesture… I don’t believe television channels are meant to be 
a platform for dark green activism. I think [Planet Green] utterly get that message 
out… Green is not about watching a one-hour weekly show on TV. It is about 
some kind of mindset, you know, it is a way of living, not a television channel. 
(Michalchyshyn 2013) 
For her, strategies like Occupy Wall Street and online platforms were better suited to 
advancing the green movement. 
 While the environmentalist impulses of Planet Green decision makers could 
certainly have been sincere, and their arguments that Planet Green failed because its 
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content was boring and failed to draw viewers are probably not disingenuous, it is more 
accurate to understand Planet Green’s demise in terms the tension that structured the 
brand from its inception. Planet Green was organized around overcoming a specific 
cluster of industrial anxieties that emerged at the place where fears of unruly consumers 
met worries about environmentalism. Planet Green worked to overcome these anxieties 
through the performative and governmental operations of branding. But easing the 
tension between profits and planet saving proved beyond the capacities of even the 
strongest branding. In the end, the failure of Planet Green to garner advertiser dollars 
came together with the fact that the green brand had become irrelevant to Discovery’s 
economic growth, a meeting that spelled Planet Green’s certain demise. Planet Green’s 
unraveling over its short time on air demonstrates the limits of branding 
environmentalism in neoliberal times. 
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Conclusion: What can we learn from Planet Green? 
 
On Wednesday September 1, 2010, around 1pm Easter Standard Time, James Jae 
Lee, proprietor of the environmentalist website SaveThePlanetProtest.com and long-time 
critic of Discovery and Planet Green, gained entry to Discovery Communications Inc.’s 
Silver Spring, Maryland headquarters. According to news reports, Lee was armed with a 
handgun and explosives and he took three Discovery employees hostage. After several 
hours, the standoff ended in tragedy when Lee was shot and killed by police; the hostages 
were unharmed.  
Before entering the building, Lee had posted an urgent call to action on his 
website: “The debate about the state of the planet is done… Global Warming is a reality. 
The massive extinction of animals is happening all over the world. Now let us begin the 
debate on how to save the planet. We can’t wait anymore, something must be done 
immediately! Let’s act on it right away; let this be a new chapter in the earth's history. As 
human beings we must join together to save it” (Lee 2010). 
Lee was deeply disturbed by global warming and equally preoccupied by 
Discovery as a specific and powerful agent in whether the planet would be saved or 
destroyed. “The Discovery Channel is a big part of the problem, not the solution,” he 
wrote. “Instead of showing successful solutions, their broadcast programs seem to be 
doing the opposite.” He argued that many programs “serve as diversions to keep the 
focus off what is really important, which is Global Warming and Animal Extinction”; 
other shows “like ‘Future Weapons’… only promise to destroy the planet even more.” Of 
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Planet Green, he wrote, it “is all about more products and other substandard solutions” 
(Lee quoted in Knickerbocker 2010). 
Lee appealed directly to Discovery to solve global warming and non-human 
species extinction and made a series of demands. Some were deeply troubling from a 
social justice standpoint, such as his urgent concern with “over-population,” couched in 
an extreme version of deep ecology that he credited to Daniel Quinn’s My Ishmael. For 
example, Lee insisted that Discovery “stop encouraging the birth of any more parasitic 
human infants and the false heroics behind those actions” in shows like Kate Plus 8 and 
19 Kids and Counting. In their place, he demanded “programs encouraging human 
sterilization and infertility… All former pro-birth programs must now push in the 
direction of stopping human birth, not encouraging it” (Knickerbocker 2010). But Lee 
also demanded less disturbing (though, often, equally propagandistic) actions: that 
Discovery “Find solutions for Global Warming, Automotive pollution, International 
Trade, factory pollution, and the whole blasted human economy… Find solutions so that 
people stop … using Oil in order to REVERSE Global warming and the destruction of 
the planet!” He went on to insist that Discovery “find solutions for unemployment and 
housing” and “develop shows that would dismantle the “dangerous US world economy” 
and put a stop to war and the environmental destruction it leaves in its wake. “You’re the 
media,” he wrote, “you can reach enough people. It’s your responsibility because you 
reach so many minds!!!” Appealing directly to the power of television, he added, “The 
world needs TV shows that DEVELOP solutions to the problems that humans are 
causing… I want the new shows started by asking the public for inventive solution ideas 
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to save the planet and the remaining wildlife on it” (Lee 2010). Over the years, Lee had 
pitched a number of shows to the company, particularly competition game-docs, that he 
hoped would do these things. 
It may be tempting to disregard the Lee incident as a sad story that, while surely 
very scary for Discovery personnel, had no broader implications: Lee was likely a 
troubled and terrified man who, on a fateful afternoon in 2010, became a threat to 
Discovery and its workers and, in the end, lost his life. Such was the attitude of much of 
the mainstream press, dismissing Lee, along with his demands, as “paranoid” and 
unhinged, calling him “a man obsessed with programmes on the Discovery Channel” 
(Razaq 2010) and even quipping that Discovery should have had the cameras rolling for 
an “eco-nut doc” (Stasi 2010). His website was described as, “essentially a rambling 
screed” against the cable company (Choney 2010) and when summing up Lee’s aims in 
protesting, reporters placed the word “demands” in scare quotes (Discovery hostage 
update 2010). They also positioned Lee’s analysis as hysterical personal “beliefs,” oddly, 
often highlighting two of his least radical claims: that Discovery’s environment-themed 
shows were not working since environmental degradation and global warming were 
getting worse and that Discovery is driven more by profits than environmentalism 
(Choney 2010). Sarcastically bemoaning that the incident wouldn’t be made into 
scintillating television content, the New York Post’s Linda Staci wrote, “Too bad, because 
nearly everyone at Discovery had already been familiar with bomber James Lee, who'd 
been causing problems since the launch of Planet Green, which he thought wasn’t green 
enough!” (Stasi 2010). 
  289 
 But I think discounting the incident in this way misses something crucial that it 
can teach us about the limits of branded planet saving in neoliberal times. Painting the 
fact that Lee directed his protest at Discovery as “absurd” sits uneasily in the context of 
contemporary culture. Anyone immersed in media-saturated US neoliberal culture lives 
in a world in which individuals are regularly invited to circumvent the state by appealing 
directly to brands to solve various social and environmental problems (Ouellette and Hay 
2008, Ouellette 2012). Indeed, Planet Green made just such a proposal in its very 
realization. It enacted a whole media universe, with co-branding opportunities, that aimed 
to offer themselves as a privatized form of eco-governance that was fully geared toward 
an environmentalism that would not only add value to a range of brands—from the 
brands of advertisers and celebrities to those of Planet Green and Discovery 
themselves—but also would construct a world in which doing so would unfold 
seamlessly and profitably with no obstacles from the state, recalcitrant advertisers, or 
unruly consumers. Planet Green worked to situate brands as actors and authorities in a 
new environmentalism. It was structured by a control impulse, an investment in the 
fantasy that brands, if sufficiently expansive and detailed, could organize the everyday 
activities and environmentalist sensibilities of consumers in order to overcome the 
tensions between profits and planetary health.  
And although reporters professed incredulity at Lee’s accusation that Discovery 
could or should do more for the environment (look at Planet Green!), I argue that it is 
precisely this incredulity—especially placed alongside the simultaneous and widespread 
insistence that branded and private-sector interventions are the most effective way to 
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address social and environmental problems—that marks a rupture, not just in Planet 
Green’s environment-saving promise, but to the broader possibilities of addressing 
environmental crisis through media in the context of a radically free market.  
I argue that what the papers termed Discovery’s “hostage crisis” begs the 
question: what can television really do for the environment, anyway? As I discussed in 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation, Discovery attributed Planet Green’s failure to the 
impossibility of making environmentalism “entertaining” enough for television. With the 
enormous resources of Discovery Communications Inc. and an elaborate programming 
effort that involved multiple tacks as various branding strategies failed to draw sufficient 
sponsor dollars, there was a kind of “if Discovery can’t do it, no one can” sense at the end 
of it all. Planet Green’s former President and General Manager said that Discovery 
“utterly” proved that TV was no place for “dark green” content (Michalchyshyn 2013). 
While from my own perspective, one shaped by my own life experiences as well as my 
position as a scholar, I can certainly see how some of the programs were less-than 
entertaining. Personally, I was bored by both the cops-style eco-shows and the upscale 
green living shows, but I was entertained by the campy DIY and lifestyle programs. A 
series that was supposedly successful, Greensburg—renewed for not only a second 
season, but also a third, and highly profitable as “branded entertainment”— was, for me, 
insufferable for all its earnestness. But this is neither made Planet Green radically 
different from other networks nor are views about entertainment rooted in “objective” or 
universal truths.  
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But even if Planet Green had been able to produce a media brand that was 
“entertaining” enough to be successful in its aims of bringing advertiser-friendly content 
together with a pedagogy for green consumer citizenship, what of all the other obstacles 
to what Richard Maxwell and Toby Miller (2012) call “greening the media”? Although 
electronic media technologies are often invoked in waste-free fantasies of a paperless 
future, there are all kinds of environmental consequences, from the toxic components of 
screens that harm workers and ecosystems when extracted and processed in recycling and 
waste disposal to the enormous amounts of electricity they use, to the resources 
consumed and waste generated by film and television production. Given this, Maxwell 
and Miller insist that information and communication technologies as well as consumer 
electronics be analyzed in terms of their materiality and material effects, that media ought 
to be understood as “intimate environmental participants” (9). 
Planet Green was such an “intimate environmental participant.” The network 
itself likely had a huge carbon footprint, with its extensive, resource-intensive multi-
platform content. The brand was fully implicated in Discovery’s growth in online, digital, 
and mobile device content, acquiring popular websites and building its own in connection 
with its cable networks and populating these websites with seemingly endless news bits, 
consumer advice, interactive games and quizzes, and lots and lots of video content. In 
2009, the company bragged to its shareholders that its “online digital media properties, 
consisting of 16 U.S. brand destinations, including Discovery.com, TLC.com, 
AnimalPlanet.com as well as HowStuffWorks, TreeHugger and Petfinder, reached an 
average of more than 38 million cumulative unique monthly visitors in the first half of 
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2009” (Annual Report 2009, 11), all of which surely demand enormous energy demand 
in servers. Even creating shows around planet-saving projects consumed resources and 
generated waste, an obvious example being Tommy Lee and Ludacris’s water-conserving 
“largest group shower ever,” which one blogger pointed out, was probably attended by 
people who not only showered that morning, but would shower again following the event 
(dEstries 2008). 
Further, as part of a rapidly and aggressively globalizing media corporation whose 
only responsibility was to generate profits for its shareholders, Planet Green had a vested 
interest in a number of contemporary tendencies that Naomi Klein argues “fundamentally 
conflict” with the things that are necessary to reduce emissions and combat global 
warming: “deregulated capitalism” and, more particularly, its manifestation in corporate 
globalization, the privatization of economies, and the expanding reach of free trade 
(Klein 2014, 18). And, as we have seen, this was borne out in Planet Green: in the end, 
Discovery’s growth imperatives trumped the environmental brand, which was canceled 
when it could not longer be justified as part of a growth strategy. Environmental goals 
could not be pursued it they interfered with the company’s bottom line.  
More specifically, in the case of US cable companies, growth strategies 
themselves have materiality and, hence, environmental impact. As I discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 4, the US cable market is “saturated” and now, shrinking. Because of this, 
companies are in hot pursuit of “new” markets. Discovery worked to establish its 
television brands in markets with emerging communications infrastructure, sometimes 
participating in the building of this infrastructure, as it has done through its Discovery 
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Channel Global Education Partnership with USAID in Egypt, for example. It also worked 
to move into privatizing national systems, to which its rapidly increasing market share in 
the Asia-Pacific region as well as in a number of Latin American markets attest (Annual 
Report 2009), a project that is inseparable from a whole range of extractive industries, 
polluting manufacturing, and waste processing/disposal that expand their reach and 
increase their impact alongside globalization of capitalism. Such an analysis would 
highlight even more contradictions than the ones I have addressed in this dissertation. 
This dissertation has examined Planet Green, and perhaps even more importantly, 
Planet Green’s failure, as an ideal case study for examining the contradictions that 
emerge when environmentalism itself is branded as a market commodity. Discovery’s 
attempt to create a green brand is the most extensive such example to date. Its breadth 
makes Planet Green a rich text for investigating green branding. At the same time, 
however, the fact that decision-makers at Discovery ultimately concluded that the 
channel was not a viable brand also marks Planet Green as a “limit case” for the 
possibilities of green branding. Planet Green’s ostensible failure points to the limits of 
branding and consumer citizenship in the face of present-day ecological crises. 
Planet Green promised (to Discovery, its sponsors, and its fans) a space in which 
individuals’ environmentalist commitments and activities could, at one and the same 
time, be good for the planet and good for business. Yet in the context of the particular 
imperatives of present-day cable business in a deregulated and globalizing media 
environment, this proved untenable. The Planet Green brand’s cultivation of 
individualized consumer citizenship—realized through engagement with the Planet Green 
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brand and its sponsors—did not generate sufficient value for Discovery and this seeming 
site of environmental possibility was shut down.  
Planet Green’s failure, and the myriad contradictions that emerged during its brief 
tenure, can be instructive for environmentalists as well as scholars of brand culture. 
While its contradictions (such as advertising Chevy trucks and air fresheners during a 
program that exposed the negative environmental impact of large vehicles and 
formaldehyde, one of the four main ingredients in fresheners) might suggest hypocrisy 
and nothing more, they can also be read as fissures in brand culture that are uniquely 
opened up by environmentalism. On Planet Green’s website, such contradictions 
generated heated online conversations and coexisted with other online opportunities to 
struggle against capitalist business as usual—some intentional, such as petitions to 
legislators, and others unintentional, as when individuals used Planet Green’s comment 
boards to talk to each other as they railed against the channel itself. 
Although Planet Green took great pains to mitigate these contradictions—through 
branding, through posting, and through a departure from green content, branded 
environmentalism refused to materialize in line with a pure free market logic. But despite 
Planet Green’s failure, this kind of environmental branding should nonetheless trouble 
environmentalists for it circumscribes environmental authority within the bounds of 
profit-maximization in ways that allow the biggest brands to have the loudest voices and 
leave no room for concerns—from social justice to species extinction—that brand-
owning organizations/individuals do not perceived to add value to their brands. 
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